Looks like quite a lot of redundancy here - you can split up controls over various stations really in kind of any way you want. That being the problem. The arti

Looks like quite a lot of redundancy here - you can split up controls over various stations really in kind of any way you want. That being the problem. The article led me to think the crash was more a confluence of factors: staff shortages, high operational demands, culture of tolerating cursory training, and a very complex new system that was both substantially harder to understand than traditional fixed stations, and constantly changing. The complexity of the IBNS system seems to be the ultimate culprit, in that the various members of the stressed and tired bridge crew were each operating under a different mental model of the state of the system. Because of IBNS's flexibility, there were too many possible states for a crew to reason about under pressure. Software makes it very easy for states to proliferate, but there hasn't been enough research (nor, more soberly, enough spilled blood) yet around designing flexible systems which are easily comprehensible in urgent situations. Of course this complexity does cause problems in aviation, even with that culture's extreme emphasis on rigorous training, procedure, and human factors. AF 447, for example.