8 ms·

What difference does it make when the actual hardware is still flawed? I still refuse to fly in 737 MAX and its variants. Boeing can convince AA and Southwest p

What difference does it make when the actual hardware is still flawed? I still refuse to fly in 737 MAX and its variants. Boeing can convince AA and Southwest pilots to give them vote of confidence but consumers are not stupid.

pageandrew 7y ago
If pilots and pilot unions are satisfied with the results, I'm satisfied with the results. There's no-one more safety conscious in the aviation industry than pilots, since they're responsible for the souls on board their aircraft, including their own.
- r00fus 7y ago
  They should be forced to add the 3-sensor config on the plane and have that supported by the MCAS for all planes. A single sensor failing and causing unlimited automatic shifts in pitch is a nightmare I will not fly on.
  - qaq 7y ago
    It's no longer unlimited
    - hetspookjee 7y ago
      Well, that's a relief.
      - platz 7y ago
        So if that software fix relieves you, wouldnt you have to admit that it was the software the was the most direct reason for the crashes? HN folks here seem hesitant to say this. But without the dumb ability to do repeated activations it would've been a much less severe problem.
        hu3 7y ago
        The software did exactly what it was told to do. The error was in the specification.
        platz 7y ago
        Hah, wow
        thombat 7y ago
        Let's suppose that the entire control logic for MCAS was now re-implemented with vacuum tubes. Would you now argue that the aircraft crashes indicate a hardware problem? Or would you agree that the real problem is in the system design, since any conforming implementation of it will produce the jeopardy?
        platz 7y ago
        If it was implemented with vacuum tubes, that would indicate a hardware problem as well as a system design problem. So in this situation, the claim is that braindead contractors mechanically implemented something to spec by force of law? Sure, then whoever designed the logic is accountable. In 99.9% other environments, the distinction is collapsed because the implementor typically has responsibility to design sub-component level logic correctly, to high-level requirements, but also to overall business need and in service to even higher level project goals, and the team that designed the logic is also implemented by the same team.
        bdavis__ 7y ago
        nope, all of the vacum tubes would be working as designed. not a hardware problem, a system design problem. thus the invention of a discipline called 'systems engineering'.. i would say in 100% of engineering development, the design is done as a system, and specific requirements are allocated to design elements (like MCAS software). Each of these elements is tested against the requirements. aeronautical engineering is a very specific skill. so is aircraft controls. so is airworthiness. a software engineer is an expert in software, not these other disciplines.
    - comex 7y ago
      And it’s now 2-sensor.
  - cameldrv 7y ago
    The fix means MCAS doesn't activate unless two sensors roughly agree, and it only activates once, which means that the plane is still controllable with just the yoke after MCAS activation. MCAS will also deactivate if the yoke is pulled back (questionable IMO, since it is supposed to compensate for mishandling), and you can leave the electric trim on and undo what MCAS did without fear of it activating again. IMO the risk of a mistaken activation that leads to an accident is extremely remote with these changes.
    - peteradio 7y ago
      I thought the MCAS would typically be activated while the pilot would already be pulling pack on the yoke. So I'm a little confused under what circumstances MCAS would ever activate. Does it activate while yoke is pulled back but the pilot can additionally yank harder to deactivate?
      - cameldrv 7y ago
        Yes, it typically would. There's something called an aft column cutout switch which deactivates nose down trim if you're pulling back on the yoke with a certain amount of force. They're proposing to use this switch to deactivate MCAS. I'm unsure how much force it takes to activate this switch, but it seems to me that this makes MCAS less useful for its intended purpose, and that's why I said this decision was questionable.
  - phire 7y ago
    The new software has been updated to use both sensors. It won't activate when sensors disagree by more than 5.5 degrees. The new software now only does a single stabilizer movement. They have eliminated all known failure conditions which might cause multiple movements. With only a single movement, the pilots will be able to counteract the force. Two sensors is not quite as good as three sensors. It can't know which sensor is bad. But it can disable itself and prevent unintended activations. The new software, when combined with adequate pilot simulator training to both disable MCAS when it encounters an issue, and to fly the plane in with MCAS disabled makes things safe enough.
