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> I mean, if Wittgenstein and Gödel haven't already hollowed out the possibility that language could have some innate non-information-theoretic meaning... Can

> I mean, if Wittgenstein and Gödel haven't already hollowed out the possibility that language could have some innate non-information-theoretic meaning... Can't unpack this. > For those who aren't really aware of what's going on, right now the bedrock of science is mathematics, and the hardest science is physics, and both are fully information-theoretic. "it from bit" theories are not just common, but fully compatible with our ways of looking at the world. Never know what is meant by bedrock (or foundation) in these cases and I can never understand the reductive desire to swap philosophy out for science and to single out physics as the go-to science. Is is incorrect to call Floridi's work an "it from bit" theory, if that's what you're doing. See my longer response elsewhere here. > In order to transcend information theory, one would have to abandon mathematics, and probably abandon logic as well. This more or less closes the door to a lot of the gibbering low-quality metaphysical pandering that is common in philosophical foundations. Another way of putting it is that, just like with empiricism and science, we have realized in mathematics a way to move forward, and that movement forward is creating pseudologic, in the same way that empiricism highlights pseudoscience. Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. Information theory and the Philosophy of Information are distintc though tangential subjects. >> Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. ??? False equivalences and then an odd non-sequitur. > As a final note, who are we to deny that life is informational? We're made of DNA and RNA, of proteins and cellular messages, of neuronal configurations and connectomes, and your entire reply is that it's uncomfortable to imagine. Nobody would deny that. Life is order from chaos (struggling against the tyranny of entropy), that order is information-bearing, we are information processing beings, as are our digital offspring.

lidHanteyk 7y ago
Okay, let's try again. We're talking about information theory, a hard science. Specifically, information theory is a subfield of computer science, itself a subfield of mathematics. To say that information theory is a hard science, then, is actually to tell a slight lie, because mathematics is harder than the sciences: Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses. I can't quite read Floridi's work (I'm not paying for books when there is a digital commons in need of enrichment), but after reading a few abstracts and a few passages, I've got a gist. You're right that Floridi isn't it-from-bit, and that's something of a problem, since it-from-bit reasoning is so solid and useful in quantum mechanics and computer science. Floridi's definitions are contrasted with others at Wikipedia. [0] Shannon's definitions are empty, but he at least gave us some maths and a strong connection to thermodynamics and computer science. My main problem with Floridi's definition is that it doesn't give a strong clear way to tell what lack of information is like. For example, it is well-known physics folklore that electrons are hard to tell apart. To be pedantic, there does not exist any information which would allow an observer to distinguish electrons, beyond their basic identifying information (momenta and spin). How would Floridi explain the physical idea that such information cannot exist? Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory. You may need the assistance of an old lemma which reminds us that mathematical abstracta cannot possibly be physical. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Definitions_of_%22information%22 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Defi... [1] https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf
- igravious 7y ago
  To repeat: Information theory and the Philosophy of Information are distinct though tangential subjects. So everything you've written here is more or less irrelevant to the main topic of this entire post :- The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design That being said, I'll correct a few of your conceptual errors. Information theory is a formal science, not a hard science. Information theory is a subfield of mathematics directly, not a subfield of computer science (I would have thought). > because mathematics is harder than the sciences Nonsensical > Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses. So what? > I can't quite read Floridi's work […] I've got a gist. Respectfully, I'm not sure do, and I'm even less sure why you feel the need to comment. > Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory. Pointlessly reductive, and probably nonsensical.
  - lidHanteyk 7y ago
    I don't need to comment, and neither do you. We're both just silly people talking about things that we don't understand, because our egos won't let us not say anything. You think that, because I haven't read what you've read, your understanding exceeds mine. But I also think the same way; I think that you don't grok some important mathematical concepts. So which of us is right? It sounds like your mind is still pretty small. Let's try one single exercise from one of my "pointlessly reductive" points: Since every formal logic can be expressed in the language of category/topos theory, and topos theory can express the plumbing of modern mathematics, and since the formalization of logic is itself mathematical, we have that logic is mathematics; that is, that any logical expression corresponds to a categorical expression and is fully mathematical. Making sense yet? At some point, philosophers need to study maths sincerely; the stereotype that they know nothing but Bayes is painfully on display today. You skipped entirely over my question about electrons and information. Moreover, you admit that science needs maths. I'm going to take these as a complete concession. Thanks for playing Orange Site. Finally, as a bonus, here's a metric for hardness in the sciences. A theory is harder when it predicts more. But theories always predict infinitely many things, and really we want to know how accurate a prediction is. And a theory is harder when it is smaller; that's Occam's Razor. So we'll take the sum of (the squares of) inaccuracies over all predictions, and scale it by opposite of (the logarithm of) the size of the theory. Of course, we'll have to use bits to measure both the accuracy of predictions and the size of the theory. This may remind you of certain equations in thermodynamics or statistics.

