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Elite violence and elite numeracy in Europe from 500 to 1900 CE: A co-evolution
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- larnmar 7y agoThe question posed here, about why Eastern Europe fell behind the West, is an interesting one, but the approach taken here (pick two random-ass variables we can measure and try to explain everything with them) seems pretty damn weak, as does the attempt to tie these explanations to modern EU politics.
- sigmaprimus 7y agoThe article briefly mentioned your point "Interestingly, the rate of regicide is closely linked to the homicide rate from among the general population, potentially allowing for wider conclusions than simply an analysis of elites" I tend to agree with your comment, any time I read about violence in general populations I immediately think about lead and it's effects on people who are exposed to it and wonder how many other things in our modern environment cause similar effects. Eg. Mass production and use of Alcohol, Crack Cocaine, Crystal Meth, Fentanyl, High Fructose Corn Syrup etc.
- fsloth 7y agoDarren Asemoglu's "Why nations fail" gives a pretty good attempt at explaining the east vs. west divide in from the point of view of extractive vs. inclusive institutions and manages to build up a pretty convincing case. I warmly endorse this book to everyone who is even sligthly interested of history or economics.
- stereolambda 7y ago> after the trauma of nomadic invasions, Eastern societies created institutions primarily aimed at defence rather than economic development, even over the following centuries when the threat had long disappeared. This is not even wrong and assumes that old institutions were built on some deep strategic policy considerations. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did have "nomadic invasions" even in the 17th century, but its main institutions were built on republican ideology, and more authoritarian/centralist arguments at the time were based mainly on internal affairs, not external threats. On the other hand, which Early Modern countries had institutions aimed primarily at "economic development"? It's probably debatable in the cases of the Netherlands and England. Also they neglect to mention that many of these countries were not even independent for a long time. Modern populist Poland and Hungary, incidentally, both have had continuously own elites and statehood traditions since around 900-1000 AD (in contrast to some other Eastern European countries). But in Hungary in 16th-middle 19th century, Poland in the 19th century their own elites had to take the back seat or struggle with the foreign empires. So they weren't the ones creating dominant institutions. And these, I would say, were the real formative years. If we are to play "find historical roots", the current Polish government (and probably the Hungarian one) is the direct descendant of romantic nationalist tendencies of the 19th century. It's basically LARP'ing a fight for independence which appeals to the intellectual core of these political camps. But admittedly it's hard to build nice charts out of it.
- shantly 7y ago> On the other hand, which Early Modern countries had institutions aimed primarily at "economic development"? It's probably debatable in the cases of the Netherlands and England. IIRC Spain was the first major European country to see serious state centralization (large moves toward the modern nation-state) plus a major state focus on policy aimed at economic development across their entire controlled territory (well, the core of it, anyway—Spain proper, not sure how far that control extended to farther-flung territories). England and others followed.
- stereolambda 7y agoThis is consistent with what I was taught, but I interpreted the goalposts here a little differently. Of course kings of Spain wanted economic development but probably not for the sake of it, but to build up their own power. Most political regimes want development in this sense and in the East, PLC, Muscovy and the Ottomans all had some kind of pro-economic policies (even if in the PLC it was mostly maintaining low taxation and duties on everything). If they were successful it's another matter, I understand it as a question of motivation. [for the OP's argument anyway] In this sense there were not many countries ran mostly, primarily to build wealth on a large scale, and not only for the purposes of the social circle controlling the government -- with some wider ideology (which I believe was more the case for Spain than for France) or not. In fact this is, to mind, in that period, equivalent to the dominance of a merchant class.
- shantly 7y agoI think a powerful, centralized, and stable (across transitions of power, especially) state is likely a necessary pre-requisite to focused economic development across larger kingdoms. Otherwise there's too much temptation to treat parts of "your" territory as potentially part of a future rebel state you (or one of your children) will have to fight for control of the crown, because there's a really good chance that will in fact happen at some point in the not-so-distant future. Might be better to undermine the development of some of them, even. Not a great environment for cohesive, grand, long-term economic planning. Gotta quash the infighting, gotta get the inheritance laws sorted out so the crown's territory's not being carved up all the time among kids who'll often end up going to war with one another. Then the serious economic development can start. I think that's one of the key differences between how a monarch of France and a monarch of Spain, say, would have approached economic development, around the time Spain was starting to get serious about the whole nation-state thing. I think there may actually have been different incentives and motivations driving less-effective patterns of economic development in less-centralized or less-internally-secure states, caused, more or less, by differences in effective state power. I'm not sure how politically stable and internally secure Eastern states were then, but my guess would be less so than what Spain was beginning to achieve.
- pjc50 7y agoThis is a bit weird; it seems to be taking a 10,000 foot view on history that isn't really warranted and not a great explanation for Eastern Europe being "behind" the West. It notices the various "golden horde" invasions, but skims entirely over the huge impact of the 20th century - wars, occupation, pogroms, Communism.
- ellimilial 7y agoBaffling, the liberties taken by this article trying to link ‘current’ discrepancies using correlated variables from well over 500 years ago. Without mentioning trivialities such as evolution of religious beliefs, history or totalitarian regimes, industrial changes of 17th century or Industrial Revolution. Not to mention the generalisations and lack of definitions (unless I missed an appendix). It really shows that in order to perform interdisciplinary research you not only need competency in both but also understanding how those toolkits interconnect.