    - vkou 7y ago
      So, this fixes the MCAS problem (Where the plane plunges nose-first into the ground, despite the best attempt by the pilots to pull the stick up)... But how does this fix the problem that MCAS was supposed to be a band-aid over (That the plane is aerodynamically unstable during take-off, and pulling too much on the stick will cause the plane to easily stall)..? The new MCAS sounds like it will only protect against this instability once - and, if overriden, will not do anything to protect against a stall?
      - tzs 7y ago
        > But how does this fix the problem that MCAS was supposed to be a band-aid over (That the plane is aerodynamically unstable during take-off, and pulling too much on the stick will cause the plane to easily stall)..? MCAS is not even enabled during take-off, which makes it hard to see how it could be meant to address supposed stability problems during take-off. It can't come on until the flaps are retracted.
      - sokoloff 7y ago
        The 737-Max is not “aerodynamically unstable”. (It does not exhibit negative longitudinal stability.)
      - phire 7y ago
        I mean, that's true of every plane. You pull back too much, it will stall. It's not that the MAX stalls super easily, It's not an instability. It's just that the controls feel wrong when approaching stall. The FAA have pretty precise regulations about how much backpressure the pilots should feel when approaching stall. In normal flight, the plane is never anywhere near stalling, so MCAS never activates. Nor do the pilots encounter this weird stall. The combined chances of both MCAS being disabled AND the pilot not recognizing the stall is pretty low. But this is why the simulator training is important, so the pilots are familiar with the new feel as the plane approaches stall.
  - o-__-o 7y ago
    couldn't make it 3 sensor that would change the certification (obviously they can now) but I wonder what this means for Southwest Air. The whole reason the MAX exists is because of Southwest. If southwest didn't throw their weight around and loudly announce they were considering Airbus, the MAX would likely exist in a non-737 configuration right now.
    - r00fus 7y ago
      > If southwest didn't throw their weight around So wait, it's a customer's fault that the supplier cheated the regulations?
      - redis_mlc 7y ago
        Yes, Boeing agreed to pay Southwest $1 million per airplane if retraining was required.
        o-__-o 7y ago
        And now retraining is required and we still have the MAX abomination. It’s not a bad plane, I’d happily fly on it again.. it’s just a dumb fuselage for modernizing a fleet
- mrtksn 7y ago
  Their jobs are on the line too which complicates things. I don't recall many pilots expressing distrust towards Boineng and FAA, the narrative always was "Don't worry, the issue is handled by professionals, these planes are safe". The planes turned out not to be safe.
  - pfundstein 7y ago
    The pilots weren't aware of the issue, or how to disable MCAS.
    - mrtksn 7y ago
      So their claims of safety were not well informed? I think the problem is that they trust a system that got corrupted or never was that robust in the first place. Seeing how this thing unfolded, I don't really believe that people making claims are in good authority to make those claims.
      - netsharc 7y ago
        Well, now that it's all blown up, the pilots should know not to trust the system, and challenge it. And I would delegate my skepticism to them and trust their judgement. Because if the plane crashes, it's not just their occupation in the line, it's their lives.
        mrtksn 7y ago
        Any information about the inspections and studies conducted by those pilots who make the claims? They probably "should" learnt a thing or two from this but did they?
        frenchyatwork 7y ago
        > Well, now that it's all blown up, the pilots should know not to trust the system, and challenge it. That they should in no way proves that they do. Computer programmers build all sorts of foot-guns with the idea that they'll be clever enough to avoid them in the future. I expect pilots are a little more humble and self-aware than that, but they're still human.
- freepor 7y ago
  But pilots are subject to Dunning Kruger. Most probably think they could figure out how to handle MCAS and give the OK but in reality it might be over optimistic.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
stefan_ 7y ago
