In its efforts to harden Android,[0] the Tor Project used a Nexus 6P. They note that only Google Nexus and Pixel models apparently support user-generated keys,

In its efforts to harden Android,[0] the Tor Project used a Nexus 6P. They note that only Google Nexus and Pixel models apparently support user-generated keys, which is necessary for using the hardened Copperhead build. But anyway, they note that GPS on those models is device-only by default. I gather that for many phones, GPS is supplemented by WiFi-based geolocation, which requires using online data for AP locations. So does avoiding that substantively reduce the risk of location leakage to third parties? And is that substantively less of an issue on iOS devices? They also note that Copperhead randomizes the device's MAC address, and also randomizes MAC addresses of APs acquired during scanning. It seems like that would prevent WiFi-based geolocation. But does it, really? I recall reading that SSIDs and BSSIDs are used for that, not MAC addresses. They also mention using the phone in airplane mode, with an external cellular or WiFi router for Internet access. That should entirely prevent WiFi-based geolocation. But then there's the GPS itself. They note that wiping the cellular baseband (radio) firmware also disables GPS. That's not an issue, as long as you're using an external router for Internet connectivity. And it might entirely prevent geolocation. But it might also brick the phone. Is that a workable option? 0) https://blog.torproject.org/mission-improbable-hardening-android-security-and-privacy https://blog.torproject.org/mission-improbable-hardening-and...