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You haven't answered the central question, which is why you want a punishment outside of the deterrence effect. And I've addressed the deterrence issue at leng
by ikeboy 7y ago
You haven't answered the central question, which is why you want a punishment outside of the deterrence effect.
And I've addressed the deterrence issue at length, just asserting that my model is wrong without explaining why won't cut it.
- mpweiher 7y ago> And I've addressed the deterrence issue at length No you haven't. You've just asserted a random formula, without any supporting evidence. > just asserting that my model is wrong without explaining why won't cut it. “That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.” (Christopher Hitchens). You haven't provided any evidence for you "model" (=random formula), so there is no reason to demand evidence for dismissing it. However, multiple people actually have provided that evidence and explained in great detail why your idea and formula is wrong. Also, multiple countries have based parts of their legal systems on this model (relative fine). So if you want to figure out why you are wrong, which you are, feel free to examine the legal systems of those countries. For example: "Ziel ist es, Menschen mit unterschiedlichem Einkommen verhältnismäßig gleich hart zu bestrafen." → "The goal is to punish people with different incomes equally hard." From the Wikipedia entry on "Tagessatz" that I pointed out to you earlier. Outta here.
- ikeboy 7y ago>However, multiple people actually have provided that evidence and explained in great detail why your idea and formula is wrong. This is false. The only comment that actually purported to respond said there's an issue with an error rate in applying the fine. This is a minor problem, nowhere close to justifying a massive differential across all income levels. >So if you want to figure out why you are wrong, which you are, feel free to examine the legal systems of those countries. Of course, the fact that a country does something does not imply it's economically sound, and your implication of such is absurd. You've yet to give any economic rationale for "punishment" as opposed to deterrence, yet continue to cite "punishment" as a justification. I'm happy to concede that this does, in fact, "punish people with different incomes equally hard", but since punishment is a stupid goal, this is useless. >You haven't provided any evidence for you "model" I provided all assumptions required to derive it; you need to disprove some explicit or implicit assumption, or agree.
- mpweiher 7y ago> economically sound ... economic rationale A country is not an economy. An economy serves society, not the other way around. > yet continue to cite "punishment" as a justification. Deterrence is one of the components of and reasons for punishment: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ https://www.upcounsel.com/legal-def-punishment https://www.upcounsel.com/legal-def-punishment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punishment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punishment ...and the reasons I give very much apply to "deterrence": if committing this crime/misdemeanour will cost me 6 minutes of my life, iff I get caught, I am not deterred. At all. If it costs me a month, I probably am.
- ikeboy 7y agoYou wrote above >The purpose of a speeding ticket is to (a) punish and (b) deter. You've yet to give any justification of "punishment" in this context outside of deterrence, and you've explicitly claimed that punishment is distinct from the deterrence effect. Linking to various definitions of punishment is just silly. >A country is not an economy. An economy serves society, not the other way around. Since apparently Wikipedia links are sufficient to make points: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_and_economics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_and_economics >...and the reasons I give very much apply to "deterrence": if committing this crime/misdemeanour will cost me 6 minutes of my life, iff I get caught, I am not deterred. At all. If it costs me a month, I probably am. If the goal is maximizing deterrence, then as above, just set a million dollar fine for everyone. You claimed that would be "disproportionate" above but gave no reason why that's more important than establishing a deterrence effect. Again, a constant fine establishes a constant deterrence effect. This will not mean that the same percentage of people of any group will end up commiting the crime, both because their initial probability of doing it may differ and because their desires to do it may differ. You've yet to respond to my point that demonstrates that fines will either be set too high or too high under such a system. Here's a paper with 300 citations that lays out largely the same model I did and which you dismissed as not supported by evidence: https://www.jstor.org/stable/725557?seq=1 https://www.jstor.org/stable/725557?seq=1 They actually add the enforcement cost of administering the fine, which makes sense but doesn't significantly change the conclusion.