Consumers are not stupid? Most of them (are) drive(n) to the airport in cars. That is the most dangerous part of the whole journey.
- FartyMcFarter 7y ago
  It is still stupid to get into a plane that is vastly less safe than others for no good reason.
  - alkonaut 7y ago
    The reason is usually that it’s several hundred dollars more expensive to take the second cheapest flight. Or requires a stopover. And if you aren’t aware of what plane is operating your flight then you risk having to cancel very late and re-book a likely much more expensive ticket.
    - DuskStar 7y ago
      > And if you aren’t aware of what plane is operating your flight then you risk having to cancel very late and re-book a likely much more expensive ticket. I always try to select my seats at time of booking, which requires knowing the model+revision of the plane. Is that weird?
      - gav 7y ago
        There’s no guarantee that the model of plane that you’ve booked on is the one that’s at the gate. There’s been plenty of times my plane has been changed out at the last minute due to weather or mechanical issues.
      - alkonaut 7y ago
        Not at all. But that’s based on a (good) guess about what plane will eventually be scheduled for the flight. Especially if it’s far in advance it’s more likely to change. Also, because it’s likely to change, carriers that use both 737-800 and 737-MAX8 (A lot of them if not most of them) likely use similar seat layouts for both, so last minute plane switches aren’t a problem even if everyone has a seat booked. So they could swap a 737-800 for a 737-MAX8 last second and you’d only know when you board it and spot the split winglets.
tus88 7y ago
Isn't the MAX still grounded?
- rst 7y ago
  It is. The news is that Boeing has conceded that retraining pilots will be required to get it flying again.
alkonaut 7y ago
If the hardware is fixed (redundant sensors where necessary etc., but obviously not “smaller engines”) and the software is fixed, and training is fixed so pilots can handle the situations that can occur, and authorities believe the plane is safe - then I believe the plane is safe. It’s at least then safe enough that I wouldn’t pay hundreds of dollars to avoid it. Would I prefer an A320neo departing from the next gate at the same price? Sure.
- SilasX 7y ago
  > and authorities believe the plane is safe After the FAA let themselves get hoodwinked by Boeing, this means a lot less than it used to, and it will take time to restore a reputation for being a legit independent check.
  - nolok 7y ago
    Just wait until the European agency certify it. They got the right to certify it themselves (before that they were grandfathered in the "accept FAA certification as is for Boeing plane" deal), and they're taking it seriously. Also even the FAA seems to finally have realized how close they were to losing their world status, so they act all serious about it.
    - alkonaut 7y ago
      Yeah I think this is one of those cases where both manufacturers and authorities knows there will be extreme scrutiny and no room for error.
- freepor 7y ago
  I’ll let you be the guy on the plane wondering why he made the choices he did as the ground zooms in. I’ll fly a different plane or not fly.
  - pnw_hazor 7y ago
    Also, since this catastrophe happened because of systemic bad engineering practices how many of the other upgraded systems or software in Boeing airplanes should we trust? Also of note, the US Air Force has been refusing delivery of the air tankers Boeing is building because of manufacturing sloppiness. Bad engineering and poor quality manufacturing seems to be a hallmark of Boeing these days.
wyldfire 7y ago
> What difference does it make when the actual hardware is still flawed? Pilots often know a great deal about the general design qualities of the planes they fly. Defective parts happen, parts wear down, sensors break, etc. When a sensor or mechanism breaks, pilots recognize the symptom and override the feature that uses the broken part. 737 MAX tries to bolt the big engine on the little plane (old design), with minimal changes. This plane may not be necessarily defective on its own, the MCAS was created to compensate. But it will activate incorrectly with a defective sensor. MCAS was designed not be overridable (or optionally so, if you shell out for it?). Why not put in an override? Because Southwest offered Boeing a financial incentive bonus if they provided 737 MAX with minimal/no new training requirement. If the plane has a new indicator light and a new switch to override a feature, you have to train pilots on how and when to do so. Instead, Boeing decided to "just" rely on MCAS. > Boeing can convince AA and Southwest pilots to give them vote of confidence Pilots have the most to lose, their trust should be valuable.

