5 ms·

Years ago, I bought an old Sun Netra server from ebay. It had the original OS and apps still installed. Before installing OpenBSD, I changed the root password a

by _wldu 7y ago

Years ago, I bought an old Sun Netra server from ebay. It had the original OS and apps still installed. Before installing OpenBSD, I changed the root password and looked around. It had customer data from a large, well-known online company. I looked-up the company's contact info and emailed them. They called the next day and asked for the server's serial number (which I gave them). A few days later one of the company's executives called back and asked me to confirm the serial number (which I did), he said he was holding a certificate of destruction for that server's hard drives and would be taking some action against the contractor that had been hired to destroy them. I had already wiped the data and installed OpenBSD (or was about to). Anyway, I'm not surprised this type of thing still occurs. To be sure data is not exposed, companies ought to wipe drives themselves and encrypt them before handing them over to contractors. Once the gear is gone, no one knows where it will end up.

tyingq 7y ago
I had a similar experience. Bought a 1U server on eBay. It was apparently the central controller for the flight information displays at a big airport. Lots of plain text passwords for upstream services in config files, etc.
mc32 7y ago
If things are that sensitive and important no disk should leave a building whole. You have to have a ridiculous process in place that is unforgiving that says that unless physically destroyed a disk cannot leave a building (unless it’s in a sealed bag from mfg —obviously disks have to get from receiving to where they’ll be used).
- avar 7y ago
  You make that policy and pay a contractor to enforce it, and now you're back to square #1. Usable hard disks are just heavier and more inconvenient money. Truly ensuring their destruction is going to cost, including but not limited to security guards, people to watch those people, searching through or destroying the trash generated in the building, looking through "parts" to see if they're disassembled hard disks etc.
  - mc32 7y ago
    If it’s a e-commerce concern as alluded to, then they are in a data center and already have limited access, materials air locks, security guards and cameras, so the main thing missing is a policy enforcing it as a firable offense.
    - michaelt 7y ago
      ...and the tools, space, consumables, safety equipment, cleaning equipment, training, and policies making on-site destruction possible. I can easily angle-grind a HDD in two in my garage, where if I fuck it up no-one would be liable. But it would be quite involved to do the same thing in work, where if I fuck up they'd be liable. Unless of course your rule is "diligently follow all security policies, but ignore and bypass workplace safety policies" which I would say is a confusing message to give your employees. Of course, there's no excuse not to dd zeros over the entire disk and, (if it's an SSD) trigger a security-erase with hdparm.
      - mc32 7y ago
        For a big company with training systems, SOPs and PPE, something even portable such as : https://www.amazon.com/Garner-PD-5-Hard-Drive-Destroyer/dp/B00CORG0O2 https://www.amazon.com/Garner-PD-5-Hard-Drive-Destroyer/dp/B... will do the job to comply.
- vidarh 7y ago
  Part of the problem is that modern hard drives are hard to destroy. E.g. try taking a hammer and chisel to them - you might manage to destroy the connectors and PCBs, but those are replaceable, and someone having hacked the pcb to pieces is a good sign it's worth trying to get to the contents. Getting to the platters is a pain, and destroying them enough to make recovery impossible as well. If you don't have a facilities department that is prepared - e.g. with protective gears and an angle grinder or similar power tools, odds are someone will decide it's easier to bypass that process you describe than to get the equipment and do the job properly. It takes firm management by someone who knows and understand the risks and cares about preventing them to ensure it's hard enough to bypass these processes, and hiring someone that takes this seriously just isn't high up on peoples list (e.g. I've never been asked about what approach I'd take to physical security of server infrastructure by anyone wanting to hire me to roles where I'd be responsible for server infrastructure).
  - Nursie 7y ago
    I haven't taken a hard drive apart for about a decade but last time I did take one apart getting at the platters was a job for a couple of minutes and a hex-driver. At that point, when the platters have been exposed, you're basically done, feel free to scratch them up or smash them with a hammer. Frankly, having read about this, a once-over pass with dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdX is going to be enough to destroy all data anyway. There is no instance I know of that the theoretical data-recovery techniques proposed to recover after that have been successful in practice, they depended on electron microscopes and 90s platter densities.
    - mc32 7y ago
      I think you’re right that zeroing is effective with today’s densities but it lacks visual evidence that gives confidence a policy was executed properly. Also with defective drives or S.M.A.R.T. failures it’s easier to meet the requirements by physically destroying the medium.
      - Nursie 7y ago
        True!
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]

