Running a recursive resolver does protect against one very specific kind of threat: a malicious recursive resolver that has decided to log all of my queries.

Running a recursive resolver does protect against one very specific kind of threat: a malicious recursive resolver that has decided to log all of my queries. DoH absolutely does not protect against this specific threat, because it's just a different protocol for speaking to a third-party recursive resolver. A properly-configured resolver (i.e. one that is doing QNAME minimisation) only reveals a very limited amount of information to each DNS server that it queries. It's akin to the fact that browsing a web site reveals my activity to that site's origin server. I'm not overly concerned about it. The only threat that DoH protects against is the situation where an adversary is able to observe all of my outbound DNS query traffic. In this very specific scenario (essentially a compromised ISP), then yes, DoH offers better privacy protection. But it's a rather Faustian bargain to make, because in order to receive protection against a malicious ISP, I must instead put my full trust in whomever is operating the DoH resolver. Out of the kettle and into the frying pan, isn't it? So DoH doesn't solve the problem. It merely lets users transfer their trust from their ISP (with whom they have a legal contractual relationship governed under the laws of their home country) to a large third-party organisation (with whom they do not have a legal contractual relationship). If it came down to a matter of holding someone to account for a breach of my privacy, I'd sure rather be up against my local ISP as opposed to a faceless global entity such as Google, Cloudflare, or even the Mozilla Foundation.