4 ms·
> Hard to justify going to the trouble of encrypting your backup. 10 years from now, it might be as good as plain text. When has that happened? Public key cryp
by baddox 7y ago
> Hard to justify going to the trouble of encrypting your backup. 10 years from now, it might be as good as plain text.
When has that happened? Public key cryptography and symmetric key cryptography are still doing fine as far as I'm aware, and the latter doesn't even seem to be vulnerable to quantum computing.
Moreover, SHA-1 has been considered insecure for, what, at least 10 years? The fact that a cryptographic hash function has been widely considered insecure and widely recommended for deprecation a decade before a proof of concept even emerges is, to me, something to feel very good about.
- rakoo 7y ago"Public/symmetric key cryptography" is just the name of the practice, of course it's doing fine. What's not doing fine is picking a particular set of ciphers/hash functions/signature scheme and expecting to not fail in 40 years.
- xmprt 7y agoEncrypting is still better than not encrypting and if you care about keeping your data private then you can take additional measures to ensure that. Nothing will last forever but that's not a good reason to be nihilistic.
- xoa 7y agoIncorrect, particular sets of ciphers are themselves doing just fine. There is no hint of well studied symmetric-key algorithms (like AES, which is in fact now over 20 years old) with long known sufficient key lengths "failing" (in terms of cold ciphertext being cracked) in 40 years, or 400 years for that matter. Even with a fully scalable general quantum computer, the best known improvement is Grover's Algorithm, which results in roughly a quadratic improvement (so a 128-bit key cracked in 2^64 iterations, 256-bit in 2^128, etc). This obviously is trivially defeated by doubling the key length, and AES-256 has been available from the beginning and has been becoming more standard for a while as well. Now, there are various kinds of hot attacks, such as side channel leaks, that always present a serious challenge in many threat scenarios. And it's certainly possible to have bad implementations of a solid algorithm. But for AES implementations are very mature, and side channel attacks do not apply to data at rest. So in the context of "will my encrypted ciphertext with all my deepest secrets [sitting on a drive/in the cloud/wherever] be crackable in 40 years" no, symmetric-key crypto with 256-bit keys is dependable at this point. A false sense of defeatism is itself plenty dangerous to security.
- ReidZB 7y agoDES is a good example here: it was designed ~45 years ago and it's still theoretically surprisingly strong when you compare it with other areas of cryptography. By that, I mean it's held up very well to cryptanalysis that attempts to find faster-than-brute-force techniques, with the best attack taking 2^43 time (vs. the 2^56 brute-force time). To be clear, 2^56 is trivially brute-force-able today, but that can be mitigated with constructs like 3DES, which are still (barely) secure despite being based on a 45-year-old cipher. (So no one mistakes my intent, there are many reasons to prefer AES over DES. I just wanted to provide it as an example, especially since it happened to line up with the 40-year timeframe.)
- zwp 7y ago> 2^56 is trivially brute-force-able today Youch, this broke my intuition. https://crack.sh/ https://crack.sh/ "we’ve built a system with 48 Virtex-6 LX240Ts which can exhaust the keyspace in around 26 hours"
- wbl 7y agoTriple DES remains as secure today as in 1975.