I just had a funny thought. I don't know if it makes any sense, but it's funny to think about it. This is all made with my tongue firmly in my cheek, I don't kn

I just had a funny thought. I don't know if it makes any sense, but it's funny to think about it. This is all made with my tongue firmly in my cheek, I don't know nearly enough about the topic to have any sort of confidence on what follows, so hold your downvotes :-) Let's assume MWI is correct. This means that, as far as I understand, the Schrodinger equation imposes that for each quantum event there is a forking in two worlds: one per possible state (cat alive/dead). The implication is that there are (infinitely) many world branches that go from the beginning to the end of time. Since there is no collapse, each of these branches must be superdeterministic by definition: that's how we picked the branch, we identified a sequence of forks in the Schrodinger equation by picking the result. "I" can live only in one of these branches: there are infinitely many "I"s, but the one I am in right now is one of them. I'll be in my branch until I die (many other "I"s will branch off me). Since every "I" lives on a branch, every "I" experiences the universe as superdeterministic. Thus, if we assume MWI is correct, the result for any possible "I" is indistinguishable from superdeterminism. It gets funnier. If what I said it is true, MWI and superdeterminism are indistinguishable. However, one presupposes the creation of branches, while the other does not. Thus one is more parsimonious than the other, and should be preferred. Or, in other worlds, by assuming MWI is true, we prove that it is false and that superdeterminism is true.