4 ms·

This bothers me because it pretends that it's railing against an unenlightened status quo, and it isn't. Philosophers of physics considered, and largely rejecte

by lg 18y ago

This bothers me because it pretends that it's railing against an unenlightened status quo, and it isn't. Philosophers of physics considered, and largely rejected, the many-worlds interpretation because, if quantum events result in every possible outcome occurring in some world, and our consciousness ends up in one of them by some chancy process, then there's no reason why we observe some events with higher probabilities than others. But we do, and many-worlds doesn't explain that. The author talks around this by saying that, yes, these probabilities are very mysterious, indeed. Well, there are other interpretations under which they're not. Such as a) the many flavors of GRW (a collapse theory), b) the bohmian interpretation (waves + particles), and c) the many-minds interpretation (anti-realist and therefore the most out-there of the three). Those are all pretty much consistent with QM, or there's a good reason to believe that they'll be beaten into a form that is so consistent (e.g. tumulka's relativized version of GRW-flash, but that's outside the scope of a HN comment).

rms 18y ago
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation
- lg 18y ago
  Well, I mentioned many-minds because a couple guys actually do take it seriously, even though most don't. But I think this entry is a little off when they say that many-minds "extends" many-worlds. On the many-minds theory, there's only one world, which is pretty different on the face of it. And since there are an infinite number of minds, if you get an 80-20 likelihood on values of some observable, then 80% of your minds will go to one and 20% to the other, which is very different from how many-worlds approaches splitting on outcomes.
hhm 18y ago
I don't know much about this, but wouldn't it be a lot more probable to be in a world of those many where the probabilities of events are distributed in a reasonable way, than to be in another world where the distribution of probabilities is out of the standard? (that is, there are many possible time lines, but the distribution of probabilities would indicate that there would be a lot more time lines for probable events, than for improbable events, so it's easier for us to be in a probable time line than in an improbable one). Or am I understanding something wrong? (Sorry for my English, I'm not a native English speaker)
- lg 18y ago
  The problem with many-worlds is that there aren't more timelines for probable events. If every outcome occurs in some world, then for some event with two possible outcomes, there ends up being two of you; say, Lefty and Righty, one in each world. So there's no sense in saying "I'll probably end up being Lefty, since his outcome was more reasonable," because you'll end up being both of them.
  - hhm 18y ago
    But I'm conscious of only one of only being Lefty, or not? If that's true, then for me at least, that behaves like a separate timeline of all others. That's what I meant in the post above: we are only conscious on what happens on a very reasonable timeline. Can this be like this?
    - lg 18y ago
      right, but Righty is conscious of being Righty, and if his outcome was highly unlikely, then he must be wondering why his world is so unreasonable. And since he's just as much you as Lefty is, post-event, it's not true that you're only conscious of what happens on a reasonable timeline.
      - hhm 18y ago
        But... Righty could ask why his world is unreasonable, but actually, being Righty is very improbable, so if we find the world to be actually very reasonable, it's because it's more probable to be Lefty than to be Right. Whether if Lefty and Righty are the same conscious mind or two different minds, I guess that's more of a philosophycal question.
        lg 18y ago
        If something is probable, you have to ask what makes it probable. We measure quantum probabilities by the number of times a given experiment yields a given outcome. Say there's an observable and when you measure it, outcome Lefty happens 90% of the time and outcome Righty happens 10% of the time. On MW, both of those happen, and 2 conscious beings result. What makes "being Lefty" more probable? Are there more Lefties than Righties? Or will outcome Lefty happen more often than outcome Righty? The answer to both is no, you get two every time. They're two conscious minds, but both continuous with the old you in the same way.

by lg 18y ago

rms 18y ago

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation

lg 18y ago
Well, I mentioned many-minds because a couple guys actually do take it seriously, even though most don't. But I think this entry is a little off when they say that many-minds "extends" many-worlds. On the many-minds theory, there's only one world, which is pretty different on the face of it. And since there are an infinite number of minds, if you get an 80-20 likelihood on values of some observable, then 80% of your minds will go to one and 20% to the other, which is very different from how many-worlds approaches splitting on outcomes.

hhm 18y ago

I don't know much about this, but wouldn't it be a lot more probable to be in a world of those many where the probabilities of events are distributed in a reasonable way, than to be in another world where the distribution of probabilities is out of the standard? (that is, there are many possible time lines, but the distribution of probabilities would indicate that there would be a lot more time lines for probable events, than for improbable events, so it's easier for us to be in a probable time line than in an improbable one). Or am I understanding something wrong? (Sorry for my English, I'm not a native English speaker)

lg 18y ago
The problem with many-worlds is that there aren't more timelines for probable events. If every outcome occurs in some world, then for some event with two possible outcomes, there ends up being two of you; say, Lefty and Righty, one in each world. So there's no sense in saying "I'll probably end up being Lefty, since his outcome was more reasonable," because you'll end up being both of them.
- hhm 18y ago
  But I'm conscious of only one of only being Lefty, or not? If that's true, then for me at least, that behaves like a separate timeline of all others. That's what I meant in the post above: we are only conscious on what happens on a very reasonable timeline. Can this be like this?
  - lg 18y ago
    right, but Righty is conscious of being Righty, and if his outcome was highly unlikely, then he must be wondering why his world is so unreasonable. And since he's just as much you as Lefty is, post-event, it's not true that you're only conscious of what happens on a reasonable timeline.
    - hhm 18y ago
      But... Righty could ask why his world is unreasonable, but actually, being Righty is very improbable, so if we find the world to be actually very reasonable, it's because it's more probable to be Lefty than to be Right. Whether if Lefty and Righty are the same conscious mind or two different minds, I guess that's more of a philosophycal question.
      - lg 18y ago
        If something is probable, you have to ask what makes it probable. We measure quantum probabilities by the number of times a given experiment yields a given outcome. Say there's an observable and when you measure it, outcome Lefty happens 90% of the time and outcome Righty happens 10% of the time. On MW, both of those happen, and 2 conscious beings result. What makes "being Lefty" more probable? Are there more Lefties than Righties? Or will outcome Lefty happen more often than outcome Righty? The answer to both is no, you get two every time. They're two conscious minds, but both continuous with the old you in the same way.