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> The first aspect that you mention is actually not a disagreement but the whole point of his message - the recently popularized demonstrations of "quantum supr
by jessriedel 7y ago
> The first aspect that you mention is actually not a disagreement but the whole point of his message - the recently popularized demonstrations of "quantum supremacy" did not allow for universal programmability, but instead were more comparable to an experimental setup for a particular problem of how do atoms behave in that setup.
Where does Wilczek claim that? The only sentence I can see where he arguably comments on the programmability of Google's device is "the computation that Sycamore performed is very specialized". But this is before he brings up the carbon example, and he never says the programmability of Sycamore is comparable to the programmability of carbon.
Indeed, Sycamore is programable. It's obviously not capable of arbitrary-length computations, because the noise level is too high to be fault tolerant, but it has a certain accessible state space in which it can be arbitrarily configured. Here's Scott Aaronson if you don't believe me (emphasis mine):
> [Question:] Even so, there are countless examples of materials and chemical reactions that are hard to classically simulate, as well as special-purpose quantum simulators (like those of Lukin’s group at Harvard). Why don’t these already count as quantum computational supremacy?
> [Answer:] Under some people’s definitions of “quantum computational supremacy,” they do! The key difference with Google’s effort is that they have a fully programmable device—one that you can program with an arbitrary sequence of nearest-neighbor 2-qubit gates, just by sending the appropriate signals from your classical computer.
> In other words, it’s no longer open to the QC skeptics to sneer that, sure, there are quantum systems that are hard to simulate classically, but that’s just because nature is hard to simulate, and you don’t get to arbitrarily redefine whatever random chemical you find in the wild to be a “computer for simulating itself.” Under any sane definition, the superconducting devices that Google, IBM, and others are now building are indeed “computers.”
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4317 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4317
Therefore, I think abdullahkhalids's interpretation is right: Wilczek's carbon analogy is inapplicable.
- perl4ever 7y agoDevil's advocate: if you make a computerized system for generating a lot of similar atomic arrangements with random variations, then can't you call the process of placing the atoms "programming"? The more I think about the distinction people are drawing, the fuzzier it gets in my mind.
- jessriedel 7y agoYes, as long as you can achieve a complete gate set (over some N-qubit logical subspace) by arranging the atoms, and as long as the computation and read-out is reliable enough to get results, I think that's literally what it means to build a computer. (To formalize this, more needs to be said in terms of what the gate set is and how reliable it needs to be, but I think that's the basic idea.)