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That is basically what Chalmers argues in "Facing up the problem of consciousness." Basically, by the general approximation theorem, it is possible to find a ne

by yk 7y ago

That is basically what Chalmers argues in "Facing up the problem of consciousness." Basically, by the general approximation theorem, it is possible to find a neural network that acts externally precisely as you would, up to an arbitrarily small epsilon. However, one wonders if such a thing would be consciousness and if so, where does the consciousness sit, in the matrix multiplication or the graphics card. So, you can argue something like our brains are nothing but curve fitting machine with enough parameters, but then you are probably forced to argue that consciousness is very closely related to computation, to the point were a coin flip, or a hello world program has some sliver of consciousness. There are of course two possible ways around that, either one can argue for p-zombies, that is intelligent but not conscious beings, which then seems to require a super natural explanation for consciousness. Or you can argue that the brain is different, and that this gives rise to consciousness, and to general intelligence, which is the explanation that at least corresponds most closely to my subjective experience (but that is precisely what a soulless machine would write, isn't it?)

joycian 7y ago
Why is it weird that simple programs have a sliver of consciousness? That seems like a nice practical, non-magic conclusion?
- yk 7y ago
  Actually I like that solution, but try to show it to any degree of scientific standard. You need to have a good working definition of consciousness, then you need some experimental procedure, etc. etc.
missosoup 7y ago
There's no need for a supernatural explanation of consciousness. We are all p-zombies. Problem solved. The longer we refuse to acknowledge that consciousness is nothing special, the longer it will take to tackle this topic. The only reason we cling to the idea that our minds are somehow special compared to other animals of various complexity is because we refuse to acknowledge that consciousness might exist in something we can't communicate with and that consciousness is a sliding scale rather than a binary property. Ascribing consciousness only to ourselves is hubris. If one spends a bit of time observing humans, they will inevitably realise that some humans are more 'conscious' than others also. tl;dr: we're all p-zombies. The fact that we think that each one of us isn't individually doesn't detract from that. Just as natural sciences left less and less hiding places for god to exist, ML is leaving less and less hiding places for this borderline magical version of human-unique consciousness to exist. Answering this question in any more detail requires a much more rigorous definition of consciousness which is a big can of worms in itself.
- youdontknowtho 7y ago
  I couldn't agree more. It also just seems like a continuation of the old story in science where the things that we think are special or magical just aren't.
- throwaway713 7y ago
  You make a strong claim without anything to back it up. I don’t understand why it’s become trendy to deny that consciousness exists; to me it’s isomorphic to saying “We don’t actually exist at all. Prove me wrong.” It’s a vacuous statement, meant to sound evocative, but difficult to respond to in any meaningful way. If I made a list of everything in order of how certain I am that the item on the list exists, consciousness would be at the top by far. Everything else could just be a nice illusion.
  - mattmcknight 7y ago
    You falsely imply that the parent comment attempts "to deny that consciousness exists". What the parent comment actually says is "consciousness is nothing special" and "consciousness is a sliding scale rather than a binary property". These are different from non-existence.
    - arbsn 7y ago
      p-zombies are not conscious, by definition.
      - missosoup 7y ago
