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I mean, if Wittgenstein and Gödel haven't already hollowed out the possibility that language could have some innate non-information-theoretic meaning... For th

I mean, if Wittgenstein and Gödel haven't already hollowed out the possibility that language could have some innate non-information-theoretic meaning... For those who aren't really aware of what's going on, right now the bedrock of science is mathematics, and the hardest science is physics, and both are fully information-theoretic. "it from bit" theories are not just common, but fully compatible with our ways of looking at the world. In order to transcend information theory, one would have to abandon mathematics, and probably abandon logic as well. This more or less closes the door to a lot of the gibbering low-quality metaphysical pandering that is common in philosophical foundations. Another way of putting it is that, just like with empiricism and science, we have realized in mathematics a way to move forward, and that movement forward is creating pseudologic, in the same way that empiricism highlights pseudoscience. Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. As a final note, who are we to deny that life is informational? We're made of DNA and RNA, of proteins and cellular messages, of neuronal configurations and connectomes, and your entire reply is that it's uncomfortable to imagine.

trevyn 7y ago
Indeed; I think that it is a really big clue that certain thoughts are “uncomfortable to imagine”.
ukj 7y ago
The bedrock of science is not Mathematics - it's Formal Language Theory (FLT)[1] (but to be fair, this may be a semantic distinction). FLT is closer to Computer Science than Mathematics for one simple reason - Time. The concept of Time doesn't exist in the Mathematical universe, while computer scientists obsess with time-complexity. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_grammar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_grammar
xamuel 7y ago
Wittgenstein and Gödel didn't have the advantage of knowing about mirror neurons [1], which have at least some potential to shoot some life back into the idea of at least some sense of innate information-theoretic meaning in language. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron
igravious 7y ago
> I mean, if Wittgenstein and Gödel haven't already hollowed out the possibility that language could have some innate non-information-theoretic meaning... Can't unpack this. > For those who aren't really aware of what's going on, right now the bedrock of science is mathematics, and the hardest science is physics, and both are fully information-theoretic. "it from bit" theories are not just common, but fully compatible with our ways of looking at the world. Never know what is meant by bedrock (or foundation) in these cases and I can never understand the reductive desire to swap philosophy out for science and to single out physics as the go-to science. Is is incorrect to call Floridi's work an "it from bit" theory, if that's what you're doing. See my longer response elsewhere here. > In order to transcend information theory, one would have to abandon mathematics, and probably abandon logic as well. This more or less closes the door to a lot of the gibbering low-quality metaphysical pandering that is common in philosophical foundations. Another way of putting it is that, just like with empiricism and science, we have realized in mathematics a way to move forward, and that movement forward is creating pseudologic, in the same way that empiricism highlights pseudoscience. Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. Information theory and the Philosophy of Information are distintc though tangential subjects. >> Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. ??? False equivalences and then an odd non-sequitur. > As a final note, who are we to deny that life is informational? We're made of DNA and RNA, of proteins and cellular messages, of neuronal configurations and connectomes, and your entire reply is that it's uncomfortable to imagine. Nobody would deny that. Life is order from chaos (struggling against the tyranny of entropy), that order is information-bearing, we are information processing beings, as are our digital offspring.
- lidHanteyk 7y ago
  Okay, let's try again. We're talking about information theory, a hard science. Specifically, information theory is a subfield of computer science, itself a subfield of mathematics. To say that information theory is a hard science, then, is actually to tell a slight lie, because mathematics is harder than the sciences: Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses. I can't quite read Floridi's work (I'm not paying for books when there is a digital commons in need of enrichment), but after reading a few abstracts and a few passages, I've got a gist. You're right that Floridi isn't it-from-bit, and that's something of a problem, since it-from-bit reasoning is so solid and useful in quantum mechanics and computer science. Floridi's definitions are contrasted with others at Wikipedia. [0] Shannon's definitions are empty, but he at least gave us some maths and a strong connection to thermodynamics and computer science. My main problem with Floridi's definition is that it doesn't give a strong clear way to tell what lack of information is like. For example, it is well-known physics folklore that electrons are hard to tell apart. To be pedantic, there does not exist any information which would allow an observer to distinguish electrons, beyond their basic identifying information (momenta and spin). How would Floridi explain the physical idea that such information cannot exist? Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory. You may need the assistance of an old lemma which reminds us that mathematical abstracta cannot possibly be physical. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Definitions_of_%22information%22 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Defi... [1] https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf

