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Ban the aircraft. Criminally charge everyone involved in suppressing it's serious issues and forcing it through approval. Figure out how their processes become

Ban the aircraft. Criminally charge everyone involved in suppressing it's serious issues and forcing it through approval. Figure out how their processes become vulnerable to corruption and attempt to change them. The problem is of course the FAA doesn't want to hurt Boeing or the industry over this. But that strongly conflicts with their job. The hope at this point seems to be to drag it out until people forget.

CharlesColeman 7y ago
> Ban the aircraft. Criminally charge everyone involved in suppressing it's serious issues and forcing it through approval. That's going a bit too far. Banning MCAS and requiring pilots to undergo MAX-specific training and certification seems more reasonable (and less wasteful) response to the issues. I would support criminal charges against the chief decision-makers that led Boeing into this mess, going all the way up to the top. Examples need to be made to reset the priorities of corporate decision-makers.
- snuxoll 7y ago
  The 737 Max is doomed without the MCAS, the entire reason it exists is to keep the same type rating the same to keep pilots from needing to re-certify. Airlines will have serious reason to consider other manufacturers if they can’t just throw pilots behind the stick with minimal training.
  - acqq 7y ago
    > Airlines will have serious reason to consider other manufacturers if they can’t just throw pilots behind the stick with minimal training. Hopefully the regulators will seriously investigate if it is safe to assume that the retraining is not needed even with modified MCAS. Just claiming that pilots will easier deactivate MCAS, or that, after the "fix", MCAS will deactivate itself if there is some problem should not be enough: without MCAS running the plane just doesn't behave as the one for which the pilots were trained.
  - CharlesColeman 7y ago
    > The 737 Max is doomed without the MCAS, the entire reason it exists is to keep the same type rating the same to keep pilots from needing to re-certify. That's what Boeing wanted, but that doesn't mean they should get it. Anyway, I think "doomed" is overstating it. I would assume whatever training an existing 737 pilot would need to fly and MCAS-less MAX would be far less that what they would need to fly an Airbus.
    - salawat 7y ago
      The MAX can't be certified for civil air transport without MCAS. That's the rub. If Boeing could have built and certified the plane without it, they would have.
      - kingofpandora 7y ago
        Are you sure? There's been a lot written about the reasons for MCAS and this is the first time I've seen anyone claim that the MAX couldn't be certified without it. Everyone else has stated that the reason for MCAS is so that MAX could be certified as a previous generation of 737 and therefore not require training for an established 737 pilot to fly.
        mantap 7y ago
        They added MCAS because the larger engines increase the propensity of the aircraft to pitch up at high angles of attack. This is against FAA rules and renders the aircraft uncertifiable. Their solution was to add MCAS which is designed to change the aircraft's stall characteristics "in software" so that it can be certified without major design changes. If they want to remove MCAS then they need to enlarge the undercarriage to give the aircraft more ground clearance, so that the engines can be placed further back. Such a major change to the aircraft's design would mean the 737 MAX could not share a type rating with the other 737s or at least would require significant differences training (not an iPad lesson)
        salawat 7y ago
        I am. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/ https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the... Yes, you are correct in that part of the reason for it was to mimic the control forces of older 737's for avoiding the burden of simulator training. However, you have to look at why it was a manufacturer would take the risk to make such a boneheaded implementation in the first place. Nothing goes into a mass-produced highly complex system without being very carefully thought through. It wasn't some "accident". It was a calculated act of value engineering. On the one hand, someone had wind tunnel results that said there would be a divergence from the old 737 force curves. On the other, you had a pile of solutions capable of fixing the problem, each with varying degrees of cooperation with regulators, time taken, and a price tag attached. The FAA (if provided with the benefit of a doubt that they aren't covering their asses which I'm not necessarily willing to give given reports from the IG) has signalled that if they'd known what MCAS was, they'd have demanded more intense