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> AES has to look like random noise. If there is any correlation to the input detectable by someone without the key it would be useless for crypto. Uh... AES (
by ajross 7y ago
> AES has to look like random noise. If there is any correlation to the input detectable by someone without the key it would be useless for crypto.
Uh... AES (to pick your particular example) is a symmetric algorithm. By definition there is a 1:1 correlation to the input. If you have the key and know the input you can compute the output, and vice versa. The question at hand is not whether the algorithm is breakable but whether someone can find the key (or more generally the PRNG state).
And that's what the entropy pool does: it seeds the PRNG state with values that are derived at runtime by the kernel and not under the control of an attacker, even one embedded in the system.
There are side arguments about whether the entropy pool's estimates are good ones, about whether it should block by default when empty, etc... But I don't see any reasonable arguments that this isn't a useful feature for an OS kernel to provide.
- dependenttypes 7y ago> By definition there is a 1:1 correlation to the input But it is still not detectable without the key.