pageandrew 7y ago

If pilots and pilot unions are satisfied with the results, I'm satisfied with the results. There's no-one more safety conscious in the aviation industry than pilots, since they're responsible for the souls on board their aircraft, including their own.

r00fus 7y ago
They should be forced to add the 3-sensor config on the plane and have that supported by the MCAS for all planes. A single sensor failing and causing unlimited automatic shifts in pitch is a nightmare I will not fly on.
- qaq 7y ago
  It's no longer unlimited
  - hetspookjee 7y ago
    Well, that's a relief.
    - platz 7y ago
      So if that software fix relieves you, wouldnt you have to admit that it was the software the was the most direct reason for the crashes? HN folks here seem hesitant to say this. But without the dumb ability to do repeated activations it would've been a much less severe problem.
      - hu3 7y ago
        The software did exactly what it was told to do. The error was in the specification.
        platz 7y ago
        Hah, wow
        thombat 7y ago
        Let's suppose that the entire control logic for MCAS was now re-implemented with vacuum tubes. Would you now argue that the aircraft crashes indicate a hardware problem? Or would you agree that the real problem is in the system design, since any conforming implementation of it will produce the jeopardy?
        platz 7y ago
        If it was implemented with vacuum tubes, that would indicate a hardware problem as well as a system design problem. So in this situation, the claim is that braindead contractors mechanically implemented something to spec by force of law? Sure, then whoever designed the logic is accountable. In 99.9% other environments, the distinction is collapsed because the implementor typically has responsibility to design sub-component level logic correctly, to high-level requirements, but also to overall business need and in service to even higher level project goals, and the team that designed the logic is also implemented by the same team.
        bdavis__ 7y ago
        nope, all of the vacum tubes would be working as designed. not a hardware problem, a system design problem. thus the invention of a discipline called 'systems engineering'.. i would say in 100% of engineering development, the design is done as a system, and specific requirements are allocated to design elements (like MCAS software). Each of these elements is tested against the requirements. aeronautical engineering is a very specific skill. so is aircraft controls. so is airworthiness. a software engineer is an expert in software, not these other disciplines.
  - comex 7y ago
    And it’s now 2-sensor.
- cameldrv 7y ago
  The fix means MCAS doesn't activate unless two sensors roughly agree, and it only activates once, which means that the plane is still controllable with just the yoke after MCAS activation. MCAS will also deactivate if the yoke is pulled back (questionable IMO, since it is supposed to compensate for mishandling), and you can leave the electric trim on and undo what MCAS did without fear of it activating again. IMO the risk of a mistaken activation that leads to an accident is extremely remote with these changes.
  - peteradio 7y ago
    I thought the MCAS would typically be activated while the pilot would already be pulling pack on the yoke. So I'm a little confused under what circumstances MCAS would ever activate. Does it activate while yoke is pulled back but the pilot can additionally yank harder to deactivate?
    - cameldrv 7y ago
      Yes, it typically would. There's something called an aft column cutout switch which deactivates nose down trim if you're pulling back on the yoke with a certain amount of force. They're proposing to use this switch to deactivate MCAS. I'm unsure how much force it takes to activate this switch, but it seems to me that this makes MCAS less useful for its intended purpose, and that's why I said this decision was questionable.
- phire 7y ago
  The new software has been updated to use both sensors. It won't activate when sensors disagree by more than 5.5 degrees. The new software now only does a single stabilizer movement. They have eliminated all known failure conditions which might cause multiple movements. With only a single movement, the pilots will be able to counteract the force. Two sensors is not quite as good as three sensors. It can't know which sensor is bad. But it can disable itself and prevent unintended activations. The new software, when combined with adequate pilot simulator training to both disable MCAS when it encounters an issue, and to fly the plane in with MCAS disabled makes things safe enough.
