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This whole narrative just seems like fear mongering to me. For starters, there’s no evidence that military personnel would follow even a lawful order to launch

This whole narrative just seems like fear mongering to me. For starters, there’s no evidence that military personnel would follow even a lawful order to launch nuclear weapons, especially if there was no evidence of an existential crisis taking place. The only example I can think of in history is the Soviet submarine that was given orders to launch nukes, if it was engaged by the US, during the Cuban middle crisis. Well it was engaged by the US, and the officers onboard refused to use them. The president doesn’t have a button that launches nukes, and I can’t see anybody following an order to, in absence of the US being overrun or hit with a nuke first. Secondly, I can’t see it ever being a good tactical decision. The highest yield conventional bombs are on-par with the lowest yield nukes. If you want to launch a single massively destructive device, there’s already better options. If you want to target an underground facility, then weapons designed to target underground facilities are going to do a better job than just scaling up the yield anyhow. If you’re just looking for a massive effect on target, then a barrage of smaller weapons is going to do a better jobs of that anyway, and do so more reliably. Finally, even if you find the perfect tactical use case, it could never make sense strategically. Using a nuke of any size will provoke the maximum response from any potential adversary, regardless of whether they have any stake in the conflict to begin with, and will deter any hope of support from our allies. This is plainly obvious to anybody. All of this is nothing more than an implausible and baseless “what if”.

vkou 7y ago
> For starters, there’s no evidence that military personnel would follow even a lawful order to launch nuclear weapons, especially if there was no evidence of an existential crisis taking place. The whole point of the military is that you have no idea whether or not the order you are given is a good, or just idea, and it's not your job to make that decision. You carry the order out. People who get into ethical quagmires while holding their finger on the trigger of an end-of-the-world weapon don't get posted in Minutemen nuclear bunkers. Also, the beauty of MAD is that even if 90% of your silos refuse to carry out the order, 10% will - and then the other side will retaliate, and because most of your silos did not launch, their retaliatory strike will be far more destructive. So if you're the guy who didn't launch the missiles, when given the order, you're the bad guy, who let millions of his countrymen die - because your missiles, which you refused to launch could have destroyed enemy launch sites. Since someone on your team will launch (Thus starting a war), upon receiving on order, if you want to minimize casualties on your side, you have to launch as well. All in all, it's complete lunacy to give two men the power to end the world.
- AmericanChopper 7y ago
  > The whole point of the military is that you have no idea whether or not the order you are given is a good, or just idea, and it's not your job to make that decision. You carry the order out. This simply isn’t true. Silo staff will know if the US is suffering a massive ground invasion or ICBM bombardment, and will have a very clear idea of whether launching nukes is reasonable. Even given your maximum implausibility example of all silos ordered to launch all nukes, to get even one launched a number of people in the chain of command need to be convinced that risking the destruction of human civilization is justified, knowing full well that no order will protect them from war crimes or crimes against humanity charges. The only post WWII example in history (I’m pretty sure it’s only happened once) of an order being given to launch a nuke was refused by the officer in charge. You haven’t added any basis to support this “what if” speculation. Your scenario also ignores the fact that there are other better (and better readied) tactical options. There is no scenario where the US will be tactically dependant on using a nuke to destroy a site, so your “if I don’t launch the nuke Americans will die” scenario is perhaps the least plausible part of your comment.
  - dsfyu404ed 7y ago
