> (b) a breakdown of TLS implies the code running on the endpoint can't be trusted, therefore (c) assume data exfiltration when TLS breaks down regardless of o

> (b) a breakdown of TLS implies the code running on the endpoint can't be trusted, therefore (c) assume data exfiltration when TLS breaks down regardless of other variables In security engineering the main question is always "from whom do you want to protect it." If your assumed adversary can overtake both your TLS and deliver modified scripts, yes, the encryption in browser doesn't bring anything. If your assumed adversary is somebody less powerful like a passive listener somewhere the traffic is comes out of TLS, or somebody who has access to the data, but the data are already encrypted, then yes, the encryption can make a difference. Or as one great thinker wrote for Usenix 2014: "In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad." "If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https:// https:// If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them." https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf