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Not at all, just that the pure theory of falsificationism as specified by Popper both excludes valid science, and includes pseudoscience (for instance, astrolog
by claudiawerner 7y ago
Not at all, just that the pure theory of falsificationism as specified by Popper both excludes valid science, and includes pseudoscience (for instance, astrology is falsifiable). Thus, falsifiablity is not both necessary and sufficient[0].
[0] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/
- taneq 7y agoThe core tenet of science is testing of hypotheses. Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. Astrology itself is not scientific but, if you use a version of it that's falsifiable, you absolutely can do a valid scientific study on it by making astrological predictions and then testing to see whether they come true. I think it's pretty widely agreed that we've already done this and the (valid scientific) result was negative.
- claudiawerner 7y ago>Any hypothesis that's not falsifiable is by definition not scientifically testable. This is beside the point. The point of contention is whether or not falsifiability is what makes science what it is, or should be. Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. Bad science, such as astrology, does often propose falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific (useful to remember that Popper counted Darwinian evolution as non-science). Falsifiability isn't enough for something to be science; it's not necessary and sufficient - because otherwise astrology is science, and exploratory research, popular in many scientific fields, isn't science. The fact that astrology's claims have been falsified does not discount it as science, since a great number of genuine scientific papers also successfully falsify their hypotheses - finding a null result is an example of falsifying a hypothesis.
- taneq 7y ago> Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so. > Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it science in and of itself. Science is work that follows the scientific process: Choose a question to answer, formulate a hypothesis, make testable predictions based on the hypothesis, test the predictions, analyze and report the results. We can come with a new term (maybe 'pondering'?) for trying to answer questions without testing hypotheses, but by definition it won't be science.
- claudiawerner 7y ago>There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so. That's quite a bold statement which is not supported by current work in the philosophy of science. Would you be willing to claim that most papers submitted to Nature don't count as science? >No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it science in and of itself. The claim was that falsifiability is necessary and sufficient to count as science - so really we're in agreement. Making falsifiable claims is not necessary and sufficient demarcation of science and pseudo-science. You need something more than falsifiability to distinguish science from pseudo-science. The question is: what is that thing? >but by definition it won't be science. By whose definition? You're sending mixed messages - why is physics a science, rather than merely capable of being a subject of scientific study? We can make claims in physics that are just as falsifiable as the ones in astrology. It's also unwise to paint an idealistic vision of science (falsificationism) in contrast to how it's actually practiced; from SEP: >Popper’s focus on falsifications of theories led to a concentration on the rather rare instances when a whole theory is at stake. According to Kuhn, the way in which science works on such occasions cannot be used to characterize the entire scientific enterprise. Instead it is in “normal science”, the science that takes place between the unusual moments of scientific revolutions, that we find the characteristics by which science can be distinguished from other activities.