> This meme has been debunked several months ago but keeps getting repeated along with the more ignorant 'the plane is inherently unstable'. Yet, there has bee

> This meme has been debunked several months ago but keeps getting repeated along with the more ignorant 'the plane is inherently unstable'. Yet, there has been no information released, at least publicly, as to the bare airframe flight characteristics (bare as in sans MCAS). The reasons for the initial inclusion of the MCAS seems like it may have been related to the augmentation of the "touch and feel" of the flight controls, but we simply do not know at this point what were the reasons for the increase of it's operating envelope and authority. > Please stop spreading thoroughly debunked misinformation. If you have a source for the debunking, I would appreciate if you could share it. In the meantime, our best bet is to hope for one of the other CAA-s to conduct said bare airframe tests. I suspect that one must also consider that the Boeing's PR department is busy coloring the narrative in a favourable way. Source: https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/Final_JATR_Submittal_to_FAA_Oct_2019.pdf https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/Final_JATR_Submit... Recommendation R3.4: The FAA should review the natural (bare airframe) stalling characteristics of the B737 MAX to determine if unsafe characteristics exist. If unsafe characteristics exist, the design of the speed trim system (STS)/MCAS/elevator feel shift (EFS) should be reviewed for acceptability. Observation O3.4-A: The original implementation of MCAS was driven primarily by its ability to provide the B737 MAX with FAA-compliant flight characteristics at high speed. An unaugmented design would have been at risk of not meeting 14 CFR part 25 maneuvering characteristics requirements due to aerodynamics. Observation O3.4-B: Extension of MCAS to the low-speed and 1g environment during the flight program was due to unacceptable stall characteristics with STS only. The possibility of a pitch-up tendency during approach to stall was identified for the flaps-up configuration prior to the implementation of MCAS. Finding F3.4-A: The acceptability of the natural stalling characteristics of the aircraft should form the basis for the design and certification of augmentation functions such as EFS and STS (including MCAS) that are used in support of meeting 14 CFR part 25, subpart B requirements. In short, Boeing designed a full-authority flight envelope protection system, just like Airbus has. Except for the fact that Airbus uses a full triplex system (3 ADIRU-s with their own set of sensors), while Boeing went with a single source of data, treating the wetware on the seat as the pseudo duplex channel ("you are the backup", while neglecting to inform them of their role, or their potential physical inability to accomplish this, nor provide accurate force feedback in sims). Now they are trying to sell us a duplex/pseudo-triplex model with the consolation that while the beast still has half a brain (pun intended), it is at least more tame. All this while simply neglecting to tell us, the pilots and the flying public, exactly why it was needed in the first place. See O3.4-B above. Disclaimer: pilot.