  - vkou 7y ago
    So, this fixes the MCAS problem (Where the plane plunges nose-first into the ground, despite the best attempt by the pilots to pull the stick up)... But how does this fix the problem that MCAS was supposed to be a band-aid over (That the plane is aerodynamically unstable during take-off, and pulling too much on the stick will cause the plane to easily stall)..? The new MCAS sounds like it will only protect against this instability once - and, if overriden, will not do anything to protect against a stall?
    - tzs 7y ago
      > But how does this fix the problem that MCAS was supposed to be a band-aid over (That the plane is aerodynamically unstable during take-off, and pulling too much on the stick will cause the plane to easily stall)..? MCAS is not even enabled during take-off, which makes it hard to see how it could be meant to address supposed stability problems during take-off. It can't come on until the flaps are retracted.
    - sokoloff 7y ago
      The 737-Max is not “aerodynamically unstable”. (It does not exhibit negative longitudinal stability.)
    - phire 7y ago
      I mean, that's true of every plane. You pull back too much, it will stall. It's not that the MAX stalls super easily, It's not an instability. It's just that the controls feel wrong when approaching stall. The FAA have pretty precise regulations about how much backpressure the pilots should feel when approaching stall. In normal flight, the plane is never anywhere near stalling, so MCAS never activates. Nor do the pilots encounter this weird stall. The combined chances of both MCAS being disabled AND the pilot not recognizing the stall is pretty low. But this is why the simulator training is important, so the pilots are familiar with the new feel as the plane approaches stall.
- o-__-o 7y ago
  couldn't make it 3 sensor that would change the certification (obviously they can now) but I wonder what this means for Southwest Air. The whole reason the MAX exists is because of Southwest. If southwest didn't throw their weight around and loudly announce they were considering Airbus, the MAX would likely exist in a non-737 configuration right now.
  - r00fus 7y ago
    > If southwest didn't throw their weight around So wait, it's a customer's fault that the supplier cheated the regulations?
    - redis_mlc 7y ago
      Yes, Boeing agreed to pay Southwest $1 million per airplane if retraining was required.
      - o-__-o 7y ago
        And now retraining is required and we still have the MAX abomination. It’s not a bad plane, I’d happily fly on it again.. it’s just a dumb fuselage for modernizing a fleet
mrtksn 7y ago
Their jobs are on the line too which complicates things. I don't recall many pilots expressing distrust towards Boineng and FAA, the narrative always was "Don't worry, the issue is handled by professionals, these planes are safe". The planes turned out not to be safe.
- pfundstein 7y ago
  The pilots weren't aware of the issue, or how to disable MCAS.
  - mrtksn 7y ago
    So their claims of safety were not well informed? I think the problem is that they trust a system that got corrupted or never was that robust in the first place. Seeing how this thing unfolded, I don't really believe that people making claims are in good authority to make those claims.
    - netsharc 7y ago
      Well, now that it's all blown up, the pilots should know not to trust the system, and challenge it. And I would delegate my skepticism to them and trust their judgement. Because if the plane crashes, it's not just their occupation in the line, it's their lives.
      - mrtksn 7y ago
        Any information about the inspections and studies conducted by those pilots who make the claims? They probably "should" learnt a thing or two from this but did they?
      - frenchyatwork 7y ago
        > Well, now that it's all blown up, the pilots should know not to trust the system, and challenge it. That they should in no way proves that they do. Computer programmers build all sorts of foot-guns with the idea that they'll be clever enough to avoid them in the future. I expect pilots are a little more humble and self-aware than that, but they're still human.
freepor 7y ago
But pilots are subject to Dunning Kruger. Most probably think they could figure out how to handle MCAS and give the OK but in reality it might be over optimistic.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]

