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Fedora has a prototype: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Default_Local_DNS_Resolver https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Default_Local_DNS_Res... I ra
by amluto 7y ago
Fedora has a prototype:
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Default_Local_DNS_Resolver https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Default_Local_DNS_Res...
I ran it for a while. It was problematic from a UI perspective (nothing to do with DNSSEC per se — it was just immature), and it wasn’t fantastic with captive portals.
Also, it noticed that I visited an internet connection where the ISP was hijacking google.com. So it worked!
- tptacek 7y agoSo by "actual high quality DNSSEC implementation", you mean one that exists only in prototype form for desktop Linux users.
- amluto 7y agoI’m saying this should be done, not that it is done. The AD bit is garbage.
- tptacek 7y agoDoH actually addresses this attack, directly, regardless of whether the affected name is in a signed zone (most queried names aren't!), and it actually works on mainstream operating systems. Why would anyone waste even a moment with DNSSEC?
- mindslight 7y agoDoH moves the attack point to a different place - either between the recursive resolver and the authoritative servers, or (with DNSSEC) to the recursive resolver host itself. This is certainly a step up for security against malicious neighbors, but doesn't address malicious infrastructure.
- amluto 7y agoDoH with client-side DNSSEC validation would be nice. I don’t know whether the protocol supports this cleanly.
- tptacek 7y agoDoH moves the attack we're talking about to a place where the attack can't be carried out.
- mindslight 7y agoModifying DNS results can certainly be carried out ahead of or at the recursive resolver. DoH without DNSSEC means the results are modifiable by authoritative servers, recursive resolver, and any of the links between them. DNSSEC with a local recursive resolver prevents this. (Of course if you want privacy from your ISP, you then have to tunnel the recursive lookups through VPN(s)). If DoH is the best one can do, then do DoH. But it's wrong to shout down DNSSEC until an alternative method for authentication comes along.
- tptacek 7y agoThe same argument applies to DNSSEC: if the DNSSEC authority server is compromised, it can fake records, the same way your DNS recursor can fake records if it's compromised. If you do DoH across the path, at each step, DNSSEC does literally nothing, rather than practically nothing. Regardless: for the attack that we're discussing on this thread, DNSSEC is not relevant; or rather, this particular attack is a good illustration of how irrelevant DNSSEC is to realistic attack scenarios.
- topranks 7y agoThe DoH protocol is not designed to run “at each stage of the path.” Same things like DNScurve do that but somehow nobody got excited about that.
- tgragnato 7y agoDoT is already being used [https://engineering.fb.com/security/dns-over-tls/ https://engineering.fb.com/security/dns-over-tls/]. The value proposition of DoH is to "blend" in the HTTPS traffic. Not that DNSSEC is useless, but we should worry about tree validation AFTER having encoded every stage of the path.
- topranks 7y agoDoH doesn’t even attempt to address DNS tree validation, which is what DNSSEC does. The two are complimentary.
- tptacek 7y agoThey're complimentary in that one of them does something useful and directly addresses a real ongoing threat, and the other doesn't. It's true, those aren't the same things.