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I don't think it's reasonable to say that wake turbulence has never caused an issue for an airliner, when many hundreds of people died because pilots misapplied
by cjbprime 7y ago
I don't think it's reasonable to say that wake turbulence has never caused an issue for an airliner, when many hundreds of people died because pilots misapplied rudder in direct response to wake turbulence.
The correct systemic response is to note that wake turbulence is very dangerous for airliners because it may cause pilots to catastrophically misapply rudder.
(Sorry for my many edits to the parent, I didn't realize you'd already replied.)
- dsfyu404ed 7y agoI don't think it's reasonable to say that N=1 warrants a systemic change when the N in question was a human (as opposed to a mechanical failure which is as repeatable as the components and the failure conditions are). I don't know but I suspect United did change their training after that. The fact that the pilot reacted the way he did is as much their fault as the pilots. IMO it is a training/human factors issue, not some fundamental issue with turbulence and current following distances.
- cjbprime 7y agoBut the point of systemic thinking is to see when you've hit an area that's vulnerable to human and training factors and try to do the best you can to reasonably remove the risk. There are surely hazards that have caused less loss of life that we still consider dangerous at N=0. Do you know whether ATC large plane same-size spacing guidelines around airports have changed much over the years? I don't know whether airliner spacing would have generally increased or decreased, but I'd be surprised if it hasn't changed at all. Edit: I read more about these flights and I think I agree with you that I'm overstating the risk to airliners from wake turbulence. I was expecting to find increases in separation distances in response to the American flight and instead it looks like the only change made was a training change for rudder control.
- mannykannot 7y agoAmerican Airlines' training division had taught its pilots to react vigorously to wake turbulence, and among pilots generally, there was a widespread mistaken belief that, below the maximum maneuvering speed, it was impossible to do structural damage through the primary flight controls. Now that these misunderstandings have been corrected, we can hope this particular problem will not occur again. On the other hand, I would guess that there is still a risk of people-thrown-around-the-cabin type incidents from abnormally close encounters with wake turbulence, and I do not know if the possibility of structural damage can be ruled out, especially if this were to happen at cruising speeds. I think it is probably safe to say that any structural-risk incident would have been within a whisker of being a collision anyway, in which case the measures to avoid the latter cover the former as well.