stefan_ 7y ago

Consumers are not stupid? Most of them (are) drive(n) to the airport in cars. That is the most dangerous part of the whole journey.

FartyMcFarter 7y ago
It is still stupid to get into a plane that is vastly less safe than others for no good reason.
- alkonaut 7y ago
  The reason is usually that it’s several hundred dollars more expensive to take the second cheapest flight. Or requires a stopover. And if you aren’t aware of what plane is operating your flight then you risk having to cancel very late and re-book a likely much more expensive ticket.
  - DuskStar 7y ago
    > And if you aren’t aware of what plane is operating your flight then you risk having to cancel very late and re-book a likely much more expensive ticket. I always try to select my seats at time of booking, which requires knowing the model+revision of the plane. Is that weird?
    - gav 7y ago
      There’s no guarantee that the model of plane that you’ve booked on is the one that’s at the gate. There’s been plenty of times my plane has been changed out at the last minute due to weather or mechanical issues.
    - alkonaut 7y ago
      Not at all. But that’s based on a (good) guess about what plane will eventually be scheduled for the flight. Especially if it’s far in advance it’s more likely to change. Also, because it’s likely to change, carriers that use both 737-800 and 737-MAX8 (A lot of them if not most of them) likely use similar seat layouts for both, so last minute plane switches aren’t a problem even if everyone has a seat booked. So they could swap a 737-800 for a 737-MAX8 last second and you’d only know when you board it and spot the split winglets.

tus88 7y ago

Isn't the MAX still grounded?

rst 7y ago
It is. The news is that Boeing has conceded that retraining pilots will be required to get it flying again.

alkonaut 7y ago

If the hardware is fixed (redundant sensors where necessary etc., but obviously not “smaller engines”) and the software is fixed, and training is fixed so pilots can handle the situations that can occur, and authorities believe the plane is safe - then I believe the plane is safe. It’s at least then safe enough that I wouldn’t pay hundreds of dollars to avoid it. Would I prefer an A320neo departing from the next gate at the same price? Sure.

SilasX 7y ago
> and authorities believe the plane is safe After the FAA let themselves get hoodwinked by Boeing, this means a lot less than it used to, and it will take time to restore a reputation for being a legit independent check.
- nolok 7y ago
  Just wait until the European agency certify it. They got the right to certify it themselves (before that they were grandfathered in the "accept FAA certification as is for Boeing plane" deal), and they're taking it seriously. Also even the FAA seems to finally have realized how close they were to losing their world status, so they act all serious about it.
  - alkonaut 7y ago
    Yeah I think this is one of those cases where both manufacturers and authorities knows there will be extreme scrutiny and no room for error.
freepor 7y ago
I’ll let you be the guy on the plane wondering why he made the choices he did as the ground zooms in. I’ll fly a different plane or not fly.
- pnw_hazor 7y ago
  Also, since this catastrophe happened because of systemic bad engineering practices how many of the other upgraded systems or software in Boeing airplanes should we trust? Also of note, the US Air Force has been refusing delivery of the air tankers Boeing is building because of manufacturing sloppiness. Bad engineering and poor quality manufacturing seems to be a hallmark of Boeing these days.

wyldfire 7y ago

> What difference does it make when the actual hardware is still flawed? Pilots often know a great deal about the general design qualities of the planes they fly. Defective parts happen, parts wear down, sensors break, etc. When a sensor or mechanism breaks, pilots recognize the symptom and override the feature that uses the broken part. 737 MAX tries to bolt the big engine on the little plane (old design), with minimal changes. This plane may not be necessarily defective on its own, the MCAS was created to compensate. But it will activate incorrectly with a defective sensor. MCAS was designed not be overridable (or optionally so, if you shell out for it?). Why not put in an override? Because Southwest offered Boeing a financial incentive bonus if they provided 737 MAX with minimal/no new training requirement. If the plane has a new indicator light and a new switch to override a feature, you have to train pilots on how and when to do so. Instead, Boeing decided to "just" rely on MCAS. > Boeing can convince AA and Southwest pilots to give them vote of confidence Pilots have the most to lose, their trust should be valuable.