5 ms·

You may find this interesting https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E/and-the-winner-is-many-worlds https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E

You may find this interesting https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E/and-the-winner-is-many-worlds https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E/and-the-wi...

trevyn 7y ago
Wait, is MWI compatible with superdeterminism? That is, the sequence above seems to show that MWI is an effective way to calculate, but does not actually rule out superdeterminism underneath it — just like ordinary quantum mechanics is an effective way to calculate in certain domains of applicability but cannot effectively claim to be the “underlying reality”.
- trenchgun 7y ago
  This seems to be the correct take. Edit. Based on Hossfelder's & Palmer's paper I have transitioned from MWI to superdeterminism. I encourage all to read the paper. Very beautiful clarity of thought, I say.
- GoblinSlayer 7y ago
  All theories are compatible with undetectable additions, but that's kinda whole point: MWI doesn't need them and works fine without them. But I believe superdeterminism has single world, so I don't see how it can emulate MWI.
  - mikk14 7y ago
    I just had a funny thought. I don't know if it makes any sense, but it's funny to think about it. This is all made with my tongue firmly in my cheek, I don't know nearly enough about the topic to have any sort of confidence on what follows, so hold your downvotes :-) Let's assume MWI is correct. This means that, as far as I understand, the Schrodinger equation imposes that for each quantum event there is a forking in two worlds: one per possible state (cat alive/dead). The implication is that there are (infinitely) many world branches that go from the beginning to the end of time. Since there is no collapse, each of these branches must be superdeterministic by definition: that's how we picked the branch, we identified a sequence of forks in the Schrodinger equation by picking the result. "I" can live only in one of these branches: there are infinitely many "I"s, but the one I am in right now is one of them. I'll be in my branch until I die (many other "I"s will branch off me). Since every "I" lives on a branch, every "I" experiences the universe as superdeterministic. Thus, if we assume MWI is correct, the result for any possible "I" is indistinguishable from superdeterminism. It gets funnier. If what I said it is true, MWI and superdeterminism are indistinguishable. However, one presupposes the creation of branches, while the other does not. Thus one is more parsimonious than the other, and should be preferred. Or, in other worlds, by assuming MWI is true, we prove that it is false and that superdeterminism is true.
    - AgentME 7y ago
      I believe your understanding of MWI is close enough, but I don't think your use of "superdeterminism" is correct. Superdeterminism is an attempt to give a local explanation for seemingly-non-local quantum phenomena. MWI is a specific local explanation for quantum phenomena, so there's no reason to add in a superdeterministic explanation for non-local phenomena, because there are no non-local phenomena in MWI that need any explaining away. I think you might be slightly mixing up superdeterminism with determinism (which is compatible with MWI).
      - mikk14 7y ago
        Fair enough! My defense would be that, given that we picked a given branch from Big Bang to end-of-time, technically we picked a branch that had encoded all results of all forkings in the beginning, which is my understanding of superdeterminism. But as I said, I know too little about this to marry any opinion.
- AgentME 7y ago
  Superdeterminism was only proposed as an explanation for quantum "spooky action at a distance" without sacrificing the principle of locality. MWI already explains this weirdness without sacrificing the principle of locality, so there's no reason left to suggest superdeterminism if you accept MWI. MWI is compatible with and really is just Schrodinger's equation. Superdeterminism is compatible with practically anything, because it's just "what if the physics we know, plus something about the initial state happens to explain any spooky action at a distance [but MWI has no spooky action at a distance anyway]".

You may find this interesting https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E/and-the-winner-is-many-worlds https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/9cgBF6BQ2TRB3Hy4E/and-the-wi...

trevyn 7y ago

Wait, is MWI compatible with superdeterminism? That is, the sequence above seems to show that MWI is an effective way to calculate, but does not actually rule out superdeterminism underneath it — just like ordinary quantum mechanics is an effective way to calculate in certain domains of applicability but cannot effectively claim to be the “underlying reality”.

trenchgun 7y ago
This seems to be the correct take. Edit. Based on Hossfelder's & Palmer's paper I have transitioned from MWI to superdeterminism. I encourage all to read the paper. Very beautiful clarity of thought, I say.
GoblinSlayer 7y ago
All theories are compatible with undetectable additions, but that's kinda whole point: MWI doesn't need them and works fine without them. But I believe superdeterminism has single world, so I don't see how it can emulate MWI.
- mikk14 7y ago
  I just had a funny thought. I don't know if it makes any sense, but it's funny to think about it. This is all made with my tongue firmly in my cheek, I don't know nearly enough about the topic to have any sort of confidence on what follows, so hold your downvotes :-) Let's assume MWI is correct. This means that, as far as I understand, the Schrodinger equation imposes that for each quantum event there is a forking in two worlds: one per possible state (cat alive/dead). The implication is that there are (infinitely) many world branches that go from the beginning to the end of time. Since there is no collapse, each of these branches must be superdeterministic by definition: that's how we picked the branch, we identified a sequence of forks in the Schrodinger equation by picking the result. "I" can live only in one of these branches: there are infinitely many "I"s, but the one I am in right now is one of them. I'll be in my branch until I die (many other "I"s will branch off me). Since every "I" lives on a branch, every "I" experiences the universe as superdeterministic. Thus, if we assume MWI is correct, the result for any possible "I" is indistinguishable from superdeterminism. It gets funnier. If what I said it is true, MWI and superdeterminism are indistinguishable. However, one presupposes the creation of branches, while the other does not. Thus one is more parsimonious than the other, and should be preferred. Or, in other worlds, by assuming MWI is true, we prove that it is false and that superdeterminism is true.
  - AgentME 7y ago
    I believe your understanding of MWI is close enough, but I don't think your use of "superdeterminism" is correct. Superdeterminism is an attempt to give a local explanation for seemingly-non-local quantum phenomena. MWI is a specific local explanation for quantum phenomena, so there's no reason to add in a superdeterministic explanation for non-local phenomena, because there are no non-local phenomena in MWI that need any explaining away. I think you might be slightly mixing up superdeterminism with determinism (which is compatible with MWI).
    - mikk14 7y ago
      Fair enough! My defense would be that, given that we picked a given branch from Big Bang to end-of-time, technically we picked a branch that had encoded all results of all forkings in the beginning, which is my understanding of superdeterminism. But as I said, I know too little about this to marry any opinion.
AgentME 7y ago
Superdeterminism was only proposed as an explanation for quantum "spooky action at a distance" without sacrificing the principle of locality. MWI already explains this weirdness without sacrificing the principle of locality, so there's no reason left to suggest superdeterminism if you accept MWI. MWI is compatible with and really is just Schrodinger's equation. Superdeterminism is compatible with practically anything, because it's just "what if the physics we know, plus something about the initial state happens to explain any spooky action at a distance [but MWI has no spooky action at a distance anyway]".