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I think it's interesting because we don't assume "honor among thieves". Otherwise there's no useful way to distinguish morality from immorality. "x cooperates
by pickdenis 7y ago
I think it's interesting because we don't assume "honor among thieves". Otherwise there's no useful way to distinguish morality from immorality.
"x cooperates with y" and "y is moral" shouldn't imply "x is moral".
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- daveguy 7y agoThat, or z coerced x and x's cooperation with y has no direct indication of their morality.
- nine_k 7y agoTo me, there is a clear indicator: human suffering. A group that strives to induce suffering on the outgroup, or on uwilling members of ingroup, are "bad guys". A group that strives to limit and reduce suffering, for the ingroup, outgroup, or both, are "good guys", as long they don't match the previous definition. Corollary: "good guys" normally stay away from aggression.
- Joker_vD 7y agoYou probably need to add "increase human happiness" or something along those lines, because otherwise the group of "let's painlessly euthanize all the other humans first, and then ourselves" guys are trivially "good guys" — they monotonically reduce the human suffering to zero.
- nine_k 7y agoIn Buddhism, human existence is a source of inevitable suffering. The only way out is to (eventually) reduce your karma to nothing, and to not be born again. The difference from your euthanizing sect is that nobody can be forced to follow this path (not just morally, but also technically).
- Jeff_Brown 7y ago> In Buddhism, human existence is a source of inevitable suffering. The only way out is to ... not be born again. Framed that way, Buddhism sounds remarkably nihilistic.
- Jeff_Brown 7y ago> To me, there is a clear indicator: human suffering. I like to divide morality into happiness ("utility") and rights. All else equal, increasing aggregate happiness is better. However, if increasing (the authority's measure of) aggregate happiness tramples a lot peoples' rights, that sucks. Rights (and their implications) are easier to codify legally than happiness maximization. This eigenmagic seems easier to compute (because it's easier to encode) for happiness than for rights. (One can frame rights as an implication of happiness maximization. Some economists do this. A (properly bounded) right to private property, for instance, increases net happiness by avoiding tragedies of the commons. Thievery should be illegal because stolen goods are on average less valuable to the thief than the victim. I don't know whether such analyses imply all the rights we'd like, or how absolutely.)
- nine_k 7y agoIndeed, "rights" is a reasonably good proxy for not increasing suffering. If nobody is entitled to arbitrarily take your possessions or do bodily harm to you, a number of the worst sources of suffering are removed, at least most of the time. Since both happiness and utility are strictly subjective (e.g. not directly measurable or comparable), such proxies is our only hope to produce some formal, computable approaches to limiting of the suffering. But the intention to limit suffering for most of the outgroup seems a key indicator for me.
- swagasaurus-rex 7y agoIn stories we tell, the good guys are often fighting, and defeating the bad guys. Even though I would not say it is a good thing, I would respect somebody more who stood up for themselves and were aggressive in tense moments – if it seemed justified (provoked by the aggressive party).