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> I'm not super keen on your chosen example of helping terrorists It's a motivating example. You don't want to help Jenny and neither do I, but if the technolo
by tialaramex 7y ago
> I'm not super keen on your chosen example of helping terrorists
It's a motivating example. You don't want to help Jenny and neither do I, but if the technology actually works that shouldn't matter, we have no discretion. If we have discretion in protecting Jenny, you can be assured that the governments sending these open letters will lean on that discretion for everybody, not just Jenny.
> No, private messages are private like you expect.
That's very confident considering the later caveats you introduce.
> Even if you consider a message service based on Tor, an attacker who controls the entire network can often figure things out by looking at sender and receiver timing.
Do you think humans (this is a service for humans) need sub-second delivery accuracy? No? So, why would you ensure this when as you realise this just helps an adversary? By throwing away everything better than second precision you make essentially no difference to the user experience but you mix everything up into 3600 events per hour that all have lots of indistinguishable participants.
> No, but you can see the length. Again this is true of all all end-to-end encrypted chat apps.
Again this is a service for humans. You can _choose_ to send exactly 1326 bytes over the wire out of some desire for brevity, but for humans padding everything to the nearest whole packet (~1500 bytes) greatly improves their privacy at essentially zero cost.
> If I never turn on that old laptop for months at a time, do we keep encrypting every message for its current key?
Well do you? My understanding is that in the Keybase design the answer is "Yes" and so most likely your confident "No" earlier will be wrong. Somewhere I can probably find keys that let me read Jenny's message and I am motivated to search for them.
> Exploding messages are a better solution for this problem, but they're also not a great default for most users.
Keybase's exploding messages are greatly fictionalized for the user experience. It reminds me of Mission Impossible. What the user sees is the message vanish instantly after a short timer, like a tape seemingly consumed in flame before their eyes on the TV show
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VQfhyDP6vw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VQfhyDP6vw
The reality is more like making Mission Impossible, the visual effect is achieved in a separate shot and pasted on, you could actually trivially recover the message for some time after it "explodes" across a variety of devices which each have their own keys. A month or two later the message is gone largely because nobody cares any more, not because it really "exploded" as depicted after just a few minutes.
> Keybase solves the key distribution problem in a totally different way from other end-to-end apps, by having you use social media to prove you own your key.
So, given my involvement with the Ten Blessed Methods (the means by which a Certificate Authority decides that ycombinator.com is really ycombinator.com in the Web PKI) you might expect me to be very sympathetic to this approach. But I'm not.
It ends up as a very woolly "Web-of-trust" type system and we know humans don't reason about those well. The technical argument may be "You can be confident that this Keybase account is controlled by someone who also controls the oconnor663 account on Hacker News or by someone who controls Hacker News itself or by someone at Keybase" but the human understanding is invariably just "This is Jack O'Connor" which is... misleading if I'm generous.
Forcing humans to do in person verification if they care, and allowing them to just not care is, in my not at all humble opinion, a better choice. I am very confident that messages from Al are really from Al having verified that our Signal numbers match, and not in the least bit confident that messages saying they're from Carol are really from Carol, and all the clever work at Keybase can't make a dent in that anyway because Carol leaves her phone unlocked on her desk.
> Forgive the wall of text
I'm the very last person who should criticise anybody on that front.
- oconnor663 7y ago> you could actually trivially recover the message for some time after it "explodes" across a variety of devices which each have their own keys. A month or two later the message is gone largely because nobody cares any more, not because it really "exploded" as depicted after just a few minutes. This is worth clarifying because it's complicated. What happens when the "fuse burns down" is that the server and all running devices delete the message immediately. This matches what the user thinks is happening, and it's what really matters in the vast majority of real world use cases. Now, one of the recipient devices could choose not to delete the message, and there's nothing we can do about that. They could be running a modified version of Keybase. Or the user could just photograph the message. The exploding messages in small Keybase groups are in fact cryptographically repudiable, but almost no one in the real world knows what that means or cares about it. More likely, the server itself could be compromised. It might be running evil code, or have a bug, or perhaps all its databases just get vacuumed up by a few different nation states. Who knows. So suppose the server side messages never get deleted. What's next? Like normal messages, exploding messages are end-to-end encrypted, so if the adversary never gets their hands on a recipient device, they can't read anything. Also like normal messages, if the adversary had a compromised recipient device before the message was sent, they can read everything, and there's nothing we can do about that. So the question is, what is their window to compromise a device after the message is sent? This is where the ephemeral key schedule is relevant. An active device issues a new ephemeral key each day. Each ephemeral key is retained for a week after its successor key is issued. (So if a device goes offline for a few days, its current ephemeral key will have its lifetime extended by a similar amount.) So a typical active devices has an array of live ephemeral keys, with remaining lifetimes of 7 days, 6 days, 5 days... If I send an exploding message with a lifetime less than 1 day, I will use an ephemeral key with a day or so remaining. For a longer message lifetime, I will use one of the longer-lived keys. (In fact there is a hierarchy of user ephemeral keys and team ephemeral keys, but the idea is the same.) If a device never generates a new ephemeral key for (currently as far as I know) 1.25 months, its active key expires with no replacement, and it no longer receives exploding messages at all. Thus each mothballed device exposes a limited window of exploding messages, and only if the adversary physically gets their hands on that specific device. If the device is ever legitimately reactivated, it will immediately delete all the expired keys. I'm not sure what to make of your summary that "a month or two later the message is gone largely because nobody cares any more." Do you have any questions about the design I just described above? > You can be confident that this Keybase account is controlled by someone who also controls the oconnor663 account on Hacker News or by someone who controls Hacker News itself or by someone at Keybase Keybase cannot lie about about who controls oconnor663 on Hacker News, because each Keybase client independently fetches the proof from my profile. This is the whole point of the Keybase security model. Now the Hacker News admins could post a proof as me, and maybe create some bogus 0c0nn0r663 account on Keybase to try to impersonate me there. But they can't replicate my GitHub proof, or my proof on jacko.io. Perhaps they register 0c0nn0r663 on GitHub too, and buy the jack0.io domain, and post lookalike proofs there. But at that point, if we're assuming that other users can be tricked by lookalikes, does it even matter that they compromised my real Hacker News account?