> He cited a case in which it took more than a year from the arrest of a suspect in a child exploitation case to obtaining data from his device. They're starti

> He cited a case in which it took more than a year from the arrest of a suspect in a child exploitation case to obtaining data from his device. They're starting out with the "think of the children" argument. Which means you know from the outset they are likely not being genuine in their pursuit of this. > "...enact legislation to ensure lawful access for law enforcement, consistent with the traditional protections of privacy, to digital evidence of crime." They can make the legislation all they want. The traditional protections of privacy cannot apply to the digital evidence of crime. The digital playing field is far more level than the physical playing field. In the physical world, a lock acts as a deterrent, but not much more. In the digital world, a lock doesn't generally act as a deterrent. You just throw more computing power at it until it breaks, or you find a simpler way to make it break. If you know a lock is vulnerable, because it has legislated to be, you have every incentive and no deterrent to find the weakness in that lock. In the physical world, agents of another country are generally not a relevant concern. In the digital world, any multinational platform has to be aware of multinational efforts to control discourse, including hacking of important and/or old accounts. The digital world is much more akin to a group of embassies located side-by-side each other than the average person's home.