    >Even given your maximum implausibility example of all silos ordered to launch all nukes, to get even one launched a number of people in the chain of command need to be convinced that risking the destruction of human civilization is justified. IIRC there was even one such incident where a nuclear unit got some sent some routine training codes that turned out to be the codes for "launch against China" codes. They basically called back and asked to triple check the code and eventually it all got sorted out without any nukes being launched.
    - vkou 7y ago
      That was because erroneous codes were sent to one silo. What happens when the correct codes are sent to all the silos? So, you get on the phone, and call someone at HQ, to confirm the orders. And they confirm that the orders are, indeed, correct. Command sent them down 5 minutes ago, and yes, we confirmed it. What are you going to do? If your answer is 'Not launch', you are not silo material, and have probably been weeded out long before you got to the point where you can ask this question.
cryptonector 7y ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov_(vice_admiral) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov_(vice_admiral)
notahacker 7y ago
'What if' scenarios were the rationale for building nuclear arsenals in the first place. The Soviet submarine example is an interesting 'what if' because the same Soviet rules of engagement that entitled the crew to decide to launch tactical nuclear weapons against potential threats required unanimous approval from all senior officers, and only one of the three argued against a launch. We're obviously talking about relatively small tactical nuclear torpedos against a naval fleet rather than wiping out cities here, but I'm not sure that example of one in three opposing a nuclear response supports the narrative that we won't find any people willing to fire low yield nuclear weapons against [notional] military targets in the event of a presidential order against a recognised hostile power, even if there are others in the military who would try to stop it.
- AmericanChopper 7y ago
  The only scenarios where using a low yield nuke make sense are the deliberate and calculated scenarios (with the Soviet example again being unique is the sense that the submarine had no contact with outside command, and with the submarine being the only option for using a tactical nuke should the rules of engagement warrant it). As there are always superior tactical options to a low yield nuke, and it will always be a incredibly terrible strategic option, there is essentially no basis for speculating this will ever happen, outside of having a nuclear war already taking place. Even in such a scenario, it’s hard to imagine how low yield devices fit into a MAD strategy. The MOAB has an equivalent yield to some tactical nukes, it’s only been used once, and was arguably chosen as a show of force (and in a very particular scenario where collateral damage was minimized). A strategy that makes no sense with a nuke. There’s clearly no basis for thinking anybody is likely to want to use one, and the hypothetical examples of where use would be most plausible are frankly still very, very implausible.
  - notahacker 7y ago
    I agree entirely that the strategic benefits of using a low yield nuclear weapon are dubious at best. Then again, that didn't stop them being manufactured, hasn't stopped other military actions dubious strategic benefit have been carried out or advocated by senior military personnel, and you yourself cited the example where the only thing stopping a low yield nuclear attack during a moment of incredible geopolitical tension was that their particular rules of engagement allowed an officer to veto what the other two wanted.
beerandt 7y ago
>then weapons designed to target underground facilities This is the most likely scenario for tactical nuclear to happen in the current state of things, especially given Iran's facilities. Not saying likely, just most likely. I don't know if it's a technical limit, or just what happens to be currently available, but: >the GBU-28 used its large mass (2,130 kg or 4,700 lb) and casing (constructed from barrels of surplus 203 mm howitzers) to penetrate 6 meters (20 feet) of concrete, and more than 30 metres (98 feet) of earth.[11] The B61 Mod 11, which first entered military service after the Cold war had ended, in January 1997, was specifically developed to allow for bunker penetration, and is speculated to have the ability to destroy hardened targets a few hundred feet beneath the earth. I assume we could design a non-nuclear to penetrate to comparable depths as the nuclear, but the nuclear will always have the yield advantage, and therefore greater effective depth. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_bunker_buster https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_bunker_buster