- acqq 7y ago> correlated variables from well over 500 years ago Not to mention that ithe reliability of inputs is completely ignored. If one would try to honestly estimate the error bars for all that, it should be obvious that the data for most of the places can’t be used for any such analysis and even less to draw any conclusions, especially not to support current policies. It’s something produced with an agenda and it shows.
- mac_was 7y agoThis article seems weak - it is extremely disappointing that it was written by a research assistant and a 'professor'. This line here 'Eastern societies created institutions primarily aimed at defence rather than economic development, even over the following centuries when the threat had long disappeared' - someone who know history of Eastern countries will be aware that those countries where constantly attacked by Western ones - Germany-Poland wars lasted between 1000-1400. Poland was under relative peace in the 16th century when it gained wealth ( according to some statistics, Polish Kingdom was the biggest importer of luxurious cloths at that time, and as we know today if basic needs are satisfied people turn into consumption). Then in the 17th century Poland was attacked by Swedes, Germans, Russians which started the dawn of the country which ended in the end of the 18th century by splitting Poland between Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary. Then when Poland re-gained independency in the 20th century it stared building an army, economy was raising, then WWII happened during which Poland was completely destroyed and until today it did not receive any compensation from Germany, obviously after WWII Communist Russia ruled in Poland which didn't help the economy. Since 1989 Poland is developing again, nobody is attacking the country and it is developing again. I'd like to know taking into account the above citation when did the threat had long disappeare? Obviously taking into consideration the dates which the article mentions, not know, as there are no wars ATM. From my own experience Polish people are not EU sceptic, and the ruling party is not sceptic at all. The problem has far more deeper roots and is related to transformation process in which post-communist stayed in power even though the Communism collapsed. But this requires another article by people who know more than me.
- danielam 7y agoTo add further to your point, while no one in the EU is currently mobilizing their armies across the Oder or the Neman, a synoptic view of history shows that the present situation is rather unusual, geopolitically and historical speaking. And just because armies aren't involved does not mean a kind of "soft" economic and cultural imperialism isn't at work, often through the abuse of EU institutions. Sadly, the Western media (which includes >80% of the media in Poland) ignorantly or maliciously misrepresents the ongoing political realities in Poland, employing simplistic, boorish and slanderous slogans to discredit anyone that could possibly disrupt the comfortable but corrupt status quo in the country and on the continent. Too often, people eat all that up because, frankly, Westerners known next to nothing about Poland and the region. Years of propaganda during the Cold War and before only encouraged crude and bigoted stereotypes that make it that much easier to push false narratives. N.b., for those interested in a brief introduction to Polish history, Adam Zamoyski's "Poland: A History" is worth a read.
- dimitar 7y agoIts about the appearance of serfdom in the early modern era, just as western Europe was freed from it, which in turn is partly driven by population-density. This is far from a new idea BTW, and largely drove the abolition of these institutions in the 19th century (it largely came from the top, not as a result of great rebellions). Here is a nice and short explanation from Paul Krugman: "my old teacher Evsey Domar wrote a classic paper arguing that serfdom and slavery often were the response of ruling classes to labor shortage. Thus Russia imposed strict restrictions on the mobility of peasants from the late 16th century onward, precisely because the availability of rich new farmland on the expanding frontier would otherwise have increased their bargaining power against landlords. (The frontier expansion itself was probably the result of the growing effectiveness of firearms, which turned the military balance against the steppe nomads; so gunpowder, which contributed to the rise of the bourgeoisie in the West, created serfdom in the East). And, of course, slavery - which, along with serfdom, had died out in the West during the labor-abundant high Middle Ages - was reintroduced in the land-abundant conditions of the New World." http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/Serfdom.htm http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/Serfdom.htm Darren Asemoglu's and Robinson's "Why nations fail" in turn go on in length about effects of repressive economic and political institutions to economic growth. Forms of serfdom and slavery were (re)introduced around the same time in the Muscovite state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Hungary, Wallachia, Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire and even the Cossack Hetmanate which had roots in anti-serfdom rebellion had a form of serfdom.
- AnimalMuppet 7y agoGiven that historical pattern, it's worth noting the exception: When the US west was being settled, they gave away the land to those who wanted to move there, rather than imposing serfdom to prevent it. (Yes, I know, the US south fits the serfdom/slavery pattern...)
- dimitar 7y agoWhen the US (east coast) was first settled, it was largely by indentured servants and prisoners. The settling of the US west parallels the cossack settlements - these guys were free to take land and paid few taxes, but were expected to defend themselves. Normally the goverments of Poland and Russia tried to reduce the cossacks to serfdom (which triggered wars like the great rebellion of Bohdan Khmelnytsky) or at the very least turn them into a warrior class that enforces the serfdom institution (like what happened with the Russian cossacks after the defeat of the big cossack-peasant uprisings there). I think the North of the US started colonizing the West late, when the North was already pretty urbanized, densely populated and industrial, which made the free-soil type settlement possible. The South of course was still fully agricultural, which insentivised a different type of settlement driven by soil erosion by inefficient slave-based agriculture.