4 ms·

Most likely you are _less safe_ using Tor than using a regular Firefox or Chrome with no VPN, because using Tor automatically means nation state attackers are g

Most likely you are _less safe_ using Tor than using a regular Firefox or Chrome with no VPN, because using Tor automatically means nation state attackers are going to target you. So you have to do extra work just to break even. Google EgotisticalGiraffe for details.

rahuldottech 7y ago
There's no way this is true. Even if nation state actors _are_ more likely to target you just for using Tor, even if it's for completely regular browsing, Tor provides a lot of additional protection and anonymity.
- DyslexicAtheist 7y ago
  I initially got hung up on the GP assertion that users are most likely better off with Firefox. It depends on the threat model. But after thinking about it for a while, I agree with GP. Those people thinking about such topics constantly might not be the average user. I would not feel safe installing Tor on my parents computer and telling them it is safer to do all their browsing now with Tor. Threat models matter otherwise we'll end up applying wrong security tools: *"use Signal. use tor." when the right thing would have been to meet in person wearing a fake mustache, and keep a pebble in your shoe to change your walk. GP's advise makes sense for anyone who does not know what Tor is (most people). They are off better if we symlink their "Internet Button" from the desktop to Firefox, install uBlock and NanoDefender for them. If they're still adventurous teach them about creating/editing "multitab containers" (though I bet we've lost most of them by now).
  - dmos62 7y ago
    > GP's advise makes sense for anyone who does not know what Tor is Whether or not someone knows of Tor doesn't influence her threat model or privacy requirements, and therefore doesn't influence what measures can help. Other than that, I agree that you have to be aware of the threat model and what given tools provide.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
ErikCorry 7y ago
For example you should assume the entry point is owned by an attacker, which means they know via your IP that you use Tor, how often, and at what times of day you do it. In addition you should assume that the exit point is owned by an attacker, which means they know which sites are receiving Tor traffic. The Tor Browser has HTTPS Everywhere which is rather misleadingly named. It still loads stuff over HTTP if it doesn't know of an HTTPS alternative to that particular site. So you should assume that everything you load over HTTP has been trojaned or contains attacks like EgotisticalGiraffe. This applies even if the HTTP site you visit is not compromised or dodgy since the exit node will rewrite content on the fly. https://www.zdnet.com/article/rogue-tor-node-wraps-executables-with-malware/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/rogue-tor-node-wraps-executabl... If the site you visit is shady enough then that has also been compromised and is serving you malware over HTTPS. https://thenextweb.com/security/2016/11/11/the-fbi-likely-ran-nearly-half-the-child-porn-sites-on-the-dark-web-in-2016/ https://thenextweb.com/security/2016/11/11/the-fbi-likely-ra... Good luck with the sandbox https://venom.crowdstrike.com/ https://venom.crowdstrike.com/
- gruez 7y ago
  >For example you should assume the entry point is owned by an attacker [...] In addition you should assume that the exit point is owned by an attacker If you assume both, it's already game over because you can be deanonymized by traffic correlation attacks. At that point you might as well be using a VPN.
  - peteretep 7y ago
    Only if they’re the same attacker
    - cjbprime 7y ago
      Or I suppose more precisely, attackers who are willing to collude with each other by sharing logs.
      - Lammy 7y ago
DyslexicAtheist 7y ago
by default JavaScript is on in Tor[1] and javascript.options.bigint is enabled too. (bigint is off in firefox by default) [1] https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-34/ https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-34/
- ErikCorry 7y ago
  Bigint seems to be enabled in newer FF too, since version 68. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/BigInt https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Refe...
IAmEveryone 7y ago
- "Nation state attackers" don't possess unlimited and/or magical capabilities. There's a reasonable case that TOR is run by some US three-letter agency, but even that is by no means certain. The official story of some limited and non-offensive support by the State Department is still plausible, and the turf wars b/w State and the darker branches are legendary. - Beyond the US, China and Russia might have the resources and enough of an interest to undermine TOR. Everyone else has lots of other, lower-hanging fruit to attack first. I've had some interaction with Germany's efforts about a decade ago, and I wouldn't be surprised if their largest project back then is still ongoing, which was migrating away from Windows 95. - More nation states trying to attack TOR would probably lead to increased security, because the only known weak point is controlling both exit and entry nodes. - None of these agencies outside of 5-eyes plus maybe Israel & NATO would ever collaborate on something like this. - Your drug, porn, or even whistleblowing habits aren't even interesting enough to warrant investment in far more obvious avenues of investigation. If, for example, you semi-regularly buy a few hundred $ worth of bitcoin with your credit card but don't report/have any holdings, you're probably not spending it at the one or two remaining legal online stores accepting it. - Heck, there is some guy apparently working in the Trump administration, publishing an anonymous book this month. Considering we're probably talking about Harvard Law and not MIT grad here, and that the Prez isn't exactly known for letting strategic considerations get in the way of his gut instinct to exact revenge for personal slights, every day this person isn't outed is a pretty good argument against the tendency to consider the US security apparatus to be all-mighty. - In the alternative, if they are unwilling to compromise their methods for that target, you will probably never make it to the level where they would be willing to do it for you (sorry). - The same argument applies to all the dark markets, where history suggest retiring with a bunch of your customers' cash is just about as likely as somehow being caught. Most prosecutions also happened outside US jurisdiction, making me doubt suggestions of parallel construction.

rahuldottech 7y ago

There's no way this is true. Even if nation state actors _are_ more likely to target you just for using Tor, even if it's for completely regular browsing, Tor provides a lot of additional protection and anonymity.