        p-zombies can believe that they are though. Which circles back to 'consciousness is nothing special' rather than 'consciousness doesn't exist'. To put it another way, if AGI is computable, then we are all p-zombies. And evidence is starting to strongly hint that AGI is computable.
  - bermanoid 7y ago
    Claiming that some mysterious and hard to define property that we can't measure even in principle "exists" in some meaningful way strikes me as the stronger claim than the skeptical take does. Why do you think the burden of proof should be inverted? The mere fact that most humans intuitively feel "something" doesn't count for much of anything, especially once you stipulate that p-zombies would vote the same way.
youdontknowtho 7y ago
My exposure to these subjects has been limited, but the thing that I liked about Dan Dennets rebuttal to Chalmers is that it does away with the special-ness of consciousness. It is more likely that consciousness is just a property of brains inside bodies. The interesting question to me is the level of complexity of brain and body required to produce something like what we experience and what is it like in other arrangements of brains and bodies. I also don't know that intelligence is the great thing that we think it is. It's an adaptation. It's an adaptation that lots of other organisms survive just fine without.
degyves 7y ago
That depends of which precise definition of consciouness you're talking about, which is a flame wars research field. But it is a consensus that consciouness is not equal to inteligence.
- yk 7y ago
  Yes, that is why I tried to contrast consciousness with computations.
red75prime 7y ago
> hen you are probably forced to argue that consciousness is very closely related to computation, to the point were a coin flip, or a hello world program has some sliver of consciousness. Why not? Those things have zero-consciousness that is conscious only of itself and which correctly reflects their lack of self-model.
- yk 7y ago
  The argument is, if our brains are just a curve fitting machine, then we can dial in the complexity of the computation. Start with a single layer parameter, then two parameter, and so on until we are at the complexity of the brain. By that procedure, we can ask after each parameter, if the machine is now conscious, and I strongly doubt that there is a good answer.
  - danans 7y ago
    The way we ascribe consciousness to entities other than ourselves is based on similarity to ourselves. Obviously other living humans have the highest similarity, so they are automatically deemed conscious. Next are other primates, followed by other domesticated mammals, and other animals. Furthest from the status of conscious are creatures we see as automata like dung beetles rolling their food, or jellyfish ... jellyfishing. Presumably we'd apply a similar process to hypothetical AGIs.
  - Akababa 7y ago
    That's an ill-defined question. You can do the same thing with far less vague concepts than consciousness, and I could even ask you the same question about a brain and adding neurons. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox
visarga 7y ago
> it is possible to find a neural network that acts externally precisely as you would, up to an arbitrarily small epsilon. However, one wonders if such a thing would be consciousness and if so, where does the consciousness sit, in the matrix multiplication or the graphics card. I don't like very much this reverent way of thinking about consciousness, as if it is from another world, or a different essence. I believe consciousness is the ability of the agent to adapt to the environment in order to protect itself and maximise rewards. It's not just in the matrix multiplication, but in the embodiment, the environment-agent loop. Consciousness is not something that transcends the world and matrices, it's just a power to adapt and survive. And it feels like something because that feeling has a survival utility, so the agent has a whole neural network to model future possible rewards and actions, which impacts behaviour and outcomes.

