4 ms·
While I see your point, there's a rub. If you're right and he's wrong, then MCAS is a non-critical system (augmentation, not fly-by-wire) and would require a m
by jiggawatts 7y ago
While I see your point, there's a rub.
If you're right and he's wrong, then MCAS is a non-critical system (augmentation, not fly-by-wire) and would require a mere software fix, which ought to have been completed by now.
Why hasn't it?
- missosoup 7y agoMCAS is a critical system if it's present in its current form, and may very well require more than just a software fix (3rd alpha vane perhaps). At this point not a lot is publicly known about what Boeing is doing to remediate the issue and I don't want to engage in speculation. But their ultimate fallback plan if all else fails, will be to remove MCAS and have this thing get its own type rating and dedicated pilots.
- salawat 7y agoIt hasn't because the Flight Computer represents a single point of failure in a system with a catastrophic consequence of failure. This is not allowed. If it's even possible in theory but unlikely, it doesn't matter, it has to be redesigned. That redesign alone is likely enough to violate the little or no training required that was the original intent of the resign. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/newly-stringent-faa-tests-spur-a-fundamental-software-redesign-of-737-max-flight-controls/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/newly... Note, these weren't "newly stringent" as if they've never been done before now. Worst case scenario bit flips by cosmic rays are textbook test cases in aerospace projects. That they weren't considered before then is a marked demonstration of lack of due-diligence or follow-through in enumerating the fault-tree.