4 ms·

For the life of me, I have absolutely no idea how you can look at what has happened with the Max and believe that more entrenched automation is the answer.

jandrese 7y ago
Yeah, my thought was "Do the Boeing execs actually know why the -MAX crashes happened?" Holy crap the very first paragraph is opposite-of-reality.txt > Boeing Co. is increasingly committed to transferring more control of aircraft from pilots to computers after two crashes exposed flaws in an automated system on its 737 MAX that overpowered aviators in the disasters. The whole problem was the computer overriding the best efforts of the pilots until the planes nosed into the ground.
dnautics 7y ago
At the very least, entrenched automation by Boeing.
AlDeeMer 7y ago
Exactly what I'm thinking.
mrtksn 7y ago
What's the logic behind this statement? Airbus is known for its automation, they had some rough times but now they are doing very well. If anything, the most prominent crash that comes to mind from recent history of 737s equivalent a320 is the suicidal pilot of Airberlin. I would love it when the planes are as easily operated as an elevator. It's probably more realistic than self-driving cars.
Retric 7y ago
The argument goes something like this: It’s the disconnect between pilots mental models of what’s going on and what’s actually going on that caused the Max‘s and several other related crashes on different aircraft. As such software designed based on how the system actually works may actually be both simpler and safer than increasingly abstracted fly by wire systems trying to safely intuit what the pilots want. An example from 10 years ago: https://www.fastcompany.com/1669720/how-lousy-cockpit-design-crashed-an-airbus-killing-228-people https://www.fastcompany.com/1669720/how-lousy-cockpit-design...
- bkdbkd 7y ago
  While true. That disconnect is not related to the automation system consistently doing the wrong thing. The 'thing the pilots didn't know' enough about was how to turn off the automation. Which was what saved the Lion Air flight the day before was that a jump seat pilot knew how to disable the automation. Increasing the automation in this scenario, does the opposite of what they hope.
  - jki275 7y ago
    The pilots did know to turn off the automation, and they did exactly that. The problem was that they didn't decrease thrust, and then they turned the automation back on in an attempt to regain control because they couldn't move the control surfaces because they were going too fast.
    - bkdbkd 7y ago
      The turn off the MCAS system button on the 737 Max the pilots were using, does _not_ in fact turn off the MCAS system. It is a "Pause the MCAS system button" Even worse, After a few moments, the MCAS system reactivates and then adds even more down trim. So pressing the button, not only does not turn off the system, actually triggers the plane to make the situation worse by adding more down trim. When the FAA certified the 737 Max the MCAS Software was able to move the horizontal tail a max of 0.6 degrees. (out of a total of 5 degrees) The software flying on those planes was in fact able to move the horizontal tail 4.17 times that amount: 2.5 degrees. They never told anyone this changed. The system went from being able to control 12% of the tail range to 50% of its range. Those pilots were pulling up on the nose of the aircraft with their feet pressed against the controls. Directing the aircraft with clear intent and skill. The 737's automation had unbeknownst to them and with their knowledge of the aircraft - un-overridable, tilted the horizontal tail into a position that would, under any operating condition direct the nose of the craft into the ground.
      - jki275 7y ago
        They pulled the breakers for MCAS. That was the correct action. The problem was that then they turned them back on because they flew the plane into a situation where they could not trim it anymore by hand. When they turned the breakers for MCAS back on, it flew the plane into the ground.

jandrese 7y ago

Yeah, my thought was "Do the Boeing execs actually know why the -MAX crashes happened?" Holy crap the very first paragraph is opposite-of-reality.txt > Boeing Co. is increasingly committed to transferring more control of aircraft from pilots to computers after two crashes exposed flaws in an automated system on its 737 MAX that overpowered aviators in the disasters. The whole problem was the computer overriding the best efforts of the pilots until the planes nosed into the ground.

dnautics 7y ago

At the very least, entrenched automation by Boeing.

AlDeeMer 7y ago

Exactly what I'm thinking.

mrtksn 7y ago

What's the logic behind this statement? Airbus is known for its automation, they had some rough times but now they are doing very well. If anything, the most prominent crash that comes to mind from recent history of 737s equivalent a320 is the suicidal pilot of Airberlin. I would love it when the planes are as easily operated as an elevator. It's probably more realistic than self-driving cars.

Retric 7y ago

The argument goes something like this: It’s the disconnect between pilots mental models of what’s going on and what’s actually going on that caused the Max‘s and several other related crashes on different aircraft. As such software designed based on how the system actually works may actually be both simpler and safer than increasingly abstracted fly by wire systems trying to safely intuit what the pilots want. An example from 10 years ago: https://www.fastcompany.com/1669720/how-lousy-cockpit-design-crashed-an-airbus-killing-228-people https://www.fastcompany.com/1669720/how-lousy-cockpit-design...

bkdbkd 7y ago
While true. That disconnect is not related to the automation system consistently doing the wrong thing. The 'thing the pilots didn't know' enough about was how to turn off the automation. Which was what saved the Lion Air flight the day before was that a jump seat pilot knew how to disable the automation. Increasing the automation in this scenario, does the opposite of what they hope.
- jki275 7y ago
  The pilots did know to turn off the automation, and they did exactly that. The problem was that they didn't decrease thrust, and then they turned the automation back on in an attempt to regain control because they couldn't move the control surfaces because they were going too fast.
  - bkdbkd 7y ago
    The turn off the MCAS system button on the 737 Max the pilots were using, does _not_ in fact turn off the MCAS system. It is a "Pause the MCAS system button" Even worse, After a few moments, the MCAS system reactivates and then adds even more down trim. So pressing the button, not only does not turn off the system, actually triggers the plane to make the situation worse by adding more down trim. When the FAA certified the 737 Max the MCAS Software was able to move the horizontal tail a max of 0.6 degrees. (out of a total of 5 degrees) The software flying on those planes was in fact able to move the horizontal tail 4.17 times that amount: 2.5 degrees. They never told anyone this changed. The system went from being able to control 12% of the tail range to 50% of its range. Those pilots were pulling up on the nose of the aircraft with their feet pressed against the controls. Directing the aircraft with clear intent and skill. The 737's automation had unbeknownst to them and with their knowledge of the aircraft - un-overridable, tilted the horizontal tail into a position that would, under any operating condition direct the nose of the craft into the ground.
    - jki275 7y ago
      They pulled the breakers for MCAS. That was the correct action. The problem was that then they turned them back on because they flew the plane into a situation where they could not trim it anymore by hand. When they turned the breakers for MCAS back on, it flew the plane into the ground.