by yk 7y ago

joycian 7y ago

Why is it weird that simple programs have a sliver of consciousness? That seems like a nice practical, non-magic conclusion?

yk 7y ago
Actually I like that solution, but try to show it to any degree of scientific standard. You need to have a good working definition of consciousness, then you need some experimental procedure, etc. etc.

missosoup 7y ago

There's no need for a supernatural explanation of consciousness. We are all p-zombies. Problem solved. The longer we refuse to acknowledge that consciousness is nothing special, the longer it will take to tackle this topic. The only reason we cling to the idea that our minds are somehow special compared to other animals of various complexity is because we refuse to acknowledge that consciousness might exist in something we can't communicate with and that consciousness is a sliding scale rather than a binary property. Ascribing consciousness only to ourselves is hubris. If one spends a bit of time observing humans, they will inevitably realise that some humans are more 'conscious' than others also. tl;dr: we're all p-zombies. The fact that we think that each one of us isn't individually doesn't detract from that. Just as natural sciences left less and less hiding places for god to exist, ML is leaving less and less hiding places for this borderline magical version of human-unique consciousness to exist. Answering this question in any more detail requires a much more rigorous definition of consciousness which is a big can of worms in itself.

youdontknowtho 7y ago
I couldn't agree more. It also just seems like a continuation of the old story in science where the things that we think are special or magical just aren't.
throwaway713 7y ago
You make a strong claim without anything to back it up. I don’t understand why it’s become trendy to deny that consciousness exists; to me it’s isomorphic to saying “We don’t actually exist at all. Prove me wrong.” It’s a vacuous statement, meant to sound evocative, but difficult to respond to in any meaningful way. If I made a list of everything in order of how certain I am that the item on the list exists, consciousness would be at the top by far. Everything else could just be a nice illusion.
- mattmcknight 7y ago
  You falsely imply that the parent comment attempts "to deny that consciousness exists". What the parent comment actually says is "consciousness is nothing special" and "consciousness is a sliding scale rather than a binary property". These are different from non-existence.
  - arbsn 7y ago
    p-zombies are not conscious, by definition.
    - missosoup 7y ago
      p-zombies can believe that they are though. Which circles back to 'consciousness is nothing special' rather than 'consciousness doesn't exist'. To put it another way, if AGI is computable, then we are all p-zombies. And evidence is starting to strongly hint that AGI is computable.
- bermanoid 7y ago
  Claiming that some mysterious and hard to define property that we can't measure even in principle "exists" in some meaningful way strikes me as the stronger claim than the skeptical take does. Why do you think the burden of proof should be inverted? The mere fact that most humans intuitively feel "something" doesn't count for much of anything, especially once you stipulate that p-zombies would vote the same way.

youdontknowtho 7y ago

My exposure to these subjects has been limited, but the thing that I liked about Dan Dennets rebuttal to Chalmers is that it does away with the special-ness of consciousness. It is more likely that consciousness is just a property of brains inside bodies. The interesting question to me is the level of complexity of brain and body required to produce something like what we experience and what is it like in other arrangements of brains and bodies. I also don't know that intelligence is the great thing that we think it is. It's an adaptation. It's an adaptation that lots of other organisms survive just fine without.

degyves 7y ago

That depends of which precise definition of consciouness you're talking about, which is a flame wars research field. But it is a consensus that consciouness is not equal to inteligence.

yk 7y ago
Yes, that is why I tried to contrast consciousness with computations.

red75prime 7y ago

> hen you are probably forced to argue that consciousness is very closely related to computation, to the point were a coin flip, or a hello world program has some sliver of consciousness. Why not? Those things have zero-consciousness that is conscious only of itself and which correctly reflects their lack of self-model.

yk 7y ago
The argument is, if our brains are just a curve fitting machine, then we can dial in the complexity of the computation. Start with a single layer parameter, then two parameter, and so on until we are at the complexity of the brain. By that procedure, we can ask after each parameter, if the machine is now conscious, and I strongly doubt that there is a good answer.
- danans 7y ago
  The way we ascribe consciousness to entities other than ourselves is based on similarity to ourselves. Obviously other living humans have the highest similarity, so they are automatically deemed conscious. Next are other primates, followed by other domesticated mammals, and other animals. Furthest from the status of conscious are creatures we see as automata like dung beetles rolling their food, or jellyfish ... jellyfishing. Presumably we'd apply a similar process to hypothetical AGIs.
- Akababa 7y ago
  That's an ill-defined question. You can do the same thing with far less vague concepts than consciousness, and I could even ask you the same question about a brain and adding neurons. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox

visarga 7y ago

> it is possible to find a neural network that acts externally precisely as you would, up to an arbitrarily small epsilon. However, one wonders if such a thing would be consciousness and if so, where does the consciousness sit, in the matrix multiplication or the graphics card. I don't like very much this reverent way of thinking about consciousness, as if it is from another world, or a different essence. I believe consciousness is the ability of the agent to adapt to the environment in order to protect itself and maximise rewards. It's not just in the matrix multiplication, but in the embodiment, the environment-agent loop. Consciousness is not something that transcends the world and matrices, it's just a power to adapt and survive. And it feels like something because that feeling has a survival utility, so the agent has a whole neural network to model future possible rewards and actions, which impacts behaviour and outcomes.