4 ms·

Locally, where I serve as an election officer, we - check in - fill out a bubble sheet - scan it - declare vict'ry Complex schemes are great intellectual e

Locally, where I serve as an election officer, we - check in - fill out a bubble sheet - scan it - declare vict'ry Complex schemes are great intellectual exercises. Just understand that perfection is unattainable. We need enough automation for speedy reporting, without losing the secret ballot. But the temptation to fetish technology past the point of diminishing returns, too, is a bugaboo. KISS.

mlyle 7y ago
I like this scheme because it's a similar complexity to existing voting protocols at the polling place. You fill in a bubble sheet, scan it, throw away half the ballot and take the other half as a receipt. Later the user can prove their vote, but only to the election authority.
- smitty1e 7y ago
  You may not want to leave the polling place with any physical evidence of how you voted. - a bad actor may lean on you about it - recounts will be ridiculously costly - a suitable ballot will be expensive to produce When one considers all of the privacy/usability ramifications, just - casting the ballot - hearing a 'thunk' inside the DS200 machine - having zero connecting information . . .is more or less optimal.
  - mlyle 7y ago
    > You may not want to leave the polling place with any physical evidence of how you voted. > - a bad actor may lean on you about it Except the scheme precludes it. Have you just not read this? > - recounts will be ridiculously costly This has some implications for recounts, but I don't think anything fatal or complicated. > - a suitable ballot will be expensive to produce The ballots I use currently have a perforated receipt, just not arranged in the way suggested. Yes, it may have slightly longer perforation, I guess...
    - smitty1e 7y ago
      > Except the scheme precludes it. Have you just not read this? Scheme or no scheme: if there is information, it will leak.
      - mlyle 7y ago
        I suggest you read the document and maybe learn about the math involved. The stuff the voter keeps cannot be used to prove anything except that the voter's vote is in the count.
        deleted 7y ago
        [deleted]
        deleted 7y ago
        [deleted]
        smitty1e 7y ago
        For a more thorough review, two points: - This is a mathematically elegant approach, and the author is to be commended. - The legal challenges impeding implementation would be staggering. > "Each ballot has a randomized order – this means that a right-hand ballot alone can’t reveal who the vote was cast for." This may be legally possible in some areas, but none with which I'm familiar. The ballot has to be known and printed weeks in advance of the election. The costs are already huge. Managing randomized hard-copy ballots is going to be a tough sell. There's just a bit more afoot here than (admittedly splendid) abstract mathematical exercises.
        rusbus 7y ago
        This is actually addressed -- votes can be made on a computer where ballot options are ordered then printed on a receipt in the same ballot format but with randomized order.
        smitty1e 7y ago
        Again: great tech. Please understand: a large number of people want a printed, paper ballot. Excellent though the mathematical architecture may be, the fish don't want no bicycles.

mlyle 7y ago

I like this scheme because it's a similar complexity to existing voting protocols at the polling place. You fill in a bubble sheet, scan it, throw away half the ballot and take the other half as a receipt. Later the user can prove their vote, but only to the election authority.

smitty1e 7y ago
You may not want to leave the polling place with any physical evidence of how you voted. - a bad actor may lean on you about it - recounts will be ridiculously costly - a suitable ballot will be expensive to produce When one considers all of the privacy/usability ramifications, just - casting the ballot - hearing a 'thunk' inside the DS200 machine - having zero connecting information . . .is more or less optimal.
- mlyle 7y ago
  > You may not want to leave the polling place with any physical evidence of how you voted. > - a bad actor may lean on you about it Except the scheme precludes it. Have you just not read this? > - recounts will be ridiculously costly This has some implications for recounts, but I don't think anything fatal or complicated. > - a suitable ballot will be expensive to produce The ballots I use currently have a perforated receipt, just not arranged in the way suggested. Yes, it may have slightly longer perforation, I guess...
  - smitty1e 7y ago
    > Except the scheme precludes it. Have you just not read this? Scheme or no scheme: if there is information, it will leak.
    - mlyle 7y ago
      I suggest you read the document and maybe learn about the math involved. The stuff the voter keeps cannot be used to prove anything except that the voter's vote is in the count.
      - deleted 7y ago
        [deleted]
      - deleted 7y ago
        [deleted]
      - smitty1e 7y ago
        For a more thorough review, two points: - This is a mathematically elegant approach, and the author is to be commended. - The legal challenges impeding implementation would be staggering. > "Each ballot has a randomized order – this means that a right-hand ballot alone can’t reveal who the vote was cast for." This may be legally possible in some areas, but none with which I'm familiar. The ballot has to be known and printed weeks in advance of the election. The costs are already huge. Managing randomized hard-copy ballots is going to be a tough sell. There's just a bit more afoot here than (admittedly splendid) abstract mathematical exercises.
        rusbus 7y ago
        This is actually addressed -- votes can be made on a computer where ballot options are ordered then printed on a receipt in the same ballot format but with randomized order.
        smitty1e 7y ago
        Again: great tech. Please understand: a large number of people want a printed, paper ballot. Excellent though the mathematical architecture may be, the fish don't want no bicycles.