9 ms·

Charlie, Al, and I were just trying to maintain a sense of humor in fairly tough times, knowing that the first who would see the key would be the folks we were

by rozzie 7y ago

Charlie, Al, and I were just trying to maintain a sense of humor in fairly tough times, knowing that the first who would see the key would be the folks we were working with at the ministry.

Ozzie_osman 7y ago
Respect to you (from one Ozzie to another).
dclowd9901 7y ago
With no judgment whatsoever, may I ask: why did you do the work? Why did you not walk away and stand on moral principle against such intervention? From reading your comments, I gather this isn’t something you agreed with.
- acqq 7y ago
  The context has an unofficial name "crypto wars": https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars "In the U.S." since "the immediate post WWII period" the "crypto software was included as a Category XIII item into the United States Munitions List." That meant that exporting software with strong encryption was legally the same as exporting weapons. What they Ray Ozzie and colleagues implemented was at that moment (1996) claimed to be a "superior exportable encryption technology when compared to other US products on the market": https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/21281/lotus.notes.nsa.backdoor.txt.html https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/21281/lotus.notes.nsa.... To compare: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_th... To be able to export Netscape web browser with SSL (a predecessor of TLS) "Netscape developed two versions of its web browser. The "U.S. edition" supported full size (typically 1024-bit or larger) RSA public keys in combination with full size symmetric keys (secret keys) (128-bit RC4 or 3DES in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0). The "International Edition" had its effective key lengths reduced to 512 bits and 40 bits respectively (RSA_EXPORT with 40-bit RC2 or RC4 in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0).[6] Acquiring the 'U.S. domestic' version turned out to be sufficient hassle that most computer users, even in the U.S., ended up with the 'International' version,[7] whose weak 40-bit encryption can currently be broken in a matter of days using a single computer." Only later: "In January 2000, the U.S. Government relaxed export regulations over certain classes of mass-market encryption products. In line with these changes, Netscape has made the strong-crypto versions of Communicator and Navigator available worldwide." (1) https://www.fortify.net/README.html#do https://www.fortify.net/README.html#do
  - dclowd9901 7y ago
    I appreciate the illustrative nature of your comment, but I'm really looking to learn something from a rather influential mind in software engineering.
- rozzie 7y ago
  The product we built (1984) was for team collaboration & business apps, and we placed a strong bet on crypto for end to end encryption rather than just the illusion of security via access control. It hadn’t been done before. Crypto based products in that era were classified as munitions. They didn’t know what to do with our request; initially they suggested granting us 20 bits for symmetric keys. We got them up to 32. Within a couple years they went to 40. But we used 64 in our US products and wanted to deliver that level globally. The principled thing to do would be to have never tried to ship our product outside the US, knowing the export regime. But we had customers who wanted to communicate and collaborate with teams globally. Their alternative was to send everything in the clear, and I wanted to deliver a secure comms system for my global customers. Ultimately I felt that they were better off with something to protect them - even a compromise - rather than nothing. The bet was that we could get rid of the compromise over time. (Thankfully, the hack was only necessary for a few short years.) While “working the issue” in DC, I personally came to the viewpoint that most of the policy makers were not inherently evil or stupid; they truly didn’t fully grasp the myriad implications of this new technology. The issues are complex, the pressures great, and it is difficult for them to know how to balance equities. And so, right or wrong, I felt my best bet to change the system was to use methods that I suppose Bruce Lee would call “fighting without fighting”, as opposed to purely principled extremism.

by rozzie 7y ago

Charlie, Al, and I were just trying to maintain a sense of humor in fairly tough times, knowing that the first who would see the key would be the folks we were working with at the ministry.

Ozzie_osman 7y ago

Respect to you (from one Ozzie to another).

dclowd9901 7y ago

With no judgment whatsoever, may I ask: why did you do the work? Why did you not walk away and stand on moral principle against such intervention? From reading your comments, I gather this isn’t something you agreed with.

acqq 7y ago
The context has an unofficial name "crypto wars": https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars "In the U.S." since "the immediate post WWII period" the "crypto software was included as a Category XIII item into the United States Munitions List." That meant that exporting software with strong encryption was legally the same as exporting weapons. What they Ray Ozzie and colleagues implemented was at that moment (1996) claimed to be a "superior exportable encryption technology when compared to other US products on the market": https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/21281/lotus.notes.nsa.backdoor.txt.html https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/21281/lotus.notes.nsa.... To compare: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_th... To be able to export Netscape web browser with SSL (a predecessor of TLS) "Netscape developed two versions of its web browser. The "U.S. edition" supported full size (typically 1024-bit or larger) RSA public keys in combination with full size symmetric keys (secret keys) (128-bit RC4 or 3DES in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0). The "International Edition" had its effective key lengths reduced to 512 bits and 40 bits respectively (RSA_EXPORT with 40-bit RC2 or RC4 in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0).[6] Acquiring the 'U.S. domestic' version turned out to be sufficient hassle that most computer users, even in the U.S., ended up with the 'International' version,[7] whose weak 40-bit encryption can currently be broken in a matter of days using a single computer." Only later: "In January 2000, the U.S. Government relaxed export regulations over certain classes of mass-market encryption products. In line with these changes, Netscape has made the strong-crypto versions of Communicator and Navigator available worldwide." (1) https://www.fortify.net/README.html#do https://www.fortify.net/README.html#do
- dclowd9901 7y ago
  I appreciate the illustrative nature of your comment, but I'm really looking to learn something from a rather influential mind in software engineering.
rozzie 7y ago
The product we built (1984) was for team collaboration & business apps, and we placed a strong bet on crypto for end to end encryption rather than just the illusion of security via access control. It hadn’t been done before. Crypto based products in that era were classified as munitions. They didn’t know what to do with our request; initially they suggested granting us 20 bits for symmetric keys. We got them up to 32. Within a couple years they went to 40. But we used 64 in our US products and wanted to deliver that level globally. The principled thing to do would be to have never tried to ship our product outside the US, knowing the export regime. But we had customers who wanted to communicate and collaborate with teams globally. Their alternative was to send everything in the clear, and I wanted to deliver a secure comms system for my global customers. Ultimately I felt that they were better off with something to protect them - even a compromise - rather than nothing. The bet was that we could get rid of the compromise over time. (Thankfully, the hack was only necessary for a few short years.) While “working the issue” in DC, I personally came to the viewpoint that most of the policy makers were not inherently evil or stupid; they truly didn’t fully grasp the myriad implications of this new technology. The issues are complex, the pressures great, and it is difficult for them to know how to balance equities. And so, right or wrong, I felt my best bet to change the system was to use methods that I suppose Bruce Lee would call “fighting without fighting”, as opposed to purely principled extremism.