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Boeing 737 Max: Automated Crashes [video]
- trymas 7y agoUnrelated to the content of the video - is it possible to remove French voice-over? EDIT: I guess only option is to download the video file and switch the audio language as browser's player cannot do this. EDIT2: from html - there are multiple sources, english is the first one, though player starts automatically from the second source. Link to english video: https://koeln.ftp.media.ccc.de//congress/2019/h264-hd/36c3-10961-eng-Boeing_737MAX_Automated_Crashes.mp4 https://koeln.ftp.media.ccc.de//congress/2019/h264-hd/36c3-1... EDIT3: after couple reloads and waiting couple dozen of seconds native html video player have switched to some custom CCC player with settings option available. Probably needed some time before JS fully loaded and did it's job. Apparently /u/lovehashbrowns had loading issues, so this sounds related. Maybe CCC is getting hug of death from HN, Reddit or whatever.
- HelenePhisher 7y agoCheck the small gear icon at the bottom of the video, you can choose the audio track there.
- jmkni 7y agoI was able to change language by clicking on the gear icon in the web player (bottom right).
- trymas 7y agoFor whatever reason latest Chrome and FF on MacOS does not have any settings/gear icon ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ .
- HelenePhisher 7y agoStrange, Chrome on MacOS shows it here. Ugly workaround, you could download the video and select the appropriate audio track in your video player.
- jmkni 7y agoWeird, I'm on Firefox on Windows and it's there.
- DangerousPie 7y agoIt might be worth reporting this to them as a bug? I just got the English version as expected.
- agumonkey 7y agoFunny, I was impressed that they embedded many languages in the video and felt it was a great great work from the group. Sorry it was an annoyance to you.
- HelenePhisher 7y agoYoutube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlaMQBEg-9M https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlaMQBEg-9M
- lovehashbrowns 7y agoThe video was taking ages to load for me, but I believe this is the same video from the same source: https://youtu.be/PlaMQBEg-9M https://youtu.be/PlaMQBEg-9M
- EddieCPU 7y ago"Underestimating the dangers of designing a protection system" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlaMQBEg-9M https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PlaMQBEg-9M “In the course of the investigation, a new type of flight assistance system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) came to light. It was intended to bring the flight characteristics of the latest (and fourth) generation of Boeing's best-selling 737 airliner, the "MAX", in line with certification criteria. The issue that the system was designed to address was relatively mild. A little software routine was added to an existing computer to add nose-down trim in situations of higher angles of attack, to counteract the nose-up aerodynamic moment of the new, much larger, and forward-mounted engine nacelles.” “Apparently the risk assessment for this system was not commensurate with its possible effects on aircraft behaviour and subsequently a very odd (to a safety engineer's eyes) system design was chosen, using a single non-redundant sensor input to initiate movement of the horizontal stabiliser, the largest and most powerful flight control surface. At extreme deflections, the effects of this flight control surface cannot be overcome by the primary flight controls (elevators) or the manual actuation of the trim system. In consequence, the aircraft enters an accelerated nose-down dive, which further increases the control forces required to overcome its effects.”
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- mechhacker 7y agoRight around 37:30 it shows how difficult it is to use the manual trim wheel to affect the plane's attitude. One pilot has to move all focus to it, without touching the other controls. It is still baffling to me how everything, from one sensor to a control system that can overwhelm the pilots with stick forces with no sanity checks in software, got through Boeing and then the FAA.
- nickpeterson 7y agoI think getting through Boeing was effectively the same as 'getting through' the FAA at this point though, since the FAA relied so heavily on Boeing in order to perform their stated duties.
- xeromal 7y agoDamn. Thanks for pointing that out. You can see the exertion he's having to apply. That's unsustainable over any long period of time.
- StreamBright 7y agoFAA is just another department of Boeing at this stage. See page 30 at 33.00 https://youtu.be/PlaMQBEg-9M?t=1989 https://youtu.be/PlaMQBEg-9M?t=1989
- ulfw 7y agoThey're not going to get me to sit in this shit plane again. Software update or not. I do not care.
- floki999 7y agoThis is a great presentation, goes into a lot of details. Thanks for sharing.
