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I'm struggling to parse this comment. Is Airbus's "corruption" somehow responsible for assembly line 3rd world pilot programs? How are these two interconnected?

I'm struggling to parse this comment. Is Airbus's "corruption" somehow responsible for assembly line 3rd world pilot programs? How are these two interconnected? >Air France 447 By all accounts this was textbook pilot error and Airbus's "fault" - a frozen pitot tube - also happens on Boeing (actually, all) aircraft. You don't hear about it because a trained crew following CRM can diagnose and deal with this failure without much fanfare. >Indonesian airlines Sure, they may have bad safety records, but any plane with known faulty software cannot be allowed to fly. Human error is inevitable, software can always be avoided (and thrown away). >There is a long list of Airbus accidents that many choose to ignore. Who is "many"? What ignorance is applied? As far as I am aware every Airbus accident is investigated by the same safety boards and government agencies. Nobody in power is going to ignore a commercial airliner crash. If you are talking about the general populace, well, that was my comment's point - social media allows everyone to armchair aviate while ignoring the general history and context of the field. But I don't think it's reasonable to expect Joe down the street to know every aviation accident off the tip of his tongue. Nor should he have to - that's why we pay taxes to other people so they figure stuff out for us. Furthermore: >Boeing made a mistake with MCAS training MCAS itself was a mistake. It is possible that pilots may have been able to save the plane if they were told the proper override procedure, but they should never have needed that procedure in the first place. It would be like driving a car that randomly slammed the gas pedal down and you could only release it by tuning the radio to a certain frequency.

mlyle 7y ago
> By all accounts this was textbook pilot error and Airbus's "fault" - a frozen pitot tube - also happens on Boeing (actually, all) aircraft. You don't hear about it because a trained crew following CRM can diagnose and deal with this failure without much fanfare. It's a bit more than that; it was exacerbated by design choices. 1. Position of other sidestick is not clear to a pilot (there's no mechanical coupling of control forces). 2. Presenting a crew with a simultaneous "overspeed" and "stall" warning in cruise is an interesting test. 3. Training of aircrews that full-power, pull-the-stick-back-all-the-way is a valid and sometimes valuable technique (thanks to the envelope protection that is only available in the normal law).

mlyle 7y ago

> By all accounts this was textbook pilot error and Airbus's "fault" - a frozen pitot tube - also happens on Boeing (actually, all) aircraft. You don't hear about it because a trained crew following CRM can diagnose and deal with this failure without much fanfare. It's a bit more than that; it was exacerbated by design choices. 1. Position of other sidestick is not clear to a pilot (there's no mechanical coupling of control forces). 2. Presenting a crew with a simultaneous "overspeed" and "stall" warning in cruise is an interesting test. 3. Training of aircrews that full-power, pull-the-stick-back-all-the-way is a valid and sometimes valuable technique (thanks to the envelope protection that is only available in the normal law).