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> This quote is present in the first comment you've replied to. There is no need to attribute malice to me. You attributed a quote to me that isn't even remote

> This quote is present in the first comment you've replied to. There is no need to attribute malice to me. You attributed a quote to me that isn't even remotely reminiscent of anything I've said in this discussion. There is no need to grossly distort my position. > This self-fulfilling prophecy. Russia wasn't a threat, NATO expanded nonetheless, Russia reacted to this threat, you claim that this reaction is the proof that Russia was a threat. Ridiculous, isn't it? Not really, since virtually all countries in the region consider the Russian response to be wildly disproportionate and in flagrant violation of international law. > Firstly, I'd recommend you to read "To win the nuclear war" by Kaku and Axelrod about Pentagon plans for first strike. It is a horrifying reading for a Russian, hopefully, it will be such for you too. You're referring to plans that predate the existence of the Soviet (and now Russian) nuclear arsenal and were specifically made obsolete by it. > Secondly, the US is working hard on increasing effectiveness of the first strike -- high-precision warheads[2] (no need for them in MAD concept - you cannot miss a city), ABM, etc. ABM is a joke. Its effectiveness is dubious even for its purported usecase (a limited attack by NK or Iran) and if the U.S. ever tried to seriously scale it, it would always be orders of magnitude more expensive than the effort required for Russia to defeat it. High-precision warheads are unnecessary in MAD, but do nothing to threaten or disrupt it. They exist because U.S. military doctrine is primarily concerned with adversaries other than Russia. > Thirdly, please google "salami tactics" and "escalation dominance" -- there is no need to use nuclear weapons even in conflict with nuclear-armed country. I don't have to google them. Russia is in a much better position to use escalation dominance against its EU neighbors than the U.S. is against Russia. In purely military terms, NATO's defensive posture across Eastern Europe and particularly in the Baltic States is still very weak, precisely out of fear of provoking hostilities. > But NATO is ruled by consensus and it was the choice of the all European countries. Whatever the formal rules are, NATO is ruled predominantly by the U.S. For the actual countries in question it was a simple trade - safety from Russia in exchange for U.S. influence, market penetration, etc. This arrangement was popular then and remains popular now. > Not in retrospect. Many people warned about that [1], including former American presidents and George Kennan [0] -- the man behind the "containment policy". They were in a minority then, now the consensus has shifted for the most part. > That was remarkably unspecific. An exhaustive list would be far too long, but it includes both Chechen wars (the first of which caused a significant disillusionment among Western populations), the tragicomically mismanaged economic reforms in the early 90s and the subsequent political instability in Russia, various trade and investor disputes (especially after the '98 crisis), Russian actions in the ex-Soviet republics and many others.

gdy 7y ago
"There is no need to grossly distort my position." Oh, come on. It's obvious I thought you two are the same person. "the Russian response to be wildly disproportionate" What would be a proportionate response then? "You're referring to plans that predate the existence of the Soviet (and now Russian) nuclear arsenal" You are wrong. Read the book. "ABM is a joke." Not if it has to deal with a few rockets surviving first strike. It will be much more potent in a couple decades. "High-precision warheads are unnecessary in MAD, but do nothing to threaten or disrupt it." Again, read the link. "still very weak" Nothing prevents this from changing very quickly. "NATO is ruled predominantly by the U.S." To a certain extent, but not entirely. Read "A Little War That Shook the World" by Asmus for an example -- Georgia wasn't granted NATO membership action plan thanks to Germany finally seeing the light. "it includes" So you are saying that NATO expanded because of "tragicomically mismanaged economic reforms" in Russia? Or maybe you shouldn't be including such ridiculous reasons in your list? "Russian actions in the ex-Soviet republics" Please be specific.
- keldaris 7y ago
  > What would be a proportionate response then? First of all, if you think military intervention is a proportionate response, the onus is on you to justify such an extraordinary measure. That being said, there's a wide array of reasonable measures, ranging from changes in Russian military deployments all the way to targeted sanctions (a particularly effective tool in the case of Ukraine, as I'm sure you know). > You are wrong. Read the book. Okay. > Not if it has to deal with a few rockets surviving first strike. It will be much more potent in a couple decades. That's what ABM proponents have been saying for decades. Never seems to amount to much. Like I said, Russia has ample countermeasures that are much cheaper than an ABM system. Your own policymakers have always recognized this clearly, that's why Russia left START II (which would have banned MIRVs) literally the next day after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Putin's hypersonic weapon pronouncements, however PR-distorted, are ultimately directed at the same goal, just like the RS-28 (and the associated active protection system for launch sites) and other systems. > Again, read the link. I did, and I'm aware of the W76 deployments. They're much better tailored to limit the value of the Chinese nuclear deterrent than yours. On a more general MAD point - I wish your military invested in better early warning capabilities rather than silly doomsday weapons. Your existing arsenal easily suffices for credible deterrence many times over, it's the information asymmetry that's the dangerous part. > To a certain extent, but not entirely. Read "A Little War That Shook the World" by Asmus for an example -- Georgia wasn't granted NATO membership action plan thanks to Germany finally seeing the light. I have read it, actually. You're right about Georgia, but that's not really comparable to the earlier rounds of NATO expansion. Germany and France were happy to see Eastern European states join the EU, which left them in a much less credible position to oppose the same countries joining NATO as well. You may also recall that Asmus describes the 2008 war as essentially a Russian provocation, by the way (a position I don't entirely share). > So you are saying that NATO expanded because of "tragicomically mismanaged economic reforms" in Russia? Or maybe you shouldn't be including such ridiculous reasons in your list? They're not ridiculous if you consider them in context. If you're dealing with an unstable country with political, economic and social issues of such a magnitude that it cannot be regarded as a reliable partner, yet one with most of the world's nukes, at some point you're going to start viewing it as a potential threat. > Please be specific. Sure, why not. Russia has created and continuously maintained a number of "frozen conflict" zones (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, parts of Eastern Ukraine will probably join the list in a few years), directly interfered into the political systems of virtually every ex-Soviet state (with measures ranging from illegal financing all the way to targeted cyberattacks and active measures) and weaponized its gas exports for political aims. And yes, I know you can justify every point on that list by pointing to similarly hostile actions conducted by Western states against Russia. That's my point. There was tremendous good will after the collapse of the Soviet Union and both sides squandered it, preferring to engage in an escalating series of tit-for-tat responses, each of which individually makes sense to those who commit it, but which collectively add up to lead us to where we are today.

