3 ms·

It's not quite ready to go, but it's doable with TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt: https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%20System.html https://www.verac

It's not quite ready to go, but it's doable with TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt: https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%20System.html https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%2...

hutzlibu 7y ago
Why is it not ready to go? I used truecrypt hidden systemvolume years ago? I do not anymore, but did it decreased?
- close04 7y ago
  Deniable encryption is part of a few encryption solutions (probably more than listed below). [0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption#Software https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption#Software
- tyingq 7y ago
  The "plausible" part is what seems not out of the box to me. Some easy way for the decoy image to show recent real looking activity, and an easy way to use the real image. Probably some integration with a VM or container.
- stordoff 7y ago
  I took ready to go to mean "run a command and it spins up a plausible fake system". The tech of TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt, AFAICT, seems sound, but maintaining the contents of the fake system (so it's not an obvious decoy/placeholder) takes more work.
- shakna 7y ago
  TrueCrypt shuttered in 2014, though an independent audit didn't find any significant issues in 2015. [0] VeraCrypt is one of the main forks that has picked up popularity, and has addressed some of the minor concerns of the audit. The hidden volume hasn't had a high degree of success when it comes to deniability [1]. Some leaks closed, probably not all. With the design, it may not actually be possible to close all the leaks. (Especially as "Stoned" can break the full-disk encryption). TrueCrypt doesn't use the TPM (and nor does VeraCrypt), because the authors didn't believe it added any security whatsoever (as it can't defend against a hardware keylogger, despite making coldboot attacks harder). TrueCrypt is vulnerable to coldboot, evil maid and the "Stoned" bootkit. Depending on your security concerns, that might be fine, it might not. Other solutions may be better when dealing with those attacks. [0] [PDF] https://opencryptoaudit.org/reports/TrueCrypt_Phase_II_NCC_OCAP_final.pdf https://opencryptoaudit.org/reports/TrueCrypt_Phase_II_NCC_O... [1] https://yro.slashdot.org/story/08/07/17/2043248/schneier-uw-team-show-flaw-in-truecrypt-deniability https://yro.slashdot.org/story/08/07/17/2043248/schneier-uw-...

hutzlibu 7y ago

Why is it not ready to go? I used truecrypt hidden systemvolume years ago? I do not anymore, but did it decreased?

close04 7y ago
Deniable encryption is part of a few encryption solutions (probably more than listed below). [0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption#Software https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption#Software
tyingq 7y ago
The "plausible" part is what seems not out of the box to me. Some easy way for the decoy image to show recent real looking activity, and an easy way to use the real image. Probably some integration with a VM or container.
stordoff 7y ago
I took ready to go to mean "run a command and it spins up a plausible fake system". The tech of TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt, AFAICT, seems sound, but maintaining the contents of the fake system (so it's not an obvious decoy/placeholder) takes more work.
shakna 7y ago
TrueCrypt shuttered in 2014, though an independent audit didn't find any significant issues in 2015. [0] VeraCrypt is one of the main forks that has picked up popularity, and has addressed some of the minor concerns of the audit. The hidden volume hasn't had a high degree of success when it comes to deniability [1]. Some leaks closed, probably not all. With the design, it may not actually be possible to close all the leaks. (Especially as "Stoned" can break the full-disk encryption). TrueCrypt doesn't use the TPM (and nor does VeraCrypt), because the authors didn't believe it added any security whatsoever (as it can't defend against a hardware keylogger, despite making coldboot attacks harder). TrueCrypt is vulnerable to coldboot, evil maid and the "Stoned" bootkit. Depending on your security concerns, that might be fine, it might not. Other solutions may be better when dealing with those attacks. [0] [PDF] https://opencryptoaudit.org/reports/TrueCrypt_Phase_II_NCC_OCAP_final.pdf https://opencryptoaudit.org/reports/TrueCrypt_Phase_II_NCC_O... [1] https://yro.slashdot.org/story/08/07/17/2043248/schneier-uw-team-show-flaw-in-truecrypt-deniability https://yro.slashdot.org/story/08/07/17/2043248/schneier-uw-...