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I've been researching and thinking about consciousness (and specifically the hard problem) for a while now, and while the whole discussion is interesting, it se

I've been researching and thinking about consciousness (and specifically the hard problem) for a while now, and while the whole discussion is interesting, it seems to me that invoking qualia as evidence for the existence of the hard problem (or for there being something "to explain") doesn't really make much sense. Its perfectly plausible, if not likelly, that qualia is also part of the emergent phenomenon . I'm saying this more so to hear what your (or anybody else's) thoughts here are - why would qualia lie "above" or be "unexplainable" by materialism alone?

shrimpx 7y ago
The crazy thing is that qualia is materialism. This computer you're typing on is a real thing that's also your qualia. The real failure is to say that qualia is a separate thing that doesn't matter in "materialism".
- monktastic1 7y ago
  Under materialism, there's a hypothetical "real computer" that is the cause of your computer-qualia, but they are not identical.
TheOtherHobbes 7y ago
I don't see how it's perfectly plausible. In fact I see no reason to think it's plausible at all. What does qualia (plural, btw) "are part of the emergent phenomenon" mean in practice? That just seems to be begging the question. If you want to explain qualia, you have to do two things. The first is explain the nature of the experiencing entity. This means defining the precise mechanism by which subjective states are experienced by the entity instead of simply existing as objective state correlates. This in turn means explaining the nature of all of subjective experience. The second is to explain the precise mechanism by which external inputs and internal states generate the experiences the entity has. Most of the "Well it's obvious and there's no problem here" positions rely on the fallacy that defining a complicated-enough objective correlate - such as the detailed state of a computer with some form of introspection - solves the problem. It doesn't. In fact it doesn't even begin to understand the problem. It's simply a statement of hope and faith with no empirical support that a complicated-enough state with enough introspection will somehow cross the border from automatic operation to sentient experience, just because it will, obviously.
- kruasan 7y ago
  > mechanism by which subjective states are experienced by the entity Why are you implying some kind of mental entity that "does the experiencing"?

shrimpx 7y ago

The crazy thing is that qualia is materialism. This computer you're typing on is a real thing that's also your qualia. The real failure is to say that qualia is a separate thing that doesn't matter in "materialism".

monktastic1 7y ago
Under materialism, there's a hypothetical "real computer" that is the cause of your computer-qualia, but they are not identical.

TheOtherHobbes 7y ago

I don't see how it's perfectly plausible. In fact I see no reason to think it's plausible at all. What does qualia (plural, btw) "are part of the emergent phenomenon" mean in practice? That just seems to be begging the question. If you want to explain qualia, you have to do two things. The first is explain the nature of the experiencing entity. This means defining the precise mechanism by which subjective states are experienced by the entity instead of simply existing as objective state correlates. This in turn means explaining the nature of all of subjective experience. The second is to explain the precise mechanism by which external inputs and internal states generate the experiences the entity has. Most of the "Well it's obvious and there's no problem here" positions rely on the fallacy that defining a complicated-enough objective correlate - such as the detailed state of a computer with some form of introspection - solves the problem. It doesn't. In fact it doesn't even begin to understand the problem. It's simply a statement of hope and faith with no empirical support that a complicated-enough state with enough introspection will somehow cross the border from automatic operation to sentient experience, just because it will, obviously.

kruasan 7y ago
> mechanism by which subjective states are experienced by the entity Why are you implying some kind of mental entity that "does the experiencing"?