- logjammin 7y ago"Apparently the only design of the MCAS system the FAA saw was limited to a 0.6 degree deflection [of the stabilizer] at high speeds and only single deflection only. And that was changed and ... it is still unclear how that could happen ... it was changed to multiple activations, even at high speed, and each activation could move the stabilizer as much as 2.5 degrees, and there was no limit to how often it could activate." (~28min; emphasis added) For me, in a crisis with a lot of burning questions, one I haven't seen raised much is: who changed the MCAS behavior after the FAA "saw" the first version? Someone decided this should happen, and someone implemented it (perhaps the same person). Forget the C-suite for a moment; someone in middle management made this call. Shouldn't they answer for it?
- bjornsing 7y agoThat must be one sorry bastard...
- HeyLaughingBoy 7y agoNo, "they" shouldn't. When stuff like this happens, it's a process issue, not an issue with a particular engineer. It's human nature to try to assign blame to people and that's why it's so important to avoid that. Whatever process created the flawed product is where the blame lies. Somewhere in the group that produced MCAS, there's a process to permit changes to be submitted, reviewed, accepted or rejected, implemented and tested along with the documentation produced at each stage. Maybe that process is broken, maybe it isn't. From the outside we can't tell. However, as responsible professional software developers what we should do is understand that these are system problems and not just look around for someone to pin the blame on.
- LoSboccacc 7y agoas people died, now you need both: to identify the issue with the process that caused the problem to happen, sure, but also to identify key figures that signed off the design and trough the justice system identify whether exists a direct cause between their decisions and people deaths.
- 7y ago
- fhub 7y agoIn the Q&A, there were two questions about topics that the speaker wasn't really aware of. 1. A purchase option for an instrument/indicator that shows discrepancies between Angle of Attack sensors on each wing. 2. In the KC-46A Pegasus it seems the pilots are able to override the MCAS system by simply pulling on the controls. For me, #2 would have been an interesting discussion as perhaps Boeing chose not to re-use this system because it might delay certification. Imagine being the person who (may) have made the call to create a worse software than something that existed to sneak past compliance.
- kayfox 7y agoOn #1. No-one has, other than speculating, confirmed the option is cost difference (there are hundreds of options for the 737 series, many of which are just configuration differences). In the case of the indicator, there would need to be additional training, so airlines may opt not to have it to save on training, since it is not required.
- gsnedders 7y agoNote that for the 767-2C/KC-46 it's very likely the case that the 767-2C wouldn't share a common type-rating with the rest of the 767 family (as this wasn't a requirement for the KC-46 contract!), and for the 737 MAX a lot of design decisions were driven by the desire for the 737 MAX to have a common type rating with earlier 737 models. From the 767-2C type certificate: > The Boeing 767-2C has not been evaluated by the Flight Standards Board. No pilot type rating or training, checking and currency requirement determinations have been made. Note the only 767-2Cs built were to certify the type, no airline has ordered the freighter aircraft.
- SAI_Peregrinus 7y agoAs I see it there are several critical flaws in the MAX. First, the engine placement means it has a non-linear control force curve, so it needs some system to compensate for that. Hence MCAS. This is because the landing gear can't be lengthened without expanding the gear bays, which would void the type certificate AFAICT. Second, the larger size of the plane means that a single pilot cannot be guaranteed to be able to use the manual trim wheels in all flight modes. The force required is extreme, weaker pilots may not be capable of trimming the aircraft. This can't be fixed without changing the trim wheel size (which requires a new cockpit layout) and/or the horizontal stabilizer, both of which would void the type certificate. Third, critical flight control systems need to be triple-redundant, and there are only two AOA sensors. Since the plane cannot be certified without MCAS (point 1) and MCAS can command a catastrophic failure (see two craters) it should be a triple-redundant system. A new AOA sensor would void the type certificate. Canada stated that they would certify the MAX without MCAS and with required pilot training, if its performance characteristics were acceptable. Boeing has made no attempt (AFAICT) to try this, which raises suspicion that MCAS is in fact required for certification, which would make it a Fly-By-Wire system (and subject to appropriate regulations, requiring hardware changes) and not just a stability augmentation system. Essentially Canada called Boeing's bluff. It's not the software that's the (only) issue. If it were, the plane would be flying by now.
