4 ms·

I accept that judges sometimes need to refer to dictionaries, but wonder whether this particular essay is someehow related to Scalia's positions on orginalism?

I accept that judges sometimes need to refer to dictionaries, but wonder whether this particular essay is someehow related to Scalia's positions on orginalism? Also, why are the "fowls raised for meat" definitions that they use as an example more explanatory than the "domesticated fowls" definitions? Is it possible that the authors are confusing greater specificity for being fuller or more explanatory or superior? Given the prevailing dogma that English language dictionaries merely describe popular use rather than prescribe it, it is unclear that the more specific definitions more accurately describe its use by fluent language users.

twic 7y ago
> wonder whether this particular essay is someehow related to Scalia's positions on orginalism Indeed. IANAL, but i suspect that in the poultry case, a British judge would start with the plain meaning rule, decide that it wasn't absolutely clear whether a fighting cock was poultry, and then fall back to the mischief rule, asking what the original intent of the law was. They wouldn't sit around poring over dictionaries trying to find a definition that fits their desired meaning. Whereas that's an originalist's favourite thing to do!
- Balanceinfinity 7y ago
  You may agree or disagree with Justice Scalia, but he was not one to sit around trying to figure out legislative intent when reading a statute (http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1486&context=mulr http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art...). His take was that the legislature spoke through the statutes text, and after that it was up to the judges.