vkou 7y ago

> For starters, there’s no evidence that military personnel would follow even a lawful order to launch nuclear weapons, especially if there was no evidence of an existential crisis taking place. The whole point of the military is that you have no idea whether or not the order you are given is a good, or just idea, and it's not your job to make that decision. You carry the order out. People who get into ethical quagmires while holding their finger on the trigger of an end-of-the-world weapon don't get posted in Minutemen nuclear bunkers. Also, the beauty of MAD is that even if 90% of your silos refuse to carry out the order, 10% will - and then the other side will retaliate, and because most of your silos did not launch, their retaliatory strike will be far more destructive. So if you're the guy who didn't launch the missiles, when given the order, you're the bad guy, who let millions of his countrymen die - because your missiles, which you refused to launch could have destroyed enemy launch sites. Since someone on your team will launch (Thus starting a war), upon receiving on order, if you want to minimize casualties on your side, you have to launch as well. All in all, it's complete lunacy to give two men the power to end the world.

AmericanChopper 7y ago
> The whole point of the military is that you have no idea whether or not the order you are given is a good, or just idea, and it's not your job to make that decision. You carry the order out. This simply isn’t true. Silo staff will know if the US is suffering a massive ground invasion or ICBM bombardment, and will have a very clear idea of whether launching nukes is reasonable. Even given your maximum implausibility example of all silos ordered to launch all nukes, to get even one launched a number of people in the chain of command need to be convinced that risking the destruction of human civilization is justified, knowing full well that no order will protect them from war crimes or crimes against humanity charges. The only post WWII example in history (I’m pretty sure it’s only happened once) of an order being given to launch a nuke was refused by the officer in charge. You haven’t added any basis to support this “what if” speculation. Your scenario also ignores the fact that there are other better (and better readied) tactical options. There is no scenario where the US will be tactically dependant on using a nuke to destroy a site, so your “if I don’t launch the nuke Americans will die” scenario is perhaps the least plausible part of your comment.
- dsfyu404ed 7y ago
  >Even given your maximum implausibility example of all silos ordered to launch all nukes, to get even one launched a number of people in the chain of command need to be convinced that risking the destruction of human civilization is justified. IIRC there was even one such incident where a nuclear unit got some sent some routine training codes that turned out to be the codes for "launch against China" codes. They basically called back and asked to triple check the code and eventually it all got sorted out without any nukes being launched.
  - vkou 7y ago
    That was because erroneous codes were sent to one silo. What happens when the correct codes are sent to all the silos? So, you get on the phone, and call someone at HQ, to confirm the orders. And they confirm that the orders are, indeed, correct. Command sent them down 5 minutes ago, and yes, we confirmed it. What are you going to do? If your answer is 'Not launch', you are not silo material, and have probably been weeded out long before you got to the point where you can ask this question.

cryptonector 7y ago

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov_(vice_admiral) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov_(vice_admiral)

notahacker 7y ago

'What if' scenarios were the rationale for building nuclear arsenals in the first place. The Soviet submarine example is an interesting 'what if' because the same Soviet rules of engagement that entitled the crew to decide to launch tactical nuclear weapons against potential threats required unanimous approval from all senior officers, and only one of the three argued against a launch. We're obviously talking about relatively small tactical nuclear torpedos against a naval fleet rather than wiping out cities here, but I'm not sure that example of one in three opposing a nuclear response supports the narrative that we won't find any people willing to fire low yield nuclear weapons against [notional] military targets in the event of a presidential order against a recognised hostile power, even if there are others in the military who would try to stop it.

AmericanChopper 7y ago
The only scenarios where using a low yield nuke make sense are the deliberate and calculated scenarios (with the Soviet example again being unique is the sense that the submarine had no contact with outside command, and with the submarine being the only option for using a tactical nuke should the rules of engagement warrant it). As there are always superior tactical options to a low yield nuke, and it will always be a incredibly terrible strategic option, there is essentially no basis for speculating this will ever happen, outside of having a nuclear war already taking place. Even in such a scenario, it’s hard to imagine how low yield devices fit into a MAD strategy. The MOAB has an equivalent yield to some tactical nukes, it’s only been used once, and was arguably chosen as a show of force (and in a very particular scenario where collateral damage was minimized). A strategy that makes no sense with a nuke. There’s clearly no basis for thinking anybody is likely to want to use one, and the hypothetical examples of where use would be most plausible are frankly still very, very implausible.
- notahacker 7y ago
  I agree entirely that the strategic benefits of using a low yield nuclear weapon are dubious at best. Then again, that didn't stop them being manufactured, hasn't stopped other military actions dubious strategic benefit have been carried out or advocated by senior military personnel, and you yourself cited the example where the only thing stopping a low yield nuclear attack during a moment of incredible geopolitical tension was that their particular rules of engagement allowed an officer to veto what the other two wanted.

beerandt 7y ago

>then weapons designed to target underground facilities This is the most likely scenario for tactical nuclear to happen in the current state of things, especially given Iran's facilities. Not saying likely, just most likely. I don't know if it's a technical limit, or just what happens to be currently available, but: >the GBU-28 used its large mass (2,130 kg or 4,700 lb) and casing (constructed from barrels of surplus 203 mm howitzers) to penetrate 6 meters (20 feet) of concrete, and more than 30 metres (98 feet) of earth.[11] The B61 Mod 11, which first entered military service after the Cold war had ended, in January 1997, was specifically developed to allow for bunker penetration, and is speculated to have the ability to destroy hardened targets a few hundred feet beneath the earth. I assume we could design a non-nuclear to penetrate to comparable depths as the nuclear, but the nuclear will always have the yield advantage, and therefore greater effective depth. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_bunker_buster https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_bunker_buster