- iscrewyou 7y agoWith all those changes listed, you are basically saying that if it was a different plane, the software would not be a problem (which in turn is an issue because we don’t really know that would be true or not since Boeing seems to have institutional problems). The issue is that the plane was changed only enough to avoid a cert issue but to keep the plane flyable, software had to be implemented to keep the pilots and the plane in check. So, the plane needs to be either redesigned or it won’t certify. You are correct in that Canada called Boeing’s bluff. But the software is the issue or the plane would not be flying anyways because it wouldn’t certify.
- devit 7y agoCan't one add mechanical gears so that the trim wheel requires less force to turn but needs to be turned more, without any other visible changes?
- ryanmarsh 7y agoDoes anyone else feel like we're going to be having a nearly identical conversation about a car some day? Some mixture of design changes, sensors, and software, (driven by business) that lead to avoidable deaths? Warrant against hyperbole: I'm not against the idea of self driving cars. In fact I have a Tesla and use auto steer daily.
- aeternum 7y agoI'd argue this already happens with vehicles and many other products. Many safety features themselves can lead to avoidable deaths in certain scenarios. From something as simple as the seatbelt to something as complex as auto-braking and collision avoidance. IE a seatbelt can cause a death by inhibiting egress. Fancy collision avoidance may prevent you from getting off a train track if there is a car or gate in front of you. Car manufacturers already have to make calls not only about whether these features are worth it for the greater good, but also whether or not it will make the car too expensive.
- salawat 7y agoLike Tesla's decision to employ a door system that can't be operated in the event of electrics failure? Or how the extra strong glass they use prevents emergency responders from quickly getting through in case of emergency? Or unintended consequences created by instability and regression in Neural Network based self-driving systems after an OTA update? It's happening every day; to not overly pick on Tesla, Volkswagen, Nissan, and BMW were caught cheating in one way or another on emissions. Takata using substandard materials in airbags. Don't have the links on-hand, but these have just been a handful of what I recall over the last 10 or so years. The problem I can't figure out is how to get people as in an uproar over something less dramatic than an aircraft crash to properly signal to industry that inferior quality is not acceptable. This is all business as usual apparently. I never felt comfortable or like I was even a good fit in an environment where apparently success is gated by how much you can get away with not having to disclose, and how much scrutiny you can avoid. It's actually caused me quite the crisis of faith as a contributor to industry in general. At some point, no matter what level I'm at, someone is going to make a decision to abuse something I put in place for them. What exactly does that leave the responsible course of action as for someone who is opposed to furthering unethical business by facilitating it via automation? How does one effectively conduct themselves so as not to become an unwitting accomplice via obfuscating skeevy business practices through automating them? I'm not satisfied with the answer of "just do your part, and get paid, the chip is on someone else's shoulder". I've spent too long watching industry do what it does to be able to realistically anticipate any company doing things the "right" way by default. I simply can't entertain Hanlon's Razor anymore. Not when 2nd and third order effects of decisions are so rarely taken into account by those around me. I sure hope I figure something out, or the new year is not going to be fun... Sorry for the digression... Your question has just been related to something that has been weighing heavily on my mind recently.
- nojvek 7y agoSite videos aren't loading. Seems like HN hug of death.
- thamer 7y agoCCC has a CDN, documented here: https://media.ccc.de/about.html https://media.ccc.de/about.html To get a list of mirrors for a file, copy the URL of the file you want to download, and append ?mirrorlist to get a list of mirrors. For example, here's the list of mirrors for the video in 1080p MP4 format: https://cdn.media.ccc.de/congress/2019/h264-hd/36c3-10961-eng-deu-fra-Boeing_737MAX_Automated_Crashes_hd.mp4?mirrorlist https://cdn.media.ccc.de/congress/2019/h264-hd/36c3-10961-en... I had the same issue with another link posted today where the video wasn't loading at first. I downloaded it from a mirror using wget at over 200 Mb/s.