3 ms·
This reminds me of (I think) Richard Feynman's comment about the Challenger, to the effect that when the o-rings were eroded by 1/3 or whatever, they called tha
by perl4ever 7y ago
This reminds me of (I think) Richard Feynman's comment about the Challenger, to the effect that when the o-rings were eroded by 1/3 or whatever, they called that a safety factor of 3, whereas they should have stopped and said "wait, it wasn't supposed to do that at all, something is seriously wrong".
I'm not sure if it was him or someone else that pointed out when you do a post-mortem on a disaster, you generally find a history of near-misses, but people don't take near-misses as seriously as they should.
- michelpp 7y agoYou're right, it was part of his opinion filed with the Rogers Commission: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report#Role_of_Richard_Feynman https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report#Role_...
- typhonic 7y agoThe book Apollo by Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox shows a similar concept. In the investigation after the fire in Apollo 1, they found many possible near misses. But when each of those items did not lead to a failure, they became accepted. They poor designs or installations were allowed to slide and the accumulation of trouble spots kept increasing.