trevyn 7y ago

Indeed; I think that it is a really big clue that certain thoughts are “uncomfortable to imagine”.

ukj 7y ago

The bedrock of science is not Mathematics - it's Formal Language Theory (FLT)[1] (but to be fair, this may be a semantic distinction). FLT is closer to Computer Science than Mathematics for one simple reason - Time. The concept of Time doesn't exist in the Mathematical universe, while computer scientists obsess with time-complexity. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_grammar https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_grammar

xamuel 7y ago

Wittgenstein and Gödel didn't have the advantage of knowing about mirror neurons [1], which have at least some potential to shoot some life back into the idea of at least some sense of innate information-theoretic meaning in language. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_neuron

igravious 7y ago

> I mean, if Wittgenstein and Gödel haven't already hollowed out the possibility that language could have some innate non-information-theoretic meaning... Can't unpack this. > For those who aren't really aware of what's going on, right now the bedrock of science is mathematics, and the hardest science is physics, and both are fully information-theoretic. "it from bit" theories are not just common, but fully compatible with our ways of looking at the world. Never know what is meant by bedrock (or foundation) in these cases and I can never understand the reductive desire to swap philosophy out for science and to single out physics as the go-to science. Is is incorrect to call Floridi's work an "it from bit" theory, if that's what you're doing. See my longer response elsewhere here. > In order to transcend information theory, one would have to abandon mathematics, and probably abandon logic as well. This more or less closes the door to a lot of the gibbering low-quality metaphysical pandering that is common in philosophical foundations. Another way of putting it is that, just like with empiricism and science, we have realized in mathematics a way to move forward, and that movement forward is creating pseudologic, in the same way that empiricism highlights pseudoscience. Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. Information theory and the Philosophy of Information are distintc though tangential subjects. >> Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent. ??? False equivalences and then an odd non-sequitur. > As a final note, who are we to deny that life is informational? We're made of DNA and RNA, of proteins and cellular messages, of neuronal configurations and connectomes, and your entire reply is that it's uncomfortable to imagine. Nobody would deny that. Life is order from chaos (struggling against the tyranny of entropy), that order is information-bearing, we are information processing beings, as are our digital offspring.

lidHanteyk 7y ago
Okay, let's try again. We're talking about information theory, a hard science. Specifically, information theory is a subfield of computer science, itself a subfield of mathematics. To say that information theory is a hard science, then, is actually to tell a slight lie, because mathematics is harder than the sciences: Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses. I can't quite read Floridi's work (I'm not paying for books when there is a digital commons in need of enrichment), but after reading a few abstracts and a few passages, I've got a gist. You're right that Floridi isn't it-from-bit, and that's something of a problem, since it-from-bit reasoning is so solid and useful in quantum mechanics and computer science. Floridi's definitions are contrasted with others at Wikipedia. [0] Shannon's definitions are empty, but he at least gave us some maths and a strong connection to thermodynamics and computer science. My main problem with Floridi's definition is that it doesn't give a strong clear way to tell what lack of information is like. For example, it is well-known physics folklore that electrons are hard to tell apart. To be pedantic, there does not exist any information which would allow an observer to distinguish electrons, beyond their basic identifying information (momenta and spin). How would Floridi explain the physical idea that such information cannot exist? Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory. You may need the assistance of an old lemma which reminds us that mathematical abstracta cannot possibly be physical. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Definitions_of_%22information%22 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Defi... [1] https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf https://philpapers.org/archive/ALVLIM-3.pdf