DyslexicAtheist 7y ago
I initially got hung up on the GP assertion that users are most likely better off with Firefox. It depends on the threat model. But after thinking about it for a while, I agree with GP. Those people thinking about such topics constantly might not be the average user. I would not feel safe installing Tor on my parents computer and telling them it is safer to do all their browsing now with Tor. Threat models matter otherwise we'll end up applying wrong security tools: *"use Signal. use tor." when the right thing would have been to meet in person wearing a fake mustache, and keep a pebble in your shoe to change your walk. GP's advise makes sense for anyone who does not know what Tor is (most people). They are off better if we symlink their "Internet Button" from the desktop to Firefox, install uBlock and NanoDefender for them. If they're still adventurous teach them about creating/editing "multitab containers" (though I bet we've lost most of them by now).
- dmos62 7y ago
  > GP's advise makes sense for anyone who does not know what Tor is Whether or not someone knows of Tor doesn't influence her threat model or privacy requirements, and therefore doesn't influence what measures can help. Other than that, I agree that you have to be aware of the threat model and what given tools provide.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]

ErikCorry 7y ago

For example you should assume the entry point is owned by an attacker, which means they know via your IP that you use Tor, how often, and at what times of day you do it. In addition you should assume that the exit point is owned by an attacker, which means they know which sites are receiving Tor traffic. The Tor Browser has HTTPS Everywhere which is rather misleadingly named. It still loads stuff over HTTP if it doesn't know of an HTTPS alternative to that particular site. So you should assume that everything you load over HTTP has been trojaned or contains attacks like EgotisticalGiraffe. This applies even if the HTTP site you visit is not compromised or dodgy since the exit node will rewrite content on the fly. https://www.zdnet.com/article/rogue-tor-node-wraps-executables-with-malware/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/rogue-tor-node-wraps-executabl... If the site you visit is shady enough then that has also been compromised and is serving you malware over HTTPS. https://thenextweb.com/security/2016/11/11/the-fbi-likely-ran-nearly-half-the-child-porn-sites-on-the-dark-web-in-2016/ https://thenextweb.com/security/2016/11/11/the-fbi-likely-ra... Good luck with the sandbox https://venom.crowdstrike.com/ https://venom.crowdstrike.com/

gruez 7y ago
>For example you should assume the entry point is owned by an attacker [...] In addition you should assume that the exit point is owned by an attacker If you assume both, it's already game over because you can be deanonymized by traffic correlation attacks. At that point you might as well be using a VPN.
- peteretep 7y ago
  Only if they’re the same attacker
  - cjbprime 7y ago
    Or I suppose more precisely, attackers who are willing to collude with each other by sharing logs.
    - Lammy 7y ago

DyslexicAtheist 7y ago

by default JavaScript is on in Tor[1] and javascript.options.bigint is enabled too. (bigint is off in firefox by default) [1] https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-34/ https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-34/

ErikCorry 7y ago
Bigint seems to be enabled in newer FF too, since version 68. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/BigInt https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Refe...

IAmEveryone 7y ago

- "Nation state attackers" don't possess unlimited and/or magical capabilities. There's a reasonable case that TOR is run by some US three-letter agency, but even that is by no means certain. The official story of some limited and non-offensive support by the State Department is still plausible, and the turf wars b/w State and the darker branches are legendary. - Beyond the US, China and Russia might have the resources and enough of an interest to undermine TOR. Everyone else has lots of other, lower-hanging fruit to attack first. I've had some interaction with Germany's efforts about a decade ago, and I wouldn't be surprised if their largest project back then is still ongoing, which was migrating away from Windows 95. - More nation states trying to attack TOR would probably lead to increased security, because the only known weak point is controlling both exit and entry nodes. - None of these agencies outside of 5-eyes plus maybe Israel & NATO would ever collaborate on something like this. - Your drug, porn, or even whistleblowing habits aren't even interesting enough to warrant investment in far more obvious avenues of investigation. If, for example, you semi-regularly buy a few hundred $ worth of bitcoin with your credit card but don't report/have any holdings, you're probably not spending it at the one or two remaining legal online stores accepting it. - Heck, there is some guy apparently working in the Trump administration, publishing an anonymous book this month. Considering we're probably talking about Harvard Law and not MIT grad here, and that the Prez isn't exactly known for letting strategic considerations get in the way of his gut instinct to exact revenge for personal slights, every day this person isn't outed is a pretty good argument against the tendency to consider the US security apparatus to be all-mighty. - In the alternative, if they are unwilling to compromise their methods for that target, you will probably never make it to the level where they would be willing to do it for you (sorry). - The same argument applies to all the dark markets, where history suggest retiring with a bunch of your customers' cash is just about as likely as somehow being caught. Most prosecutions also happened outside US jurisdiction, making me doubt suggestions of parallel construction.