gdy 7y ago

"There is no need to grossly distort my position." Oh, come on. It's obvious I thought you two are the same person. "the Russian response to be wildly disproportionate" What would be a proportionate response then? "You're referring to plans that predate the existence of the Soviet (and now Russian) nuclear arsenal" You are wrong. Read the book. "ABM is a joke." Not if it has to deal with a few rockets surviving first strike. It will be much more potent in a couple decades. "High-precision warheads are unnecessary in MAD, but do nothing to threaten or disrupt it." Again, read the link. "still very weak" Nothing prevents this from changing very quickly. "NATO is ruled predominantly by the U.S." To a certain extent, but not entirely. Read "A Little War That Shook the World" by Asmus for an example -- Georgia wasn't granted NATO membership action plan thanks to Germany finally seeing the light. "it includes" So you are saying that NATO expanded because of "tragicomically mismanaged economic reforms" in Russia? Or maybe you shouldn't be including such ridiculous reasons in your list? "Russian actions in the ex-Soviet republics" Please be specific.

keldaris 7y ago
> What would be a proportionate response then? First of all, if you think military intervention is a proportionate response, the onus is on you to justify such an extraordinary measure. That being said, there's a wide array of reasonable measures, ranging from changes in Russian military deployments all the way to targeted sanctions (a particularly effective tool in the case of Ukraine, as I'm sure you know). > You are wrong. Read the book. Okay. > Not if it has to deal with a few rockets surviving first strike. It will be much more potent in a couple decades. That's what ABM proponents have been saying for decades. Never seems to amount to much. Like I said, Russia has ample countermeasures that are much cheaper than an ABM system. Your own policymakers have always recognized this clearly, that's why Russia left START II (which would have banned MIRVs) literally the next day after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Putin's hypersonic weapon pronouncements, however PR-distorted, are ultimately directed at the same goal, just like the RS-28 (and the associated active protection system for launch sites) and other systems. > Again, read the link. I did, and I'm aware of the W76 deployments. They're much better tailored to limit the value of the Chinese nuclear deterrent than yours. On a more general MAD point - I wish your military invested in better early warning capabilities rather than silly doomsday weapons. Your existing arsenal easily suffices for credible deterrence many times over, it's the information asymmetry that's the dangerous part. > To a certain extent, but not entirely. Read "A Little War That Shook the World" by Asmus for an example -- Georgia wasn't granted NATO membership action plan thanks to Germany finally seeing the light. I have read it, actually. You're right about Georgia, but that's not really comparable to the earlier rounds of NATO expansion. Germany and France were happy to see Eastern European states join the EU, which left them in a much less credible position to oppose the same countries joining NATO as well. You may also recall that Asmus describes the 2008 war as essentially a Russian provocation, by the way (a position I don't entirely share). > So you are saying that NATO expanded because of "tragicomically mismanaged economic reforms" in Russia? Or maybe you shouldn't be including such ridiculous reasons in your list? They're not ridiculous if you consider them in context. If you're dealing with an unstable country with political, economic and social issues of such a magnitude that it cannot be regarded as a reliable partner, yet one with most of the world's nukes, at some point you're going to start viewing it as a potential threat. > Please be specific. Sure, why not. Russia has created and continuously maintained a number of "frozen conflict" zones (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, parts of Eastern Ukraine will probably join the list in a few years), directly interfered into the political systems of virtually every ex-Soviet state (with measures ranging from illegal financing all the way to targeted cyberattacks and active measures) and weaponized its gas exports for political aims. And yes, I know you can justify every point on that list by pointing to similarly hostile actions conducted by Western states against Russia. That's my point. There was tremendous good will after the collapse of the Soviet Union and both sides squandered it, preferring to engage in an escalating series of tit-for-tat responses, each of which individually makes sense to those who commit it, but which collectively add up to lead us to where we are today.