“Quality of what” is an important question as well. Oftentimes business incentivizes maximizing easily measured (and therefore also short-term) metrics. As well

“Quality of what” is an important question as well. Oftentimes business incentivizes maximizing easily measured (and therefore also short-term) metrics. As well as metrics that are easy to gain wider buy-in, and therefore don’t rely on expert knowledge. In this case, it’s easy to understand “pilots don’t need new training” and “we don’t have to recertify as much”, but it required more expertise to understand the increase in risk of dangerous situations occurring due to those changes, and the long-term impact of a loss of trust. It also sounds like the changes in the company culture reduced the status of the people with that expertise who were responsible for measuring, understanding, and informing the physical risks of the product. It’s pretty logical in retrospect, then, that Boeing suffered a airline accident scandal rather than an overspending scandal. Because of the nature of the product, there wasn’t a gradual warning sign that the risks were getting untenable. Things crossed a threshold, air disasters happened, and permanent damage was done to the company’s reputation. Even if Boeing did replace the 737 with a new plane, I’d now be wary of flying on it due to the de-escalation of engineering concerns I’ve read about. If the importance it places on engineering has dropped to the point where it can’t upgrade its own existing planes without causing them to crash, how can I trust them to design a completely new one?