scrutiny and testing. There was whistleblower testimony alleged in the 60 Minutes expose on the MAX, that Boeing intentionally engineered the system in such a way as to minimize outside scrutiny of the system (I.e. regulator attention) in order to get development done, and planes out the door. What this signals is that there was pressure from management to get things done, which meant minimizing external exposure and exploiting every trick they knew to get a rubber stamp out of the regulator. Now in terms of not being certifiable, I offer a brief bit of Boeing history. The D.P. Davies interview w.r.t the the certification of the 727 by the U.K. CAA. As a well-known test pilot, Davies goes into great detail to describe how the U.K. regulator was very particular about control forces on approach to stall for that aircraft; to the point that the 727 only got conditional airworthyness certification for civil transport via the addition of a stick pusher; a device intended to make it very clear the pilot was approaching a stall. https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-the-boeing-747-the-trident-vc10-one-eleven-the-boeing-727/ https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv... Some people at Boeing knew, or were in a position to know the behavior they were dealing with was of a type previously uncertifiable. Someone knew that if they could sneak the plane past the FAA, that reciprocity would shield the plane from further scrutiny unless something catastrophic happened. I don't know who it was, nor do I know whether the paper trail will be enough to bear it out. American management nowadays tends to go out of their way to minimize paper trail and maximize "fill-in-the-blank" style communication to facilitate plausible deniability.
  - pnathan 7y ago
    > The 737 Max is doomed without the MCAS, the entire reason it exists is to keep the same type rating the same to keep pilots from needing to re-certify. I would suggest at this point, the ...creative documentation... that Boeing's been doing to keep the "737" a "737" has reached the end of the line.
kayfox 7y ago
Why, were talking about a fatal error in one small system on a huge and complex aircraft which is 90% the same as the previous iteration of this aircraft. We can fix these things. We should not be approaching engineering problems with emotional reactions to crashes. The airline industry is so incredibly safe because each crash is analyzed, the problems identified and solved. If two crashes mean we should scrap it, does that mean we just stop flying because every major aircraft type has had serious incidents. No, we fix the problems and keep flying. You don't get better at something by giving up the first time you make a mistake.
- adrr 7y ago
  Someone did the stats around the max 8. 300 lives lost in 3 years of operation and 400 planes in the sky. It is actually quite dangerous to fly and much more dangerous than driving when you compare by travel time and not distance. In comparison, A320 Neo and 787 have no hull losses and there's more of those planes in the sky than the maxes. 787s have been flying for almost 10 years.
  - _ph_ 7y ago
    Both losses were caused by the same faulty system, MCAS. I don't understand how can one make predictions about the safety of the plane with a fixed MCAS from the MCAS related crashes.
    - tachion 7y ago
      Because it's safer thing to do, when people lives are at risk. If it would be having some milk spilled or popcorn burnt, no one would try to make those overly precautious predictions. Also, because the plane has a bad track record, so it brought the scrutiny on itself.
- the-pigeon 7y ago
  My understanding is not that at all. From what I've read the engines that were the whole point of the plan just didn't work physics wise because they were too big for the 737 frame that their required placement moved the center of gravity to a bad spot. Instead of scraping the idea as they should've they did a software fix. You can't solve a bad aircraft design with software. You can patch it but it leaves you open to all sorts of issues. Issues we've now clearly seen have killed people. Issues that people have claimed were known about (how would the engineers not know?) but were sweep under the rug in the name of profits. When people knowingly endanger other's lives in the name of profits they should face a trial and be judged.
henryfjordan 7y ago
Don't forget that the FAA also failed here too. The plane should never have gotten past the concept stage. They were taking Boeing's word that everything was going to be fine, and it wasn't. The FAA shares as much blame as Boeing for this fiasco.
- WalterBright 7y ago
  There's nothing wrong with the concept. The errors are: 1. poor detail software design of the MCAS (single point of failure) 2. poor pilot training (2 crews couldn't remember how to operate the trim system) Both are easily fixed.

