2 ms·
I don't see why the acceptance of morals facts requires attributing some special ontological status to humans. You would have to be assuming something about ani
by naasking 7y ago
I don't see why the acceptance of morals facts requires attributing some special ontological status to humans. You would have to be assuming something about animals or humans that doesn't seem entailed by anything discussed thus far.
Furthermore, mathematical monism absolutely is compatible with a moral order and the world we experience, as but one counterexample.
- yters 7y agoThat doesn't make sense to me. How can we say A is inherently more valuable than B if fundamentally A and B are the same thing?
- naasking 7y agoWho's claiming that A is inherently more valuable than B?
- yters 7y agoThat's the basis of human rights
- naasking 7y agoNot really. Claiming that humans have rights does not entail that animals don't have rights.
- yters 7y agoIn our finite world of tradeoffs, rights mean one thing must give way to another. For example, plants have lesser (no?) rights than humans, hence we eat plants and not humans. Without a value ordering, which requires something other than monism, such common sense tradeoffs make no sense.