lidHanteyk 7y ago

Okay, let's try again. We're talking about information theory, a hard science. Specifically, information theory is a subfield of computer science, itself a subfield of mathematics. To say that information theory is a hard science, then, is actually to tell a slight lie, because mathematics is harder than the sciences: Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses. I can't quite read Floridi's work (I'm not paying for books when there is a digital commons in need of enrichment), but after reading a few abstracts and a few passages, I've got a gist. You're right that Floridi isn't it-from-bit, and that's something of a problem, since it-from-bit reasoning is so solid and useful in quantum mechanics and computer science. Floridi's definitions are contrasted with others at Wikipedia. [0] Shannon's definitions are empty, but he at least gave us some maths and a strong connection to thermodynamics and computer science. My main problem with Floridi's definition is that it doesn't give a strong clear way to tell what lack of information is like. For example, it is well-known physics folklore that electrons are hard to tell apart. To be pedantic, there does not exist any information which would allow an observer to distinguish electrons, beyond their basic identifying information (momenta and spin). How would Floridi explain the physical idea that such information cannot exist? Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory. You may need the assistance of an old lemma which reminds us that mathematical abstracta cannot possibly be physical. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Definitions_of_%22information%22 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Defi... [1] https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf

igravious 7y ago
To repeat: Information theory and the Philosophy of Information are distinct though tangential subjects. So everything you've written here is more or less irrelevant to the main topic of this entire post :- The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design That being said, I'll correct a few of your conceptual errors. Information theory is a formal science, not a hard science. Information theory is a subfield of mathematics directly, not a subfield of computer science (I would have thought). > because mathematics is harder than the sciences Nonsensical > Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses. So what? > I can't quite read Floridi's work […] I've got a gist. Respectfully, I'm not sure do, and I'm even less sure why you feel the need to comment. > Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory. Pointlessly reductive, and probably nonsensical.
- lidHanteyk 7y ago
  I don't need to comment, and neither do you. We're both just silly people talking about things that we don't understand, because our egos won't let us not say anything. You think that, because I haven't read what you've read, your understanding exceeds mine. But I also think the same way; I think that you don't grok some important mathematical concepts. So which of us is right? It sounds like your mind is still pretty small. Let's try one single exercise from one of my "pointlessly reductive" points: Since every formal logic can be expressed in the language of category/topos theory, and topos theory can express the plumbing of modern mathematics, and since the formalization of logic is itself mathematical, we have that logic is mathematics; that is, that any logical expression corresponds to a categorical expression and is fully mathematical. Making sense yet? At some point, philosophers need to study maths sincerely; the stereotype that they know nothing but Bayes is painfully on display today. You skipped entirely over my question about electrons and information. Moreover, you admit that science needs maths. I'm going to take these as a complete concession. Thanks for playing Orange Site. Finally, as a bonus, here's a metric for hardness in the sciences. A theory is harder when it predicts more. But theories always predict infinitely many things, and really we want to know how accurate a prediction is. And a theory is harder when it is smaller; that's Occam's Razor. So we'll take the sum of (the squares of) inaccuracies over all predictions, and scale it by opposite of (the logarithm of) the size of the theory. Of course, we'll have to use bits to measure both the accuracy of predictions and the size of the theory. This may remind you of certain equations in thermodynamics or statistics.