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DoH moves the attack point to a different place - either between the recursive resolver and the authoritative servers, or (with DNSSEC) to the recursive resolve
by mindslight 7y ago
DoH moves the attack point to a different place - either between the recursive resolver and the authoritative servers, or (with DNSSEC) to the recursive resolver host itself. This is certainly a step up for security against malicious neighbors, but doesn't address malicious infrastructure.
- amluto 7y agoDoH with client-side DNSSEC validation would be nice. I don’t know whether the protocol supports this cleanly.
- tptacek 7y agoDoH moves the attack we're talking about to a place where the attack can't be carried out.
- mindslight 7y agoModifying DNS results can certainly be carried out ahead of or at the recursive resolver. DoH without DNSSEC means the results are modifiable by authoritative servers, recursive resolver, and any of the links between them. DNSSEC with a local recursive resolver prevents this. (Of course if you want privacy from your ISP, you then have to tunnel the recursive lookups through VPN(s)). If DoH is the best one can do, then do DoH. But it's wrong to shout down DNSSEC until an alternative method for authentication comes along.
- tptacek 7y agoThe same argument applies to DNSSEC: if the DNSSEC authority server is compromised, it can fake records, the same way your DNS recursor can fake records if it's compromised. If you do DoH across the path, at each step, DNSSEC does literally nothing, rather than practically nothing. Regardless: for the attack that we're discussing on this thread, DNSSEC is not relevant; or rather, this particular attack is a good illustration of how irrelevant DNSSEC is to realistic attack scenarios.
- topranks 7y agoThe DoH protocol is not designed to run “at each stage of the path.” Same things like DNScurve do that but somehow nobody got excited about that.
- tgragnato 7y agoDoT is already being used [https://engineering.fb.com/security/dns-over-tls/ https://engineering.fb.com/security/dns-over-tls/]. The value proposition of DoH is to "blend" in the HTTPS traffic. Not that DNSSEC is useless, but we should worry about tree validation AFTER having encoded every stage of the path.
- mindslight 7y agoI wasn't aware that DoH was currently being touted for authoritative servers as well. So, comparing the best possible adoptions of each protocol to each other on their unique strengths: 1. DNSSEC (with clients doing full recursive lookups, ofc) is able to have zones signed off of the authoritative server, meaning a compromise of the authoritative server isn't an attack point. 2. With the client performing full recursive lookups themselves, DoH provides partial query privacy. 3. With the client delegating to a trusted third party (eg Mozilla), DoH provides full query privacy modulo that trusted third party (the TTP can break both privacy and integrity) Comparing (2) to (1) I do see your argument much better now. However, DNSSEC still has the property of E2E validation that can be used for more than what current software does. One could write a resolver that shipped records laterally between peers to extend its privacy properties beyond either DoH setup. Adopting this wouldn't require all the authoritative servers to get on board, just a community of end-users. This is where my argument is coming from, especially with DoH meaning (3) to most users and the general course of what happens to trusted third parties.
- tptacek 7y agoIn reality, DNSSEC signers are online, and need to be, because the way you keep DNSSEC from revealing the full contents of your zone is to dynamically inject signed "whitelies" responses to queries. That, and then just the dramatic extra ops burden of keeping offline signing keys, means that the realistic real-world deployment of DNSSEC is, like that of TLS, based on online keys. DNSSEC does not have E2E validation. DNSSEC is validated between the recursive cache server and the authority server. The protocol explicitly delegates validation away from endpoints with the AD bit. You can run a full resolver on your laptop the same way you can run a full-feed defaultless BGP4 peer on your laptop; it'll "work fine", but that's simply not how it's deployed in reality. Another dramatic difference between DNSSEC and DoH is that DoH works whether or not zones sign (a tiny portion of the zones people actually make queries on are actually signed). Nobody needs "permission" to protect their queries with DoH, but everyone has to cooperate to make DNSSEC work. Since the value DNSSEC provides is made more marginal with each passing quarter --- because of MTA-STS, because of multi-perspective CA DNS validation, because of DoH, because of LetsEncrypt making X.509 certificates free, because of certificate transparency --- the rationale for its continued deployment has become extremely thin. It's 1990s cryptography --- queries aren't even encrypted! --- that people are advocating we forklift into the Internet to solve... it's hard to see what problem? A better plan would be to take DNSSEC back to the drawing board and come up with a modern alternative to it. DNSSEC itself is a failed protocol.