The fact that this attack is chosen prefix does weaken the first argument though, you may now find a collision even accounting for any prefixed git "header". Th

The fact that this attack is chosen prefix does weaken the first argument though, you may now find a collision even accounting for any prefixed git "header". The rest is still completely valid though. I still feel like they really should've taken this problem more seriously and earlier. The more we wait the more painful the migration will be when the day comes to move to a different hash function, because everybody knows that'll happen sooner or later. Two years ago we had a collision, now we have chosen prefix, how much longer until somebody actually manages to make a git object collision? And keep in mind that public research is probably several years behind top secret state agency capabilities. Let's stop looking for excuses every time SHA-1 takes a hit and rip the bandaid already. It's going to be messy and painful but it has to be done.