4 ms·

We have considered both of those attacks and address them in section 2.2 and 3.2 of the white paper respectively[1]. The short version is the key extraction att

We have considered both of those attacks and address them in section 2.2 and 3.2 of the white paper respectively[1]. The short version is the key extraction attacks on this specific hardened chip are more expensive than the value they escrow, and in the event a key was extracted it creates a race condition at the period of claim not during the lifetime of its use - still providing some utility. What Kong does that Casascius didn't is provide guarantees that the minter never saw the private key. [1] https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmRNRCocj4PwKMXrd1jeUGw7ASQSuEk7BDJu5KsGuWBXAX https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmRNRCocj4PwKMXrd1jeUGw7ASQSuEk7BDJu5Ks...

melcor 7y ago
> in the event a key was extracted it creates a race condition at the period of claim not during the lifetime of its use - still providing some utility. So say the key was extracted, you would not be aware until the "maturity" or whatever time you can claim the real value? How would one then know and trust that the note I'm holding on to won't be claimed by someone else at the period of claim? As far as I see it my best option would be to try and offload any Kong in my possession as soon as possible for real goods or other currency.