by _wldu 7y ago

tyingq 7y ago

I had a similar experience. Bought a 1U server on eBay. It was apparently the central controller for the flight information displays at a big airport. Lots of plain text passwords for upstream services in config files, etc.

mc32 7y ago

If things are that sensitive and important no disk should leave a building whole. You have to have a ridiculous process in place that is unforgiving that says that unless physically destroyed a disk cannot leave a building (unless it’s in a sealed bag from mfg —obviously disks have to get from receiving to where they’ll be used).

avar 7y ago
You make that policy and pay a contractor to enforce it, and now you're back to square #1. Usable hard disks are just heavier and more inconvenient money. Truly ensuring their destruction is going to cost, including but not limited to security guards, people to watch those people, searching through or destroying the trash generated in the building, looking through "parts" to see if they're disassembled hard disks etc.
- mc32 7y ago
  If it’s a e-commerce concern as alluded to, then they are in a data center and already have limited access, materials air locks, security guards and cameras, so the main thing missing is a policy enforcing it as a firable offense.
  - michaelt 7y ago
    ...and the tools, space, consumables, safety equipment, cleaning equipment, training, and policies making on-site destruction possible. I can easily angle-grind a HDD in two in my garage, where if I fuck it up no-one would be liable. But it would be quite involved to do the same thing in work, where if I fuck up they'd be liable. Unless of course your rule is "diligently follow all security policies, but ignore and bypass workplace safety policies" which I would say is a confusing message to give your employees. Of course, there's no excuse not to dd zeros over the entire disk and, (if it's an SSD) trigger a security-erase with hdparm.
    - mc32 7y ago
      For a big company with training systems, SOPs and PPE, something even portable such as : https://www.amazon.com/Garner-PD-5-Hard-Drive-Destroyer/dp/B00CORG0O2 https://www.amazon.com/Garner-PD-5-Hard-Drive-Destroyer/dp/B... will do the job to comply.
vidarh 7y ago
Part of the problem is that modern hard drives are hard to destroy. E.g. try taking a hammer and chisel to them - you might manage to destroy the connectors and PCBs, but those are replaceable, and someone having hacked the pcb to pieces is a good sign it's worth trying to get to the contents. Getting to the platters is a pain, and destroying them enough to make recovery impossible as well. If you don't have a facilities department that is prepared - e.g. with protective gears and an angle grinder or similar power tools, odds are someone will decide it's easier to bypass that process you describe than to get the equipment and do the job properly. It takes firm management by someone who knows and understand the risks and cares about preventing them to ensure it's hard enough to bypass these processes, and hiring someone that takes this seriously just isn't high up on peoples list (e.g. I've never been asked about what approach I'd take to physical security of server infrastructure by anyone wanting to hire me to roles where I'd be responsible for server infrastructure).
- Nursie 7y ago
  I haven't taken a hard drive apart for about a decade but last time I did take one apart getting at the platters was a job for a couple of minutes and a hex-driver. At that point, when the platters have been exposed, you're basically done, feel free to scratch them up or smash them with a hammer. Frankly, having read about this, a once-over pass with dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdX is going to be enough to destroy all data anyway. There is no instance I know of that the theoretical data-recovery techniques proposed to recover after that have been successful in practice, they depended on electron microscopes and 90s platter densities.
  - mc32 7y ago
    I think you’re right that zeroing is effective with today’s densities but it lacks visual evidence that gives confidence a policy was executed properly. Also with defective drives or S.M.A.R.T. failures it’s easier to meet the requirements by physically destroying the medium.
    - Nursie 7y ago
      True!

deleted 7y ago

[deleted]