for anyone interested, Brian Krebs did an excellent article[1] on The Great Cannon after the Citizen Labs incident. > [Nicholas] Weaver said the attacks from t

for anyone interested, Brian Krebs did an excellent article[1] on The Great Cannon after the Citizen Labs incident. > [Nicholas] Weaver said the attacks from the Great Cannon don’t succeed when people are browsing Chinese sites with a Web address that begins with "https://" https://", meaning that regular Internet users can limit their exposure to these attacks by insisting that all Internet communications are routed over "https" versus unencrypted "http://" http://" connections in their browsers. A number of third-party browser plug-ins — such as https-everywhere — can help people accomplish this goal. > But Bill Marczak, a research fellow with Citizen Lab, said relying on an always-on encryption strategy is not a foolproof counter to this attack, because plug-ins like https-everywhere will still serve regular unencrypted content when Web sites refuse to or don’t offer the same content over an encrypted connection. What’s more, many Web sites draw content from a variety of sources online, meaning that the Great Cannon attack could succeed merely by drawing on resources provided by online ad networks that serve ads on a variety of Web sites from a dizzying array of sources. [1] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/04/dont-be-fodder-for-chinas-great-cannon/ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/04/dont-be-fodder-for-china...