4 ms·

Huh, I wonder how the OpenBSD team will regard this one. I'm unfamiliar with exactly how to tell what's in the base system and what's in ports, but I can see o

Huh, I wonder how the OpenBSD team will regard this one. I'm unfamiliar with exactly how to tell what's in the base system and what's in ports, but I can see openvpn* entries over at http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.6/packages/amd64/ http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.6/packages/amd64/ - does that mean there's arguably a hole in the base distro? In any case, nice work. Question. Besides randomizing packet lengths (preferably with minimum and maximum tunables (per each packet type) that each site can change, to further add entropy), what else can be done to mitigate against this family of attack? Asking as someone interested in developing "ubiquitous secure container" type protocols that are application- and use-case-specific but (theoretically) high-stakes.

colmmacc 7y ago
Best practice for preventing traffic analysis is to send encrypted messages of a constant size, at a constant rate. It's better to pad to a max size, than to randomize the packet length. Sending at a constant rate may not always be feasible or cost-effective, but it can still be useful to send data at a constant rate for a minimum block of time.
- zzzcpan 7y ago
  It's just easy to implement constant rate, hence why it's best practice. But adaptive rate might be ok, like, for example, if you only pick from 4 different rates and adapt exactly every second, you only leak 2 bits of information per second. The question then becomes which leaking rate is safe enough in practice?
  - colmmacc 7y ago
    constant max rate tends not to be practical in remote roaming VPNs for cost and contention reasons. It would blast through typical mobile usage rates, for example, or get you throttled on a shared wifi network.
- GhettoMaestro 7y ago
  Ya - the NSA calls this "LINK MASKING". Makes a communication channel look busy 100% of the time at at predefined bit rate. Pretty much worthless to traffic analysis, at the cost of burning extra bits on the wire when not actually sending traffic. Mostly only used in Military applications, and specifically where you think an advanced adversary is going to do things like traffic analysis, etc.
asveikau 7y ago
> I'm unfamiliar with exactly how to tell what's in the base system and what's in ports, but I can see openvpn* entries over at http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.6/packages/amd64/ http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.6/packages/amd64/ - does that mean there's arguably a hole in the base distro? Packages are built from the ports tree.
jlgaddis 7y ago
> does that mean there's arguably a hole in the base distro? No, any packages you see there are, by definition, not part of the base install. They are extra packages you can install later.
- exikyut 7y ago
  Ah, I see. So it's part of the package collection, not the ports tree, but it's not installed by default. Hence the "only two holes in a default install". Heh. Nice. Thanks.

colmmacc 7y ago

Best practice for preventing traffic analysis is to send encrypted messages of a constant size, at a constant rate. It's better to pad to a max size, than to randomize the packet length. Sending at a constant rate may not always be feasible or cost-effective, but it can still be useful to send data at a constant rate for a minimum block of time.

zzzcpan 7y ago
It's just easy to implement constant rate, hence why it's best practice. But adaptive rate might be ok, like, for example, if you only pick from 4 different rates and adapt exactly every second, you only leak 2 bits of information per second. The question then becomes which leaking rate is safe enough in practice?
- colmmacc 7y ago
  constant max rate tends not to be practical in remote roaming VPNs for cost and contention reasons. It would blast through typical mobile usage rates, for example, or get you throttled on a shared wifi network.
GhettoMaestro 7y ago
Ya - the NSA calls this "LINK MASKING". Makes a communication channel look busy 100% of the time at at predefined bit rate. Pretty much worthless to traffic analysis, at the cost of burning extra bits on the wire when not actually sending traffic. Mostly only used in Military applications, and specifically where you think an advanced adversary is going to do things like traffic analysis, etc.

asveikau 7y ago

> I'm unfamiliar with exactly how to tell what's in the base system and what's in ports, but I can see openvpn* entries over at http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.6/packages/amd64/ http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/6.6/packages/amd64/ - does that mean there's arguably a hole in the base distro? Packages are built from the ports tree.

jlgaddis 7y ago

> does that mean there's arguably a hole in the base distro? No, any packages you see there are, by definition, not part of the base install. They are extra packages you can install later.

exikyut 7y ago
Ah, I see. So it's part of the package collection, not the ports tree, but it's not installed by default. Hence the "only two holes in a default install". Heh. Nice. Thanks.