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> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners make the polite assumption that it's also true for other similar beings.

yters 7y ago
Why is it polite to assume non concious entities are conscious?
- TuringTest 7y ago
  How do you know they are non-conscious? If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck... For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.
Zigurd 7y ago
You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.
- yters 7y ago
  What is an illusion without consciousness?
  - criddell 7y ago
    The conscious experience might be there but at the same time it could be an entirely deterministic thing. Maybe you and I having this exchange was determined in the instant of the big bang.
    - TuringTest 7y ago
      Being deterministic doesn't make it any less conscious. We're talking perception here, not free will. In fact, there's pretty good evidence that what we call consciousness is a post-facto rationalization of the subconscious brain processes that determine an automatic answer of your brain to stimulus (not that it makes them deterministic, but certainly they're not "rational" in the classic sense).
  - naasking 7y ago
    > What is an illusion without consciousness? A perception that, divorced from all other facts, entails a false conclusion. So your perception of conscious subjectivity could indeed be an illusion.
    - antonvs 7y ago
      "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. Put another way, how would you program a computer to have a perception of conscious subjectivity, as opposed to just blindly and unconsciously executing its instructions?
      - naasking 7y ago
        > "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic. We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve the illusion of parallelism, ie. context switching between internal and external mental models produces the illusion of consciousness. [1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...
        TuringTest 7y ago
        > Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere. The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definition, you assertion that 'conscious subjectivity is an illusion' is inconsistent, as an illusion is a complex form of perception that requires a consciousness to perceive it. Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).
- Gupie 7y ago
  I also hear sounds, see colours, feel pain. These are qualia don't exist outside minds, and are not thoughts but experiences.
- antonvs 7y ago
  That doesn't really work. What is "yourself" in that statement, other than a conscious entity? How would you write a computer program that "tells that story to itself," such that it actually has an experience of the world, as opposed to just being a machine executing a program without any conscious awareness? Edit: also, whether we're in charge of our thoughts is a separate question from whether we possess consciousness. Even if we're not in charge of our thoughts, we still have a conscious experience of them.
  - pistachiopro 7y ago
    I've never heard a complete and convincing explanation for what "yourself" could be, but meditating on the extreme unintuitiveness of self-reference and recursion (a la Douglas Hofstadter's I am a Strange Loop) increases my expectation that a computational explanation is coming, eventually.
    - antonvs 7y ago
      I think that's pretty wishful thinking. It's not like we don't have a lot of experience with self-reference and recursion in computational systems. In fact this site is named after that. I don't think the Y combinator is conscious.

yters 7y ago

Why is it polite to assume non concious entities are conscious?

TuringTest 7y ago
How do you know they are non-conscious? If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck... For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.

Zigurd 7y ago

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

yters 7y ago
What is an illusion without consciousness?
- criddell 7y ago
  The conscious experience might be there but at the same time it could be an entirely deterministic thing. Maybe you and I having this exchange was determined in the instant of the big bang.
  - TuringTest 7y ago
    Being deterministic doesn't make it any less conscious. We're talking perception here, not free will. In fact, there's pretty good evidence that what we call consciousness is a post-facto rationalization of the subconscious brain processes that determine an automatic answer of your brain to stimulus (not that it makes them deterministic, but certainly they're not "rational" in the classic sense).
- naasking 7y ago
  > What is an illusion without consciousness? A perception that, divorced from all other facts, entails a false conclusion. So your perception of conscious subjectivity could indeed be an illusion.
  - antonvs 7y ago
    "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. Put another way, how would you program a computer to have a perception of conscious subjectivity, as opposed to just blindly and unconsciously executing its instructions?
    - naasking 7y ago
      > "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic. We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve the illusion of parallelism, ie. context switching between internal and external mental models produces the illusion of consciousness. [1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...
      - TuringTest 7y ago
        > Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere. The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definition, you assertion that 'conscious subjectivity is an illusion' is inconsistent, as an illusion is a complex form of perception that requires a consciousness to perceive it. Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).
Gupie 7y ago
I also hear sounds, see colours, feel pain. These are qualia don't exist outside minds, and are not thoughts but experiences.
antonvs 7y ago
That doesn't really work. What is "yourself" in that statement, other than a conscious entity? How would you write a computer program that "tells that story to itself," such that it actually has an experience of the world, as opposed to just being a machine executing a program without any conscious awareness? Edit: also, whether we're in charge of our thoughts is a separate question from whether we possess consciousness. Even if we're not in charge of our thoughts, we still have a conscious experience of them.
- pistachiopro 7y ago
  I've never heard a complete and convincing explanation for what "yourself" could be, but meditating on the extreme unintuitiveness of self-reference and recursion (a la Douglas Hofstadter's I am a Strange Loop) increases my expectation that a computational explanation is coming, eventually.
  - antonvs 7y ago
    I think that's pretty wishful thinking. It's not like we don't have a lot of experience with self-reference and recursion in computational systems. In fact this site is named after that. I don't think the Y combinator is conscious.