CharlesColeman 7y ago

> Ban the aircraft. Criminally charge everyone involved in suppressing it's serious issues and forcing it through approval. That's going a bit too far. Banning MCAS and requiring pilots to undergo MAX-specific training and certification seems more reasonable (and less wasteful) response to the issues. I would support criminal charges against the chief decision-makers that led Boeing into this mess, going all the way up to the top. Examples need to be made to reset the priorities of corporate decision-makers.

snuxoll 7y ago
The 737 Max is doomed without the MCAS, the entire reason it exists is to keep the same type rating the same to keep pilots from needing to re-certify. Airlines will have serious reason to consider other manufacturers if they can’t just throw pilots behind the stick with minimal training.
- acqq 7y ago
  > Airlines will have serious reason to consider other manufacturers if they can’t just throw pilots behind the stick with minimal training. Hopefully the regulators will seriously investigate if it is safe to assume that the retraining is not needed even with modified MCAS. Just claiming that pilots will easier deactivate MCAS, or that, after the "fix", MCAS will deactivate itself if there is some problem should not be enough: without MCAS running the plane just doesn't behave as the one for which the pilots were trained.
- CharlesColeman 7y ago
  > The 737 Max is doomed without the MCAS, the entire reason it exists is to keep the same type rating the same to keep pilots from needing to re-certify. That's what Boeing wanted, but that doesn't mean they should get it. Anyway, I think "doomed" is overstating it. I would assume whatever training an existing 737 pilot would need to fly and MCAS-less MAX would be far less that what they would need to fly an Airbus.
  - salawat 7y ago
    The MAX can't be certified for civil air transport without MCAS. That's the rub. If Boeing could have built and certified the plane without it, they would have.
    - kingofpandora 7y ago
      Are you sure? There's been a lot written about the reasons for MCAS and this is the first time I've seen anyone claim that the MAX couldn't be certified without it. Everyone else has stated that the reason for MCAS is so that MAX could be certified as a previous generation of 737 and therefore not require training for an established 737 pilot to fly.
      - mantap 7y ago
        They added MCAS because the larger engines increase the propensity of the aircraft to pitch up at high angles of attack. This is against FAA rules and renders the aircraft uncertifiable. Their solution was to add MCAS which is designed to change the aircraft's stall characteristics "in software" so that it can be certified without major design changes. If they want to remove MCAS then they need to enlarge the undercarriage to give the aircraft more ground clearance, so that the engines can be placed further back. Such a major change to the aircraft's design would mean the 737 MAX could not share a type rating with the other 737s or at least would require significant differences training (not an iPad lesson)
      - salawat 7y ago
        I am. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/ https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the... Yes, you are correct in that part of the reason for it was to mimic the control forces of older 737's for avoiding the burden of simulator training. However, you have to look at why it was a manufacturer would take the risk to make such a boneheaded implementation in the first place. Nothing goes into a mass-produced highly complex system without being very carefully thought through. It wasn't some "accident". It was a calculated act of value engineering. On the one hand, someone had wind tunnel results that said there would be a divergence from the old 737 force curves. On the other, you had a pile of solutions capable of fixing the problem, each with varying degrees of cooperation with regulators, time taken, and a price tag attached. The FAA (if provided with the benefit of a doubt that they aren't covering their asses which I'm not necessarily willing to give given reports from the IG) has signalled that if they'd known what MCAS was, they'd have demanded more intense scrutiny and testing. There was whistleblower testimony alleged in the 60 Minutes expose on the MAX, that Boeing intentionally engineered the system in such a way as to minimize outside scrutiny of the system (I.e. regulator attention) in order to get development done, and planes out the door. What this signals is that there was pressure from management to get things done, which meant minimizing external exposure and exploiting every trick they knew to get a rubber stamp out of the regulator. Now in terms of not being certifiable, I offer a brief bit of Boeing history. The D.P. Davies interview w.r.t the the certification of the 727 by the U.K. CAA. As a well-known test pilot, Davies goes into great detail to describe how the U.K. regulator was very particular about control forces on approach to stall for that aircraft; to the point that the 727 only got conditional airworthyness certification for civil transport via the addition of a stick pusher; a device intended to make it very clear the pilot was approaching a stall. https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-the-boeing-747-the-trident-vc10-one-eleven-the-boeing-727/ https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interv... Some people at Boeing knew, or were in a position to know the behavior they were dealing with was of a type previously uncertifiable. Someone knew that if they could sneak the plane past the FAA, that reciprocity would shield the plane from further scrutiny unless something catastrophic happened. I don't know who it was, nor do I know whether the paper trail will be enough to bear it out. American management nowadays tends to go out of their way to minimize paper trail and maximize "fill-in-the-blank" style communication to facilitate plausible deniability.
- pnathan 7y ago
  > The 737 Max is doomed without the MCAS, the entire reason it exists is to keep the same type rating the same to keep pilots from needing to re-certify. I would suggest at this point, the ...creative documentation... that Boeing's been doing to keep the "737" a "737" has reached the end of the line.

kayfox 7y ago

Why, were talking about a fatal error in one small system on a huge and complex aircraft which is 90% the same as the previous iteration of this aircraft. We can fix these things. We should not be approaching engineering problems with emotional reactions to crashes. The airline industry is so incredibly safe because each crash is analyzed, the problems identified and solved. If two crashes mean we should scrap it, does that mean we just stop flying because every major aircraft type has had serious incidents. No, we fix the problems and keep flying. You don't get better at something by giving up the first time you make a mistake.

adrr 7y ago
Someone did the stats around the max 8. 300 lives lost in 3 years of operation and 400 planes in the sky. It is actually quite dangerous to fly and much more dangerous than driving when you compare by travel time and not distance. In comparison, A320 Neo and 787 have no hull losses and there's more of those planes in the sky than the maxes. 787s have been flying for almost 10 years.
- _ph_ 7y ago
  Both losses were caused by the same faulty system, MCAS. I don't understand how can one make predictions about the safety of the plane with a fixed MCAS from the MCAS related crashes.
  - tachion 7y ago
    Because it's safer thing to do, when people lives are at risk. If it would be having some milk spilled or popcorn burnt, no one would try to make those overly precautious predictions. Also, because the plane has a bad track record, so it brought the scrutiny on itself.
the-pigeon 7y ago
My understanding is not that at all. From what I've read the engines that were the whole point of the plan just didn't work physics wise because they were too big for the 737 frame that their required placement moved the center of gravity to a bad spot. Instead of scraping the idea as they should've they did a software fix. You can't solve a bad aircraft design with software. You can patch it but it leaves you open to all sorts of issues. Issues we've now clearly seen have killed people. Issues that people have claimed were known about (how would the engineers not know?) but were sweep under the rug in the name of profits. When people knowingly endanger other's lives in the name of profits they should face a trial and be judged.

henryfjordan 7y ago

Don't forget that the FAA also failed here too. The plane should never have gotten past the concept stage. They were taking Boeing's word that everything was going to be fine, and it wasn't. The FAA shares as much blame as Boeing for this fiasco.

WalterBright 7y ago
There's nothing wrong with the concept. The errors are: 1. poor detail software design of the MCAS (single point of failure) 2. poor pilot training (2 crews couldn't remember how to operate the trim system) Both are easily fixed.