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Yes, I agree there a few things that could be done to improve, but they all basically involve giving semi-subjective 'weights' as to the reliability of individu
by crazygringo 7y ago
Yes, I agree there a few things that could be done to improve, but they all basically involve giving semi-subjective 'weights' as to the reliability of individual reviewers.
E.g. more likely to be genuine if purchased, if not prepublication (except some people really do receive and review books in advance), if has many reviews, if reviews follow common statistical patterns both per-author and per-book, and so on.
The trouble with all of this is just that it's really, really hard to get right. There's a tremendous amount of 'tuning' involved.
It's probably not possible, but it really would be great if someone could come up with some general elegant theory to solve particularly the 'does this reviewer seem statistically trustworthy', in a way that effectively identifies brigading and harrassment, while still allowing for genuine 'oddballs' whose reviews and ratings go against the crowd.
- lazyasciiart 7y agoIn this specific case, the book isn't even out for advance readers. The literal least goodreads could do is turn off reviews for the book until the author tells them otherwise.
- strgcmc 7y agoI swear I'm not just meme-ing for the sake of it, but this has always seemed like fundamentally a decentralized trust problem, and one that can potentially be solved by some form of social blockchain. Basically, instead of an economic currency unit being mined, the value being protected is instead some form of reputational trust-token; 30 seconds of Googling leads to articles like this: https://www.forbes.com/sites/shermanlee/2018/08/13/a-decentralized-reputation-system-how-blockchain-can-restore-trust-in-online-markets/#310565a2481a https://www.forbes.com/sites/shermanlee/2018/08/13/a-decentr... Thinking about things this way essentially boils the fundamental problem into what IMO is a pretty "general elegant theory", which is simply to construct a properly balanced incentive structure, which asymmetrically disincentivizes "bad" behavior while encouraging "good" behavior, in much the same way that Bitcoin's core ledger-validation/mining abstraction rewards miners for securing the network while also discouraging prohibitively expensive attack scenarios. I'm not saying it's easy or obvious, but I think this is exactly the sort of decentralized trust problem that blockchains are well-suited for.