7 ms·

No offense taken at all. You may not have gotten it, because it probably isn’t explained fully (or even realized fully by him) until his second book, which I li

by thrav 7y ago

No offense taken at all. You may not have gotten it, because it probably isn’t explained fully (or even realized fully by him) until his second book, which I like much more. Whereas ZMM is an inquiry into values, Lila is an inquiry into morals, and is where he lays out his metaphysics of quality. Plenty of people think it’s garbage, but I’ve yet to see someone take it apart, which is why I asked the original question of you. You used the phrase, evolutionary forces in your explanation. To him, that’s quality. The force that compelled the amoeba to move towards nutrients and away from danger is quality. In Lila, written for something like 15 years after ZMM was published, he posits that quality can be broken into 2 essential forms: Dynamic quality and static quality. They basically correlate to liberalism and conservatism. In his mind, both are essential for evolutionary progress and are the source of all that is. Dynamic quality is often random, unconventional, and disruptive. It’s some wild mutation that ends up being a positive, or some rogue actor who ends up birthing a movement for good. It is essential to progress beyond what is currently. Static quality is all that is good currently. It’s the breadth of learned knowledge. It’s the safety of what’s gotten us this far. Abandoning it entirely is a recipe for chaos and potentially great loss. In his estimation, the combination of these 2 forms of quality is what makes evolution work, and he believes humans are not the highest expression of evolution. He outlines levels of the world that are conquered in the name of progress and that each one supersedes the one before it. The first level is non-living matter. It’s just there, not doing much. The second is biological. It bends the non-living stuff to its will. The next level is social. It uses the living stuff for its benefit. The good of the whole outweighs the good of the individuals. People are to the society like food is to people. They power it, create it, become it, and it carries on after they’re gone. He uses the example of New York, consuming human productivity for its own benefit. Feasting on humans to grow bigger and stronger, and shitting them out the other side. The final level, as he sees it, is intellectual. Ideas supersede the societies. They bend them to their will. The idea that slaves should be free is strong enough to risk destruction of the society. His ethics is based on these levels. At the biological level, sex is always quality. At the societal level, the wrong sex can threaten the community / society and becomes more nuanced, only quality sometimes. Society > biology. At the intellectual level, slavery is bad, even though it results in strong communities and cities and has many benefits. My plane is taking off, so I finished that off poorly, but read Lila is that’s at all intriguing. It’s my favorite book.

sideshowb 7y ago
(Aside: taking the split between static/dynamic as fundamental is at least as old as Hinduism and I do kinda like that perspective). Ok, so what stands out to me is at each of those levels you can define an individual of sorts (proton, phenotype, society, meme) with goals (electromagnetic, genetic survival, ??, memetic survival). So I get what you mean that definition of goals (quality) goes hand in hand with definition of individual and therefore subject/object in this restricted model of reality. But that's what this model seems to be to me, more of an ELI5 explanation than the grown up one. "the proton wants to move towards the electron, the rabbit wants to have babies, etc" is a simplified model that leverages our brain's skill at modelling motivations of other animals but falls prey to our tendency to see such motivation where it doesn't exist. Once you start testing this model by making predictions, it doesn't work because the levels work rather differently under the hood. Try using evolutionary principles at the social level to predict the growth of New York for example, and you are going to mispredict because New York isn't going to reproduce in any meaningful sense, it will either grow or die (there's a vague parallel to group selection controversies here but not that relevant). People (like the inhabitants of New York) and ideas (like ideas on how cities should be run), conversely, can be said to evolve due to mutation and reproduction and if you predict the growth of New York based on evolutionary influences from those levels you are more likely to succeed (alternatively you could take some sort of network/complexity approach but whatever works it isn't going to be city level evolution * ). But let's not get hung up on evolution, it's just an example of how the levels differ so much in their details that the only correct overarching definition of quality for each level would appear to be "the thing the thing is going to do anyway", a definition so general as to be useless * . From that light the good student essay was the thing Phaedrus wanted (the standard he was trying to achieve in his students) but if we want theories to make useful predictions we need to predict when this will and won't happen (e.g. because the alcohol molecule's notion of 'quality' interferes with the student's brain's efforts to reproduce Phaedrus' notion thereof) which is where the model breaks down. Or maybe this theory isn't supposed to help predict anything but is supposed to help grade essays? but "what I wanted to see" is not a useful definition of quality for the student either. *edit: unless it's morphic resonance a la Rupert Sheldrake, a theory so general you can state it as "whatever happens becomes more likely to happen again". But while at first sight that notion is strongly related to quality as defined by Pirsig, I think that may be an illusion caused by them both being super-general abstractions. MR is subtly different and although not accepted by scientific consensus that difference at least allows it to make testable predictions. Thank you for helping me think through this stuff more (as my edit history would show!)

by thrav 7y ago

sideshowb 7y ago

(Aside: taking the split between static/dynamic as fundamental is at least as old as Hinduism and I do kinda like that perspective). Ok, so what stands out to me is at each of those levels you can define an individual of sorts (proton, phenotype, society, meme) with goals (electromagnetic, genetic survival, ??, memetic survival). So I get what you mean that definition of goals (quality) goes hand in hand with definition of individual and therefore subject/object in this restricted model of reality. But that's what this model seems to be to me, more of an ELI5 explanation than the grown up one. "the proton wants to move towards the electron, the rabbit wants to have babies, etc" is a simplified model that leverages our brain's skill at modelling motivations of other animals but falls prey to our tendency to see such motivation where it doesn't exist. Once you start testing this model by making predictions, it doesn't work because the levels work rather differently under the hood. Try using evolutionary principles at the social level to predict the growth of New York for example, and you are going to mispredict because New York isn't going to reproduce in any meaningful sense, it will either grow or die (there's a vague parallel to group selection controversies here but not that relevant). People (like the inhabitants of New York) and ideas (like ideas on how cities should be run), conversely, can be said to evolve due to mutation and reproduction and if you predict the growth of New York based on evolutionary influences from those levels you are more likely to succeed (alternatively you could take some sort of network/complexity approach but whatever works it isn't going to be city level evolution * ). But let's not get hung up on evolution, it's just an example of how the levels differ so much in their details that the only correct overarching definition of quality for each level would appear to be "the thing the thing is going to do anyway", a definition so general as to be useless * . From that light the good student essay was the thing Phaedrus wanted (the standard he was trying to achieve in his students) but if we want theories to make useful predictions we need to predict when this will and won't happen (e.g. because the alcohol molecule's notion of 'quality' interferes with the student's brain's efforts to reproduce Phaedrus' notion thereof) which is where the model breaks down. Or maybe this theory isn't supposed to help predict anything but is supposed to help grade essays? but "what I wanted to see" is not a useful definition of quality for the student either. *edit: unless it's morphic resonance a la Rupert Sheldrake, a theory so general you can state it as "whatever happens becomes more likely to happen again". But while at first sight that notion is strongly related to quality as defined by Pirsig, I think that may be an illusion caused by them both being super-general abstractions. MR is subtly different and although not accepted by scientific consensus that difference at least allows it to make testable predictions. Thank you for helping me think through this stuff more (as my edit history would show!)