> What would be a proportionate response then? First of all, if you think military intervention is a proportionate response, the onus is on you to justify such

> What would be a proportionate response then? First of all, if you think military intervention is a proportionate response, the onus is on you to justify such an extraordinary measure. That being said, there's a wide array of reasonable measures, ranging from changes in Russian military deployments all the way to targeted sanctions (a particularly effective tool in the case of Ukraine, as I'm sure you know). > You are wrong. Read the book. Okay. > Not if it has to deal with a few rockets surviving first strike. It will be much more potent in a couple decades. That's what ABM proponents have been saying for decades. Never seems to amount to much. Like I said, Russia has ample countermeasures that are much cheaper than an ABM system. Your own policymakers have always recognized this clearly, that's why Russia left START II (which would have banned MIRVs) literally the next day after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Putin's hypersonic weapon pronouncements, however PR-distorted, are ultimately directed at the same goal, just like the RS-28 (and the associated active protection system for launch sites) and other systems. > Again, read the link. I did, and I'm aware of the W76 deployments. They're much better tailored to limit the value of the Chinese nuclear deterrent than yours. On a more general MAD point - I wish your military invested in better early warning capabilities rather than silly doomsday weapons. Your existing arsenal easily suffices for credible deterrence many times over, it's the information asymmetry that's the dangerous part. > To a certain extent, but not entirely. Read "A Little War That Shook the World" by Asmus for an example -- Georgia wasn't granted NATO membership action plan thanks to Germany finally seeing the light. I have read it, actually. You're right about Georgia, but that's not really comparable to the earlier rounds of NATO expansion. Germany and France were happy to see Eastern European states join the EU, which left them in a much less credible position to oppose the same countries joining NATO as well. You may also recall that Asmus describes the 2008 war as essentially a Russian provocation, by the way (a position I don't entirely share). > So you are saying that NATO expanded because of "tragicomically mismanaged economic reforms" in Russia? Or maybe you shouldn't be including such ridiculous reasons in your list? They're not ridiculous if you consider them in context. If you're dealing with an unstable country with political, economic and social issues of such a magnitude that it cannot be regarded as a reliable partner, yet one with most of the world's nukes, at some point you're going to start viewing it as a potential threat. > Please be specific. Sure, why not. Russia has created and continuously maintained a number of "frozen conflict" zones (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, parts of Eastern Ukraine will probably join the list in a few years), directly interfered into the political systems of virtually every ex-Soviet state (with measures ranging from illegal financing all the way to targeted cyberattacks and active measures) and weaponized its gas exports for political aims. And yes, I know you can justify every point on that list by pointing to similarly hostile actions conducted by Western states against Russia. That's my point. There was tremendous good will after the collapse of the Soviet Union and both sides squandered it, preferring to engage in an escalating series of tit-for-tat responses, each of which individually makes sense to those who commit it, but which collectively add up to lead us to where we are today.