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It's not a conspiracy theory if the proposed scenario is the DOJ says to Apple in a lawful wiretap order "you must push this wiretapped messaging app update to
by sneak 7y ago
It's not a conspiracy theory if the proposed scenario is the DOJ says to Apple in a lawful wiretap order "you must push this wiretapped messaging app update to phone identified by IMEI 12345". Wiretaps and stored comms records subpoenas are commonplace things, and the DOJ is entirely capable of contracting someone to quickly produce a specially-modified wiretap version of any app available on the app store (it's not a terribly difficult technical hurdle), even the ones that aren't open source.
Whether or not Apple would cooperate by providing the appropriate app signature and shipping it to the phone or not is another question. There is of course the legal argument that creating a cryptographic signature against their will is compelled speech and thus they have the right to fight or refuse. Personally, I doubt they'd fight very hard, provided the whole thing were kept secret (which would be in the interest of both Apple and the DOJ). Apple knows quite well that you can't fight city hall (or the CCP). The wiretapped iCloud servers in China are a perfect example of Apple's reputation remaining intact despite shipping a nationwide backdoor for a government to millions of their iPhone and iPad customers.
After all, they'd always have the standard "we received a lawful wiretap order, signed by a federal judge, appropriately limited in scope to a single suspect, with which we were legally required to comply" fallback.
- cjbprime 7y agoJeez, I guess so. We're pretty far off track: when I wrote that "[app stores] don't make it possible to target users with malicious updates" up there, what I was talking about was that the app stores aren't giving Foo App's developers the power to push individualized malware to their users, which is a power that Foo App has through its own desktop autoupdater system. App stores raise the bar from "Foo App decides to own you" to "The DoJ is able to convince a company with the legal firepower of Apple to sign and deliver a backdoored version of someone else's app". This is.. not a small difference in user risk.
- sneak 7y agoI suppose so, but I am not keeping my conversations secret from the nice folks at OWS, I am keeping them secret from the federal government who likes to lock people up on bogus trumped-up charges for criticizing them or their allies in public; see weev or Roger Ver or Assange for examples. The DoJ threat model is much more likely and much more dangerous than a rogue insider at the app dev shop pushing an update.